FRIEDRICH    NIETZSCHE 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE 

STATVE  BY   KLEIS 


NIETZSCHE 


AND    OTHER     EXPONENTS     OF 
INDIVIDUALISM 


BY 
PAUL  CARUS 


CHICAGO    ::  ::   ::    LONDON 

THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 

'l914 


COPYRIGHT  BY 

THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 
1914 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

ANTI-SCIENTIFIC  TENDENCIES  1 

DEUSSEN'S  RECOLLECTIONS  10 

EXTREME  NOMINALISM  17 

A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ORIGINALITY 32 

THE  OVERMAN 40 

ZARATHUSTRA    48 

A  PROTEST  AGAINST  HIMSELF 60 

NIETZSCHE'S  PREDECESSOR 74 

EGO-SOVEREIGNTY   92 

ANOTHER  NIETZSCHE 103 

NIETZSCHE'S  DISCIPLES  108 

THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  VALUATION 118 

INDIVIDUALISM    128 

CONCLUSION     142 

INDEX  . .  145 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE 


ANTI-SCIENTIFIC    TENDENCIES. 

"PHILOSOPHIES  are  world-conceptions  presenting 
-•-  three  main  features :  ( 1 )  A  systematic  comprehen- 
sion of  the  knowledge  of  their  age ;  (2)  An  emotional 
attitude  toward  the  cosmos;  and  (3)  A  principle  that 
will  serve  as  a  basis  for  rules  of  conduct.  The  first 
feature  determines  the  worth  of  the  several  philosoph- 
ical systems  in  the  history  of  mankind,  being  the  gist 
of  that  which  will  last,  and  giving  them  strength  and 
backbone.  The  second  one,  however,  appeals  power- 
fully to  the  sentiments  of  those  who  are  imbued  with 
the  same  spirit  and  thus  constitutes  its  immediate  ac- 
ceptability; while  the  ethics  of  a  philosophy  becomes 
the  test  by  which  its  use  and  practicability  can  be 
measured. 

The  author's  ideal  has  been  to  harmonize  these  three 
features  by  making  the  first  the  regulator  of  the  sec- 
ond and  a  safe  basis  of  the  third.  What  we  need  is 
truth;  our  fundamental  emotion  must  be  truthfulness, 
and  our  ethics  must  be  a  living  of  the  truth.  Truth  is 
not  something  that  we  can  fashion  according  to  our 


NIETZSCHE 

pleasure;  it  is  not  subjective;  its  very  nature  is  objec- 
tivity. But  we  must  render  it  subjective  by  a  love  of 
truth ;  we  must  make  it  our  own,  and  by  doing  so  our 
conduct  in  life  will  unfailingly  adjust  itself. 

Former  philosophies  made  the  subjective  element 
predominant,  and  thus  eyery  philosopher  worked  out 
a  philosophy  of  his  own,  endeavoring  to  be  individual 
and  original.  The  aim  of  our  own  philosophy  has  been 
to  reduce  the  subjective  to  its  proper  sphere,  and  to 
establish,  in  agreement  with  the  scientific  spirit  of  the 
age,  a  philosophy  of  objective  validity. 

It  is  a  well  known  experience  that  the  march  of  prog- 
ress does  not  advance  in  a  straight  line  but  proceeds 
in  epicycles.  Man  seems  to  tire  of  the  rigor  of  truth. 
From  time  to  time  he  wants  fiction.  A  strict  adher- 
ence to  exact  methods  becomes  monotonous  to  clever 
minds  lacking  the  power  of  concentration,  and  they 
gladly  hail  vagaries.  Truth,  they  claim,  is  relative, 
knowledge  mere  opinion,  and  poetry  had  better  re- 
place science.  Then  they  say:  Error,  be  thou  our 
guide ;  Error,  thou  art  a  liberator  from  the  tyranny  of 
truth.  Glory  be  to  Error ! 

Similar  retrograde  movements  take  place  from  time 
to  time  in  art.  Classical  taste  changes  with  romantic 
tendencies.  Goethe,  Schiller  and  Lessing  are  followed 
by  Schlegel  and  Tieck,  Mozart  and  Beethoven  by  Wag- 
ner. 

The  last  half-century  has  been  an  age  of  unprece- 
dented progress  in  science  and  we  would  expect  that 


ANTI-SCIENTIFIC   TENDENCIES 

with  all  the  wonderful  successes  and  triumphs  of  sci- 
entific invention  this  age  of  science  ought  to  find  its 
consummation  in  the  adoption  of  a  philosophy  of  sci- 
ence. But  no!  The  mass  of  mankind  is  weary  of 
science,  and  anti-scientific  tendencies  grow  up  like 
mushrooms,  finding  spokesmen  in  philosophers  like 
William  James  and  Henri  Bergson  who  have  the  ear 
of  large  masses,  proclaiming  the  superiority  of  sub- 
jectivism over  objectivism,  and  the  advantages  of  ani- 
mal instinct  over  human  reason. 

These  subjective  philosophies  if  considered  as  ex- 
pressions of  sentiment,  as  sentimental  attitudes  toward 
the  world,  as  poetical  effusions  of  a  semi-philosophical 
nature,  are  perfectly  legitimate  and  can  be  indulged  in 
as  well  as  the  several  religions  which  in  allegories 
attune  the  minds  of  their  followers  toward  the  All  of 
which  they  are  parts.  There  is  no  need  to  condemn 
arts  or  emotions  for  they  have  a  right  to  exist  just  as 
they  are. 

We  protest  against  subjectivism  in  philosophy  only 
when  it  denies  the  possibility  of  an  objective  philosophy. 
We  do  not  deny  that  the  masses  of  the  world  are  not, 
cannot  be  and  never  will  be  scientific  thinkers.  Science 
is  the  prerogative  of  the  few,  and  the  large  masses  of 
mankind  will  always  be  of  a  pragmatist  type.  If  the 
pragmatist  considered  himself  as  a  psychologist  pure 
and  simple  showing  how  the  majority  of  mankind 
argues,  how  people  are  influenced  by  their  own  inter- 
est and  how  their  thoughts  are  warped  by  what  they 


NIETZSCHE 

wish  the  facts  to  be,  pragmatism  would  be  a  commend- 
able branch  of  the  science  of  the  soul.  Pragmatism  ex- 
plains the  errors  of  philosophy  and  we  can  learn  much 
from  a  consideration  of  its  principles.  It  becomes 
objectionable  only  in  so  far  as  it  claims  to  be  phil- 
osophy in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word. 

The  name  philosophy  is  used  in  two  senses,  first 
as  we  defined  it  above,  as  a  world-conception  based 
upon  critically  sifted  knowledge;  and  secondly  it  is 
used  in  a  vague  general  sense  as  wisdom  in  the  prac- 
tical affairs  of  life.  And  if  pragmatism  claims  to  be 
a  philosophy  in  this  second  sense  it  ought  not  to  deny 
that  philosophy  as  a  science  is  possible. 

Philosophy  as  a  science  is  philosophy  par  excellence. 
It  is  the  only  philosophy  of  objective  validity.  All 
other  philosophies  are  effusions  of  subjective  points 
of  view,  of  attitudes,  of  sentiment.  But  we  must 
insist  that  these  two  contrasts  may  exist  side  by  side 
just  as  art  does  not  render  mathematics  supereroga- 
tory, and  as  a  physicist  who  in  his  profession  devotes 
himself  to  a  study  of  nature  according  to  methods  of 
an  objective  exactness  may  in  his  leisure  hours  paint 
a  Stimmungsbild  to  give  an  artistic  expression  to  a 
subjective  mood. 

This  world  is  not  merely  the  object  of  science.  There 
are  innumerable  tendencies  which  exist  and  have  a 
right  to  exist,  but  they  ought  not  to  banish  science, 
scientific  enquiry  and  scientific  ideals  from  the  place 
they  hold;  for  science  is  the  mariners'  compass  which 


ANTI-SCIENTIFIC   TENDENCIES 

guides  us  over  the  ocean  of  life,  and  though  the  major- 
ity of  the  passengers  do  not  and  need  not  worry  about 
it,  science  is  after  all  the  only  means  which  makes  for 
progress  and  lifts  mankind  to  higher  and  higher  levels. 

If  we  criticize  men  like  James  and  Bergson  and 
other  philosophers  of  subjectivism  we  do  it  as  a  de- 
fence of  the  indispensable  character  of  the  objectivity 
of  science  as  well  as  of  philosophy  as  a  science. 

James  and  Bergson  were  by  no  means  the  origina- 
tors of  their  method  of  philosophizing.  There  have 
been  many  sages  before  them  who  deemed  the  spec- 
tacles through  which  they  viewed  the  world  to  be  the 
most  important  or  even  the  only  significant  issue  of 
life's  problems.  The  Ionian  physicists  were  outdone 
by  the  sophists,  and  in  modern  times  Friedrich 
Nietzsche  expressed  the  most  sovereign  contempt  for 
science. 

Among  all  the  philosophies  of  modern  times  there  is 
perhaps  none  which  in  its  inmost  principle  is  more 
thoroughly  opposed  to  our  own  than  Nietzsche's,  and 
yet  there  are  some  points  of  mutual  contact  which  are 
well  worth  pointing  out.  The  problem  which  is  at  the 
basis  of  Nietzsche's  thought  is  the  same  as  in  our  phil- 
osophy, but  our  solution  is  radically  different  from  his. 

Friedrich  Nietzsche  is  a  philosopher  who  astonishes 
his  readers  by  the  boldness  with  which  he  rebels 
against  every  tradition,  tearing  down  the  holiest  and 
dearest  things,  preaching  destruction  of  all  rule,  and 
looking  with  disdain  upon  the  heap  of  ruins  in  which 


NIETZSCHE 

his  revolutionary  thoughts  would  leave  the  world. 

For  more  than  a  century  Germany  has  been  the 
storm-center  of  philosophical  thought.  The  commo- 
tions that  started  in  the  Fatherland  reached  other  coun- 
tries, France,  England,  and  the  United  States,  after 
they  had  lost  their  force  at  home.  Kant's  transcen- 
dentalism and  Hegel's  phenomenalism  began  to  flour- 
ish among  the  English-speaking  races  after  having  be- 
come almost  extinct  in  the  home  of  their  founders. 
Prof.  R.  M.  Wenley  of  the  University  of  Michigan, 
Ann  Arbor,  Mich.,  expresses  this  truth  with  his  native 
Scotch  wit  in  the  statement  which  I  do  not  hesitate  to 
endorse,  that  "German  professors  when  they  die  go  to 
Oxford,"  and  we  may  add  that  from  Oxford  they 
travel  west  to  settle  for  a  while  in  Concord,  Boston, 
Washington,  or  other  American  cities. 

Hegelianism  had  scarcely  died  out  in  the  United 
States  when  Schopenhauer  and  Nietzsche  began  to 
become  fashionable.  The  influence  of  the  former  has 
been  felt  in  a  quiet  way  for  some  time  while  the 
Nietzsche  movement  is  of  more  recent  date  and  also 
of  a  more  violent  character. 

Nietzsche  represents  a  type  of  most  modern  date. 
His  was  a  genius  after  the  heart  of  Lombroso.  He 
was  eccentric  and  atypical. 

Lombroso's  psychology  is  an  outgrowth  of  nominal- 
ism which  does  not  recognize  an  objective  norm  for 
truth,  health,  reason,  or  normality  of  any  kind,  and 
regards  the  average  as  the  sole  method  of  finding  a 


ANTI-SCIENTIFIC    TENDENCIES 

norm.  If,  however,  the  average  type  is  the  standard 
of  measurement,  the  unusually  excellent  specimens, 
being  rare  in  number,  must  be  classed  together  with  all 
other  deviations  from  the  average,  and  thus  a  genius 
is  regarded  as  abnormal  as  much  as  a  criminal — a 
theory  which  has  found  many  admirers  in  this  age  that 
is  sicklied  over  with  agnosticism,  the  modern  offshoot 
of  nominalism.  The  truth  is  that  true  genius  (not  the 
pseudo-genius  of  erratic  minds,  not  the  would-be  gen- 
ius of  those  who  make  a  failure  of  life)  is  uncom- 
monly normal — I  had  almost  said  "abnormally  nor- 
mal." 

A  perfect  crystal  is  rare;  so  the  perfectly  normal 
man  is  an  exception;  yet  for  all  that  he  is  a  better 
representative  of  the  ideal  of  his  type  than  the  average. 

Nietzsche  was  most  assuredly  very  ingenious ;  he  was 
unusually  talented  but  he  was  not  a  genius  in  the  full 
sense  of  the  word.  He  was  abnormal,  titanic  in  his 
pretensions  and  aims,  and  erratic.  Breaking  down 
under  the  burden  of  his  own  thought,  he  ended  his 
tragical  career  in  an  insane  asylum. 

The  mental  derangement  of  Nietzsche  may  be  an 
unhappy  accident  but  it  appears  to  have  come  as  the 
natural  result  of  his  philosophy.  Nietzsche,  by  nature 
modest  and  tractable,  almost  submissive,  was,  as  a 
thinker,  too  proud  to  submit  to  anything,  even  to  truth. 
Schopenhauer  had  taught  him  that  the  intellect,  with 
its  comprehension  of  truth,  is  a  mere  slave  of  the  will, 
ancilla  voluntatis.  Our  cognition  of  the  truth  has  a 


NIETZSCHE 

purpose ;  it  must  accommodate  itself  to  our  own  inter- 
est. But  the  self  is  sovereign ;  the  self  wants  to  assert 
itself ;  the  self  alone  has  a  right  to  exist ;  and  the  self 
that  does  not  dare  to  be  itself  is  a  servile,  menial 
creature.  Therefore  Nietzsche  preaches  the  ethics  of 
self-assertion  and  pride.  He  is  too  proud  to  recognize 
the  duty  of  inquiry,  the  duty  of  adapting  his  mind  to 
the  world,  or  of  recognizing  the  cosmic  order  of  the 
universe  as  superior  to  his  self.  He  feels  bigger  than 
the  cosmos ;  he  is  himself ;  and  he  wants  to  be  himself. 
His  own  self  is  sovereign ;  and  if  the  world  is  not  sat- 
isfied to  submit  to  his  will,  the  world  may  go  to  ruin. 
If  the  world  breaks  to  pieces,  it  will  only  cause  him 
to  laugh ;  on  the  other  hand,  if  his  very  self  is  forced 
to  the  wall  in  this  conflict,  he  will  still,  from  sheer 
pride,  not  suffer  himself  to  abandon  his  principle  of  the 
absolute  sovereignty  of  selfhood.  He  will  not  be  a 
man,  human  and  humane,  but  an  overman  (Ueber- 
mensch),  a  superhuman  despiser  of  humanity  and 
humaneness.  The  multitudes  are  to  him  like  cattle 
to  be  used,  to  be  milked,  fleeced  and  butchered,  and 
Nietzsche  calls  them  herds,  animals  of  the  flock, 
Heerdentiere. 

Nietzsche's  philosophy  is  unique  in  being  throughout 
the  expression  of  an  emotion — the  proud  sentiment  of 
a  self -sufficient  sovereignty  of  self.  It  rejects  with 
disdain  both  the  methods  of  the  intellect,  which  sub- 
mit the  problems  of  life  to  an  investigation,  and  the 

8 


ANTI-SCIENTIFIC    TENDENCIES 

demands  of  morality,  which  recognize  the  existence  of 
duty. 

Other  philosophers  have  claimed  that  rights  imply 
duties  and  duties,  rights.  Nietzsche  knows  of  rights 
only.  Nietzsche  claims  that  there  is  no  objective  sci- 
ence save  by  the  permission  of  the  sovereign  self,  nor 
is  there  any  "ought,"  except  for  slaves  and  fools.  He 
prides  himself  on  being  "the  first  Unmoralist,"  imply- 
ing the  absolute  sovereignty  of  man — of  the  overman 
— and  the  foolishness  as  well  as  falsity  of  moral  max- 
ims. 


DEUSSEN'S  RECOLLECTIONS 

PROFESSOR  PAUL  DEUSSEN,  Sanskrit  and 

•••  philosopher  of  Kiel,  was  Friedrich  Nietzsche's 
most  intimate  friend.  They  were  chums  together  in 
school  in  Schulpforta,  and  remained  friends  to  the  end 
of  Nietzsche's  life.  Nietzsche  had  come  to  Schulpforta 
in  1858,  and  Deussen  entered  the  next  year  in  the  same 
class.  Once  Nietzsche,  who  as  the  senior  of  the  class 
had  to  keep  order  among  his  fellow  scholars  during 
working  periods  and  prevent  them  from  making  a  dis- 
turbance, approached  Deussen  while  he  sat  in  his  seat 
peacefully  chewing  the  sandwich  he  had  brought  for 
his  lunch  and  said,  "Don't  talk  so  loud  to  your  crust !" 
using  here  the  boys'  slang  term  for  a  sandwich.  These 
were  the  first  words  Nietzsche  had  spoken  to  Deussen, 
and  Deussen  says:1  "I  see  Nietzsche  still  before  me, 
how  with  the  unsteady  glance  peculiar  to  extremely 
near-sighted  people,  his  eye  wandered  over  the  rows 
of  his  classmates  searching  in  vain  for  an  excuse  to 
interfere." 

1  See    Dr.    Paul    Deussen's    Erinnerungen    an    Friedrich 
Nietzsche.    Leipsic,  1901. 

10 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE 

AS  A  PUPIL  AT  SCHULPFORTA  IN  THE 
YEAR  1861 


DEUSSEN'S  RECOLLECTIONS 

Nietzsche  and  Deussen  began  to  take  walks  together 
and  soon  became  chums,  probably  on  account  of  their 
common  love  for  Anacreon,  whose  poems  were  inter- 
esting to  both  perhaps  on  account  of  the  easy  Greek  in 
which  they  are  written. 

In  those  days  the  boys  of  Schulpforta  addressed 
each  other  by  the  formal  Sie;  but  one  day  when  Deus- 
sen happened  to  be  in  the  dormitory,  he  discovered  in 
the  trunk  under  his  bed  a  little  package  of  snuff ;  Nietz- 
sche was  present  and  each  took  a  pinch.  With  this 
pinch  they  swore  eternal  brotherhood.  They  did  not 
drink  brotherhood  as  is  the  common  German  custom, 
but,  as  Deussen  humorously  says,  they  "snuffed  it"; 
and  from  that  time  they  called  each  other  by  the  more 
intimate  du.  This  friendship  continued  through  life 
with  only  one  interruption,  and  on  Laetare  Sunday  in 
1861,  they  stepped  to  the  altar  together  and  side  by 
side  received  the  blessing  at  their  confirmation.  On 
that  day  both  were  overcome  by  a  feeling  of  holiness 
and  ecstasy.  Thus  their  friendship  was  sealed  in 
Christ,  and  though  it  may  seem  strange  of  Nietzsche 
who  was  later  a  most  iconoclastic  atheist,  a  super- 
natural vision  filled  their  young  hearts  for  many  weeks 
afterwards. 

There  was  a  third  boy  to  join  this  friendship — a 
certain  Meyer,  a  young,  handsome  and  amiable  youth 
distinguished  by  wit  and  the  ability  to  draw  excellent 
caricatures.  But  Meyer  was  in  constant  conflict  with 
his  teachers  and  generally  in  rebellion  against  the  rules 

11 


NIETZSCHE 

of  the  school.  He  had  to  leave  school  before  he  finished 
his  course.  Nietzsche  and  Deussen  accompanied  him 
to  the  gate  and  returned  in  great  sorrow  when  he  had 
disappeared  on  the  highway.  What  has  become  of 
Meyer  is  not  known.  Deussen  saw  him  five  years 
later  in  his  home  at  Oberdreis,  but  at  that  time  he  was 
broken  in  health  and  courage,  disgruntled  with  God, 
the  world  and  himself.  Later  he  held  a  subordinate 
position  in  the  custom  house,  and  soon  after  that  all 
trace  of  him  was  lost.  Probably  he  died  young. 

This  Meyer  was  attached  to  Nietzsche  for  other  rea- 
sons than  Deussen.  While  Deussen  appreciated  more 
the  intellectuality  and  congeniality  of  his  friend,  Meyer 
seems  to  have  been  more  attracted  by  his  erratic  and 
wayward  tendencies  and  this  for  some  time  endeared 
him  to  Nietzsche.  Thus  it  came  to  pass  that  the  two 
broke  with  Deussen  for  a  time. 

The  way  of  establishing  a  state  of  hostility  in 
Schulpforta  was  to  declare  oneself  "mad"  at  another, 
and  to  some  extent  this  proved  to  be  a  good  institution, 
for  since  the  boys  came  in  touch  with  each  other  daily 
and  constantly  in  the  school,  those  who  could  not  agree 
would  have  easily  come  to  blows  had  it  not  been  for 
this  tabu  which  made  it  a  rule  that  they  were  not  on 
speaking  terms.  This  state  of  things  lasted  for  six 
weeks,  and  was  only  broken  by  an  incidental  discussion 
in  a  Latin  lesson,  when  Nietzsche  proposed  one  of  his 
highly  improbable  conjectures  for  a  verse  of  Virgil. 
The  discussion  grew  heated,  and  when  the  professor 

12 


DEUSSEN'S  RECOLLECTIONS 

after  a  long  Latin  disquisition  finally  asked  whether 
any  one  had  something  to  say  on  the  subject,  Deussen 
rose  and  extemporized  a  Latin  hexameter  which  ran 
thus: 

"Nietzschius  erravit,  neque  coniectura  probanda  est." 
On  account  of  the  declared  state  of  "mad"-ness,  the 
debate  was  carried  on  through  the  teacher,  addressing 
him  each  time  with  the  phrase:  "Tell  Nietzsche," 
"Tell  Deussen,"  "Tell  Meyer,"  etc.,  but  in  the  heat  of 
the  controversy  they  forgot  to  speak  in  the  third  per- 
son, and  finally  addressed  their  adversaries  directly. 
This  broke  the  spell  of  being  "mad"  and  they  came  to 
an  understanding  and  a  definite  reconciliation. 

Nietzsche  never  had  another  friend  with  whom  he 
became  so  intimate  as  with  Deussen.  Deussen  says 
(page  9)  :  "At  that  time  we  understood  each  other 
perfectly.  In  our  lonely  walks  we  discussed  all  pos- 
sible subjects  of  religion,  philosophy,  poetry,  art  and 
music.  Often  our  thoughts  ran  wild  and  when  words 
failed  us  we  would  look  into  each  other's  eyes,  and  one 
would  say  to  the  other :  'We  understand  each  other.' 
These  words  became  a  standing  phrase  which  forth- 
with we  decided  to  avoid  as  trivial,  and  we  had  to 
laugh  when  occasionally  it  escaped  our  lips  in  spite  of 
us.  The  great  ordeal  of  the  final  examination  came. 
We  had  to  pass  first  through  our  written  tests.  In 
German  composition,  on  the  'advantages  and  dangers 
of  wealth'  Nietzsche  passed  with  No.  1 ;  also  in  a 
Latin  exercise  de  bello  Punico  primo;  but  in  mathe- 

13 


NIETZSCHE 

matics  he  failed  with  the  lowest  mark,  No.  4.  This 
upset  him  and  in  fact  he  who  was  almost  the  most 
gifted  of  us  all  was  compelled  to  withdraw." 

While  the  two  were  strolling  up  and  down  in  front 
of  the  schoolhouse,  Nietzsche  unburdened  his  grief  to 
his  friend,  and  Deussen  tried  to  comfort  him.  "What 
difference  does  it  make,"  said  he,  "if  you  pass  badly, 
if  only  you  pass  at  all?  You  are  and  will  always  be 
more  gifted  than  all  the  rest  of  us,  and  will  soon  out- 
strip even  me  whom  you  now  envy.  You  must  in- 
crease but  I  must  decrease." 

The  course  of  events  was  as  Deussen  had  predicted, 
for  Nietzsche  though  not  passing  with  as  much  dis- 
tinction as  he  may  have  deserved  nevertheless  received 
his  diploma. 

When  Deussen  with  his  wife  visited  Nietzsche  in 
August  1907  at  Sils-Maria,  Nietzsche  showed  him  a 
requiem  which  he  had  composed  for  his  own  funeral, 
and  he  added :  "I  do  not  believe  that  I  will  last  much 
longer.  I  have  reached  the  age  at  which  my  father 
died,  and  I  fear  that  I  shall  fall  a  victim  to  the  same 
disease  as  he."  Though  Deussen  protested  vigorously 
against  this  sad  prediction  and  tried  to  cheer  him  up, 
Nietzsche  indeed  succumbed  to  his  sad  fate  within  two 

years. 

*        *        * 

Professor  Deussen,  though  Nietzsche's  most  inti- 
mate friend,  is  by  no  means  uncritical  in  judging  his 
philosophy.  It  is  true  he  cherishes  the  personal  char- 

14 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE 

FROM  PHOTOGRAPH  IN  THE  POSSESSION  OF 
PROFESSOR  DEUSSEN 


DEUSSEN'S  RECOLLECTIONS 

acter  and  the  ideal  tendencies  of  his  old  chum,  but  he 
is  not  blind  to  his  faults.  Deussen  says  of  Nietzsche : 
"He  was  never  a  systematic  philosopher.  .  ..  .  The 
great  problems  of  epistemology,  of  psychology,  of 
esthetics  and  ethics  are  only  tentatively  touched  upon 
in  his  writings.  .  .  .  There  are  many  pearls  of  worth 
upon  which  he  throws  a  brilliant  side  light,  as  it  were 
in  lightning  flashes.  .  .  .  His  overwhelming  imagin- 
ation is  always  busy.  His  thoughts  were  always  pre- 
sented in  pleasant  imagery  and  in  language  of  dazzling 
brilliancy,  but  he  lacked  critical  judgment  and  was  not 
controlled  by  a  consideration  of  reality.  Therefore  the 
creation  of  his  pen  was  never  in  harmony  with  the 
actual  world,  and  among  the  most  valuable  truths 
which  he  revealed  with  ingenious  profundity  there 
are  bizarre  and  distorted  notions  stated  as  general 
rules  although  they  are  merely  rare  exceptions,  as  is 
also  frequently  the  case  in  sensational  novels.  Thus 
Nietzsche  produced  a  caricature  of  life  which  means 
no  small  danger  for  receptive  and  inexperienced  minds. 
His  readers  can  escape  this  danger  only  when  they 
do  what  Nietzsche  did  not  do,  when  they  confront 
every  thought  of  his  step  by  step  by  the  actual  nature 
of  things,  and  retain  only  what  proves  to  be  true  under 
the  touchstone  of  experience." 

Between  the  negation  of  the  will  and  its  affirmation 
Nietzsche  granted  to  Deussen  while  still  living  in 
Basel,  that  the  ennoblement  of  the  will  should  be  man's 
aim.  The  affirmation  of  the  will  is  the  pagan  ideal 

15 


NIETZSCHE 

with  the  exception  of  Platonism.  The  negation  of  the 
will  is  the  Christian  ideal,  and  according  to  Nietzsche 
the  ennoblement  of  the  will  is  realized  in  his  ideal  of 
the  overman.  Deussen  makes  the  comment  that  Nietz- 
sche's notion  of  the  overman  is  in  truth  the  ideal  of 
all  mankind,  whether  this  highest  type  of  manhood  be 
called  Christ  or  overman;  and  we  grant  that  such  an 
ideal  is  traceable  everywhere.  It  is  called  "Messiah" 
among  the  Jews;  "hero"  among  the  Greeks,  "Christ" 
among  the  Christians,  and  chitin,  the  superior  man,  or 
to  use  Nietzsche's  language,  "the  overman,"  among  the 
Chinese;  but  the  characteristics  with  which  Nietzsche 
endows  his  overman  are  unfortunately  mere  brutal 
strength  and  an  unscrupulous  will  to  play  the  tyrant. 
Here  Professor  Deussen  halts.  It  appears  that  he 
knew  the  peaceful  character  of  his  friend  too  well  to 
take  his  ideal  of  the  overman  seriously. 

We  shall  discuss  Nietzsche's  ideal  of  the  overman 
more  fully  further  down  in  a  discussion  of  his  most 
original  thoughts,  the  typically  Nietzschean  ideas. 


16 


EXTREME  NOMINALISM 

A  CCORDING  to  Nietzsche,  the  history  of  philos- 
*  *•  ophy  from  Plato  to  his  own  time  is  a  progress 
of  the  idea  that  objective  truth  (a  conception  of  "the 
true  world")  is  not  only  not  attainable,  but  does  not 
exist  at  all.  He  expresses  this  idea  in  his  Twilight  of 
the  Idols  (English  edition,  pp.  122-123)  under  the  cap- 
tion, "How  the  True  World'  Finally  Became  a  Fable," 
which  describes  the  successive  stages  as  follows : 

"1.  The  true  world  attainable  by  the  wise,  the  pious,  and  the 
virtuous  man, — he  lives  in  it,  he  embodies  it. 

"(Oldest  form  of  the  idea,  relatively  rational,  simple,  and 
convincing.  Transcription  of  the  proposition,  'I,  Plato,  am  the 
truth.') 

"2.  The  true  world  unattainable  at  present,  but  promised 
to  the  wise,  the  pious,  and  the  virtuous  man  (to  the  sinner 
who  repents). 

"(Progress  of  the  idea:  it  becomes  more  refined,  more 
insidious,  more  incomprehensible, — it  becomes  feminine,  it  be- 
comes Christian.) 

"3.  The  true  world  unattainable,  undemonstrable,  and  un- 
able to  be  promised;  but  even  as  conceived,  a  comfort,  an 
obligation,  and  an  imperative. 

17 


NIETZSCHE 

"(The  old  sun  still,  but  shining  only  through  mist  and 
scepticism ;  the  idea  becomes  sublime,  pale,  northerly,  Koenigs- 
bergian.) 

"4.  The  true  world — unattainable?  At  any  rate  unattained. 
And  being  unattained  also  unknown.  Consequently  also 
neither  comforting,  saving  nor  obligatory :  what  obligation 
could  anything  unknown  lay  upon  us? 

"(Gray  morning.  First  dawning  of  reason.  Cock-crow- 
ing of  Positivism.) 

"5.  The  'true  world' — an  idea  neither  good  for  anything, 
nor  even  obligatory  any  longer, — an  idea  become  useless  and 
superfluous;  consequently  a  refuted  idea;  let  us  do  away 
with  it! 

"(Full  day;  breakfast;  return  of  ban  sens  and  cheerful- 
ness; Plato  blushing  for  shame;  infernal  noise  of  all  free 
intellects.) 

"6.  We  have  done  away  with  the  true  world :  what  world 
is  left?  perhaps  the  seeming?  .  .  .  But  no!  in  doing  away 
with  the  true,  we  have  also  done  away  with  the  seeming 
world ! 

"(Noon;  the  moment  of  the  shortest  shadow;  end  of  the 
longest  error;  climax  of  mankind;  Incipit  Zarathustra!)" 

The  reader  will  ask,  "What  next?"  Probably  after- 
noon and  evening,  and  then  night.  In  the  night  pre- 
sumably "the  old  sun,"  i.  e.,  the  idea  of  Plato's  true 
world,  which  (according  to  Nietzsche)  grew  pale  in 
the  morning,  will  shine  again. 

Nietzsche's  main  desire  was  to  live  the  real  life  and 
make  his  home  not  in  an  imaginary  Utopia  but  in  this 
actual  world  of  ours.  He  reproached  the  philosophers 
as  well  as  the  religious  leaders  and  ethical  teachers  for 
trying  to  make  mankind  believe  that  the  real  world  is 
purely  phenomenal,  for  replacing  it  by  the  world  of 

18 


EXTREME   NOMINALISM 

thought  which  they  called  "the  true  world"  or  the 
world  of  truth.  To  Nietzsche  the  typical  philosopher 
is  Plato.  He  and  all  his  followers  are  accused  of 
hypocrisy  for  making  people  believe  that  "the  true 
world"  of  their  own  fiction  is  real  and  that  man's  am- 
bition should  be  to  attain  to  this  "true  world"  (the 
world  of  philosophy,  of  science,  of  art,  of  ethical 
ideals)  built  above  the  real  world.  Nietzsche  means 
to  shatter  all  the  idols  of  the  past,  and  he  has  come  to 
the  conclusion  that  even  the  scientists  were  guilty  of 
the  same  fault  as  the  philosophers.  They  erected  a 
world  of  thought,  of  subjective  conception  from  the 
materials  of  the  real  world,  and  so  he  denounces  even 
their  attempts  at  constructing  a  "true  world"  as  either 
a  self-mystification  or  a  lie.  It  is  as  imaginary  as  the 
world  of  the  priest.  In  order  to  lead  a  life  worthy  of 
the  "overman,"  we  should  assert  ourselves  and  feel 
no  longer  hampered  by  rules  of  conduct  or  canons  of 
logic  or  by  any  consideration  for  truth. 

With  all  his  hatred  of  religion,  Nietzsche  was  never- 
theless an  intensely  religious  character,  and  knowing 
that  he  could  not  clearly  see  a  connection  between  his 
so-called  "real  world"  and  his  actual  surroundings,  he 
developed  all  the  symptoms  of  religious  fanaticism 
which  characterizes  religious  leaders  of  all  ages.  He 
indulged  in  a  mystic  ecstacy,  preaching  it  as  the  essen- 
tial feature  of  his  philosophy,  and  his  Dionysiac  en- 
thusiasm is  not  the  least  of  the  intoxicants  which  are 
contained  in  his  thought  and  bring  so  many  poetical 

19 


NIETZSCHE 

and  talented  but  immature  minds  under  his  control. 

It  is  obvious  that  "the  real  world"  of  Nietzsche  is 
more  unreal  than  "the  true  world"  of  philosophy  and 
of  religion  which  he  denounces  as  fictitious,  but  he 
was  too  naive  and  philosophically  crude  to  see  this. 
Nietzsche's  "real  world"  is  a  fabric  of  his  own  per- 
sonal imagination,  while  the  true  world  of  science  is  at 
least  a  thought-construction  of  the  world  which  pic- 
tures facts  with  objective  exactness ;  it  is  controlled  by 
experience  and  can  be  utilized  in  practical  life;  it  is 
subject  to  criticism  and  its  propositions  are  being  con- 
stantly tested  either  to  be  refuted  or  verified.  Nietz- 
sche's "real  world"  is  the  hope  (and  perhaps  not  even 
a  desirable  hope)  of  a  feverish  brain  whose  action  is 
influenced  by  a  decadent  body. 

Nietzsche's  so-called  "real  world"  is  one  ideal  among 
many  others.  It  is  as  much  subjective  as  the  ideals  of 
other  mortals, — of  men  who  seek  happiness  in  wealth, 
or  in  pleasures,  or  in  fame,  or  in  scholarship,  or  in  a 
religious  life — all  of  them  imagine  that  the  world  of 
their  thoughts  is  real  and  the  goal  which  they  endeavor 
to  reach  is  the  only  thing  that  possesses  genuine  worth. 
In  Nietzsche's  opinion  all  are  dreamers  catching  at 
shadows,  but  the  shadow  of  his  own  fancy  appeared  to 
him  as  real. 

According  to  Nietzsche  the  universe  is  not  a  cosmos 
but  a  chaos.  He  says  (La  Gaya  Sciensa,  German  edi- 
tion, p.  148)  : 

"The  astral  order  in  which  we  live  is  an  exception.     This 

20 


EXTREME    NOMINALISM 

order  and  the  relative  stability  which  is  thereby  caused,  made 
the  exception  of  exceptions  possible, — the  formation  of  or- 
ganisms. The  character-total  of  the  world  is  into  all  eternity 
chaos,  not  in  the  sense  of  a  missing  necessity,  but  of  missing 
order,  articulation,  form,  beauty,  wisdom,  and  as  all  our 
aesthetic  humanities  may  be  called." 

In  agreement  with  this  conception  of  order,  Nietz- 
sche says  of  man,  the  rational  animal : 

"I  fear  that  animals  look  upon  man  as  a  being  of  their 
own  kind,  which  in  a  most  dangerous  way  has  lost  the  sound 
animal-sense, — as  a  lunatic  animal,  a  laughing  animal,  a  cry- 
ing animal,  a  miserable  animal."  (La  Gaya  Sciensa,  German 
edition,  p.  196.) 

If  reason  is  an  aberration,  the  brute  must  be  super- 
ior to  man  and  instinct  must  range  higher  than  logical 
thought.  Man's  reason,  according  to  this  consistent 
nominalist  view,  is  purely  subjective  and  has  no  proto- 
type in  the  objective  world.  This  is  a  feature  com- 
mon to  all  nominalistic  philosophies.  John  Stuart 
Mill  regards  the  theorems  of  logic  and  mathematics, 
not  only  not  as  truths,  but  as  positive  untruths.  He 
says : 

"The  points,  lines,  circles,  and  squares,  which  any  one  has 
in  his  mind,  are  (I  apprehend)  simply  copies  of  the  points, 
lines,  circles,  and  squares  which  he  has  known  in  his  ex- 
perience. Our  idea  of  a  point,  I  apprehend  to  be  simply  our 
idea  of  the  minimum  visibile,  the  smallest  portion  of  surface 
which  we  can  see.  A  line,  as  defined  by  geometers,  is  wholly 
inconceivable.  We  can  reason  about  a  line  as  if  it  had  no 
breadth ;  because  we  have  a  power,  which  is  the  foundation 
of  all  the  control  we  can  exercise  over  the  operations  of  our 
minds ;  the  power,  when  a  perception  is  present  to  our  senses, 

21 


NIETZSCHE 

or  a  conception  to  our  intellects,  of  attending  to  a  part  only 
of  that  perception  or  conception,  instead  of  the  whole.  But 
we  cannot  conceive  a  line  without  breadth;  we  can  form  no 
mental  picture  of  such  a  line :  all  the  lines  which  we  have 
in  our  minds  are  lines  possessing  breadth." 

Nietzsche  shows  his  nominalistic  tendencies  by  re- 
peatedly pronouncing  the  same  propositions  in  almost 
literally  the  same  words,1  without,  however,  acknowl- 
edging the  school  in  which  he  picked  up  this  error. 

It  is  quite  true  that  mathematical  lines  and  circles  are 
human  conceptions,  but  they  are  not  purely  subjective 
conceptions,  still  less  untruths ;  they  are  great  and  im- 
portant discoveries.  They  are  not  arbitrarily  devised 
but  constructed  according  to  the  laws  of  the  uniform- 
ities that  dominate  existence.  They  represent  actual 
features  of  the  factors  which  shape  the  objective  uni- 
verse, and  thus  only  is  it  possible  that  the  astronomer 
through  the  calculation  of  mathematical  curves  can 
predict  the  motion  of  the  stars.2 

Reason  is  the  key  to  the  universe,  because  it  is  the 
reflex  of  cosmic  order,  and  the  cosmic  order,  the  in- 
trinsic regularity  and  immanent  harmony  of  the  uni- 
formities of  nature,  is  not  a  subjective  illusion  but  an 
objective  reality. 

When  Goethe  claims  that  all  things  transitory  are 

1  La  Gaya  Scienza,  German  edition,  p.  154 ;  and  passim  in 
Menschliches,  etc. 

'For  further  details  of  a  refutation  of  this  wrong  con- 
ception of  geometry,  see  the  author's  Foundation  of  Mathe- 
matics. 

22 


EXTREME    NOMINALISM 

symbols  of  that  which  is  intransitory  and  eternal, 
Nietzsche  answers  that  the  idea  of  anything  intrans- 
itory is  a  mere  symbol,  and  God  (the  idea  of  anything 
eternal)  a  poet's  lie. 

Like  a  mocking-bird,  the  nominalist  philosopher  imi- 
tates the  ring  of  Goethe's  well-known  lines  at  the  con- 
clusion of  the  second  part  of  "Faust,"  in  which  the 
"real  world"  of  transient  things  is  considered  as  a 
mere  symbol  of  the  true  world  of  eternal  verities: 

"Das  Unvergangliche 
1st  nur  dein  Gleichniss. 
Gott  der  Verfangliche 
1st  Dichter-Erschleichniss. 
Weltspiel,   das  herrische, 
Mischt  Sein  und  Schein : — 
Das  Ewig-Narrische 
Mischt  uns — hinein." 

"The  non-deciduous 
Is  a  symbol  of  thy  sense, 
God  ever  invidious, 
A  poetical  license. 
World-play  domineeringly 
Mixes  semblance  and  fact, 
And  between  them  us  sneeringly 
The  Ever-Foolish  has  packed." 

In  spite  of  Nietzsche's  hunger  for  the  realities  of 
life,  that  is  to  say  for  objectivity,  he  was  in  fact  the 
most  subjective  of  all  philosophers — so  much  so  that 
he  was  incapable  of  formulating  any  thought  as  an 
objectively  precise  statement.  He  did  not  believe  in 
truth:  "There  is  probability,  but  no  truth,"  says  he 

23 


NIETZSCHE 

in  Der  Wanderer  und  sein  Schatten,  p.  190;  and  he 
adds  concerning  the  measure  of  the  value  of  truth 
(ibid.,  Aphorism  4)  :  "The  trouble  in  ascending  moun- 
tains is  no  measure  of  their  height,  and  should  it  be 
different  in  science?" 

It  is  true  that  such  words  as  "long"  and  "short"  are 
relative,  because  dependent  on  subjective  needs  and 
valuations.  But  must  we  for  that  reason  give  up  all  hope 
of  describing  facts  in  objective  terms?  Are  not  meters 
and  foot-measures  definite  magnitudes,  whether  or  not 
they  be  long  for  one  purpose  and  short  for  another? 
Relativity  itself  admits  of  a  description  in  objective 
terms;  but  if  a  statement  of  facts  in  objective  terms 
were  impossible,  the  ideals  of  exact  science  (as  all 
ideals)  would  be  a  dream. 

That  Nietzsche  prefers  the  abrupt  style  of  aphorisms 
to  dispassionate  inquisitions  is  a  symptom  that  betrays 
the  nature  of  his  philosophy.  His  ideas,  thus  ex- 
pressed, are  easily  understood.  They  are  but  very 
loosely  connected,  and  we  find  them  frequently  con- 
tradictory. They  are  not  presented  in  a  logical,  orderly 
way,  but  sound  like  reiterated  challenges  to  battle. 
They  are  appeals  to  all  wild  impulses  and  a  clamor  for 
the  right  of  self-assertion. 

While  Nietzsche's  philosophy  is  in  itself  inconsist- 
ent and  illogical,  it  is  yet  born  of  the  logic  of  facts ;  it 
is  the  consistent  result  and  legitimate  conclusion  of 
principles  uttered  centuries  ago  and  which  were  slowly 
matured  in  the  historical  development  of  thought. 

24 


EXTREME    NOMINALISM 

The  old  nominalistic  school  is  the  father  of  Nietz- 
sche's philosophy.  A  consistent  nominalist  will  be 
driven  from  one  conclusion  to  another  until  he  reaches 
the  stage  of  Nietzsche,  which  is  philosophical  anarch- 
ism and  extreme  individualism. 

The  nominalist  denies  the  reality  of  reason;  he  re- 
gards the  existence  of  universals  as  a  fiction,  and  looks 
upon  the  world  as  a  heap  of  particulars.  He  loses 
sight  of  the  unity  of  the  world  and  forgets  that  form 
is  a  true  feature  of  things.  It  is  form  and  the  same- 
ness of  the  laws  of  form  which  makes  universality  of 
reason  possible. 

Nominalism  rose  in  opposition  to  the  medieval  real- 
ism of  the  schoolmen  who  looked  upon  universals  as 
real  and  concrete  things,  representing  them  as  indi- 
vidual beings  that  existed  ante  res,  in  rebus,  and  post 
res,  i.  e.,  in  the  particulars,  before  them  and  after 
them.  The  realists  were  wrong  in  so  far  as  they  con- 
ceived universals  as  substances  or  distinct  essences,  as 
true  realities  (hence  the  name  "realism")  ;  only  they 
were  supposed  to  be  of  a  more  spiritual  nature  than 
material  things  but,  after  all,  they  were  concrete  exist- 
ences. They  were  said  to  have  been  created  by  God 
as  an  artisan  would  make  patterns  or  molds  for  the 
things  which  he  proposes  to  produce.  According  to 
Plato,  ideas  serve  the  Creator  as  models  of  con- 
crete objects  of  which  they  are  deemed  to  be  the  pro- 
totypes. The  realists  were  mistaken  in  regarding  the 

m 


NIETZSCHE 

ideal  as  concrete  and  real,  but  the  nominalists,  on  the 
other  hand,  also  went  too  far  in  denying  the  objective 
significance  of  universals  and  declaring  that  universals 
were  mere  names  (nomina  and  flatus  vocis),  i.  e., 
words  invented  for  the  sake  of  conveniently  thinking 
things  and  serving  no  other  purpose. 

At  the  bottom  of  the  controversy  lies  the  problem  as 
to  the  nature  of  things.  The  question  arises,  What  are 
things  in  themselves?  Do  things,  or  do  they  not,  pos- 
sess an  independence  of  their  own?  Kant's  reply  is, 
that  things  in  themselves  can  not  be  known ;  but  our 
reply  is,  that  the  nature  of  a  thing  consists  in  its  form ; 
a  thing  is  such  as  it  is  because  it  has  a  definite  form. 
Therefore  "things  in  themselves"  do  not  exist;  but 
there  are  "forms  in  themselves." 

Form  is  not  a  non-entity  but  the  most  important 
feature  of  reality,  and  the  pure  laws  of  form  are  the 
determinative  factors  of  the  world.  The  sciences  of 
the  laws  of  pure  form,  logic,  arithmetic,  algebra,  geo- 
metry, etc.,  are  therefore  the  key  to  a  comprehension 
of  the  world,  and  morality  is  the  realization  of  ideals, 
i.  e.,  of  the  conceptions  of  pure  forms,  which  are 
higher,  nobler,  and  better  than  those  which  have  been 
actualized. 

From  our  standpoint,  evolution  is  a  process  in  which 
the  eternal  laws  of  being  manifest  themselves  in  a 
series  of  regular  transformations,  reaching  a  point  at 
which  sentiency  appears.  And  then  evolution  takes  the 
shape  of  progress,  that  is  to  say,  sentient  beings  de- 

26 


EXTREME    NOMINALISM 

velop  mind;  sentiments  become  sensations,  i.  e.,  repre- 
sentative images;  and  words  denote  the  universals. 
Then  reason  originates  as  a  reflex  of  the  eternal  laws 
of  pure  form.  Human  reason  is  deepened  in  a  scien- 
tific world-conception,  and  becoming  aware  of  the 
moral  aspect  of  universality  it  broadens  out  into  com- 
prehensive sympathy  with  all  forms  of  existence  that 
like  ourselves  aspire  after  a  fuller  comprehension  of 
existence. 

Thus  the  personality  of  man  is  the  reflex  of  that  sys- 
tem of  eternalities  which  sways  the  universe,  and  hu- 
manity is  found  to  be  a  revelation  of  the  core  of  the 
cosmos,  an  incarnation  of  Godhood.  This  revelation, 
however,  is  not  closed.  The  appearance  of  the  relig- 
ions of  good-will  and  mutual  sympathy  merely  marks 
the  beginning  of  a  new  era,  and  we  may  expect  that 
the  future  of  mankind  will  surpass  the  present,  as 
much  as  the  present  surpasses  savagery.  Such  is  the 
higher  humanity,  the  true  "overman,"  representing  a 
higher  species  of  mankind,  whom  we  expect. 

Nietzsche's  philosophy  of  "unmorality"  looms  on 
the  horizon  of  human  thought  as  a  unique  conception 
apparently  ushered  into  this  world  without  any  prepa- 
ration and  without  any  precedent.  It  sets  itself  up 
against  tradition.  Schopenhauer,  Nietzsche's  imme- 
diate predecessor,  regarded  history  as  the  desolate 
dream  of  mankind,  and  Nietzsche  exhibits  a  remorse- 
less contempt  for  everything  that  comes  to  us  as  a 
product  of  history.  Nietzsche  scorns  not  only  law  and 

27 


NIETZSCHE 

order,  church  and  state,  but  also  reason,  argument,  and 
rule;  he  scorns  consistency  and  logic  which  are  re- 
garded as  toys  for  weaklings  or  as  tools  of  the  crafty. 

Nietzsche  is  a  nominalist  with  a  vengeance.  His 
philosophy  is  particularism  carried  to  extremes.  There 
is  no  unity  of  existence  to  him.  The  God-idea  is  dead 
— not  only  the  old  metaphysical  notion  of  a  God-indi- 
vidual, but  also  God  in  the  sense  of  the  ultimate 
ground  of  being,  the  supreme  norm  of  the  cosmos. 
Nietzsche's  world  is  split  up  into  particular  selves.  He 
does  not  ask  how  they  originated;  he  only  knows  that 
they  are  here.  Above  all,  he  knows  that  his  own  self 
is  here,  and  there  is  no  bond  of  sympathy  between  it 
and  other  selves.  The  higher  self  is  that  which  as- 
sumes dominion  over  the  world.  His  ideal  is  brutal 
strength,  his  overman  the  tyrant  who  tramples  under 
foot  his  fellowmen.  Democracy  is  an  abomination  to 
him,  and  he  despises  the  gospel  of  love  as  it  is  preached 
by  both  Christ  and  Buddha.  This  is  the  key  to  his 
anti-moralism  and  to  the  doctrine  of  the  autonomy  of 
selfhood. 

Nietzsche's  philosophy  might  be  called  philosophical 
nihilism,  if  he  did  not  object  to  the  word.  He  calls  it 
positivism,  but  it  is  particularism,  or  rather  an  aristo- 
cratic individualism  which  in  the  domain  of  thought 
plays  the  same  role  that  political  nihilism  plays  in  Rus- 
sia. It  would  dethrone  the  hereditary  Czar,  the  ruler 
by  God's  grace,  but  it  would  not  establish  a  republic. 
It  would  set  on  the  throne  a  ruthless  demagogue,  a 

28 


EXTREME   NOMINALISM 

self-made  political  boss — the  overman.  It  is  the  phil- 
osophy of  protest,  and  Nietzsche  is  conscious  of  being 
Slavic  in  thought  and  aspiration.  Nor  does  he  forget 
that  his  ancestors  belonged  to  the  nobility.  He  claims 
to  have  been  descended  from  a  Polish  nobleman  by  the 
name  of  Nietzki,  a  Protestant  who  came  to  Germany 
in  the  eighteenth  century  as  a  religious  refugee. 

Nietzsche's  love  of  Slavism  manifested  itself  in  his 
childhood,  for  when  the  news  of  the  fall  of  Sebastopol 
became  known,  Nietzsche,  at  that  time  a  mere  boy,  was 
so  dejected  that  he  could  not  eat  and  gave  expression 
to  his  chagrin  in  mournful  strains  of  verse. 

He  who  has  faith  in  truth  accepts  truth  as  authority ; 
he  who  accepts  truth  as  authority  recognizes  duty;  he 
who  recognizes  duty  beholds  a  goal  of  life.  He  has 
found  a  purpose  for  which  life  appears  worth  living, 
and  reaches  out  beyond  the  bounds  of  his  narrow  indi- 
viduality into  the  limitless  cosmos.  He  transcends 
himself,  he  grows  in  truth,  he  increases  in  power,  he 
widens  in  his  sympathies. 

Here  we  touch  upon  the  God  problem.  In  defining 
God  as  the  ultimate  authority  of  conduct,  we  are  con- 
fronted by  the  dilemma,  Is  there,  or  is  there  not  a  norm 
of  morality,  a  standard  of  right  and  wrong,  to  which 
the  self  must  submit?  And  this  question  is  another 
version  of  the  problem  as  to  the  existence  of  truth.  Is 
there  truth  which  we  must  heed,  or  is  truth  a  fiction 
and  is  the  self  not  bound  to  respect  anything?  We 


NIETZSCHE 

answer  this  question  as  to  the  existence  of  truth  in  the 
affirmative,  Nietzsche  in  the  negative. 

But  he  who  rejects  truth  cuts  himself  loose  from  the 
fountain-head  of  the  waters  of  life.  He  may  deify 
selfhood,  but  his  own  self  will  die  of  its  self-apotheosis. 
His  divinity  is  not  a  true  God-incarnation,  it  is  a  mere 
assumption  and  the  self -exaltation  of  a  pretender. 

Nietzsche's  philosophy  is  more  consistent  than  it 
appears  on  its  face.  Being  the  negation  of  the  right 
of  consistency,  its  lack  of  consistency  is  its  most  char- 
acteristic feature.  If  the  intellect  is  truly,  as  Schopen- 
hauer suggests,  the  servant  of  the  will,  then  there  is 
no  authority  in  reason,  and  arguments  have  no 
strength.  All  quarrels  are  simply  questions  of  power. 
Then,  there  is  might,  but  not  right ;  right  is  simply  the 
bon  plaisir  of  might.  Then  there  is  no  good  nor  evil ; 
good  is  that  which  I  will,  bad  is  that  which  threatens 
to  thwart  my  will.  Good  and  evil  are  distinctions  in- 
vented for  the  enslavement  of  the  masses,  but  the  free 
man,  the  genius,  the  aristocrat,  who  craftily  tramples 
the  masses  under  foot,  knows  no  difference.  He  is 
beyond  good  and  evil. 

This,  indeed,  is  the  consequence  which  Nietzsche 
boldly  draws.  It  is  a  consistent  anarchism;  it  is  un- 
moralism,  a  courageous  denial  of  ethical  rule;  and  a 
proud  aristocratism,  the  ruthless  shout  of  triumph  of 
the  victor  who  hails  the  doctrine  of  the  survival  of 
the  strongest  and  craftiest  as  a  "joyful  science." 

Nietzsche  would  not  refute  the  arguments  of  those 

30 


EXTREME    NOMINALISM 

who  differ  from  him;  for  refutation  of  other  views 
does  not  befit  a  positive  mind  that  posits  its  own  truth. 
"What  have  I  to  do  with  refutations !"  exclaims  Nietz- 
sche in  the  Preface  to  his  Genealogy  of  Morals.  The 
self  is  lord.  There  is  no  law  for  the  lord,  and  so  he 
denounces  the  ethics  of  Christianity  as  slave-morality, 
and  preaches  the  lord-morality  of  the  strong  which  is 
self-assertion. 

Morality  itself  is  denounced  by  Nietzsche  as  im- 
moral. Morality  is  the  result  of  evolution,  and  man's 
moral  ideas  are  products  of  conditions  climatic,  social, 
economical,  national,  religious,  and  what  not.  Why 
should  we  submit  to  the  tyranny  of  a  rule  which  after 
all  proves  to  be  a  relic  of  barbarism?  Nietzsche  rejects 
morality  as  incompatible  with  the  sovereignty  of  self- 
hood, and,  pronouncing  our  former  judgment  a  super- 
stition, he  proposes  "a  transvaluation  of  all  values." 
The  self  must  be  established  as  supreme  ruler,  and 
therefore  all  rules,  maxims,  principles,  must  go,  for  the 
very  convictions  of  a  man  are  mere  chains  that  fetter 
the  freedom  of  his  soul. 


31 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ORIGINALITY 

ONE  might  expect  that  Nietzsche,  who  glories  in 
the  triumph  of  the  strong  over  the  weak  in  the 
struggle  for  life,  red  in  tooth  and  claw,  would  look  up 
to  Darwin  as  his  master.  But  Nietzsche  recognizes  no 
master,  and  he  emphasizes  this  by  speaking  in  his  po- 
etry of  Darwin  as  "this  English  joker,"  whose  "medi- 
ocre reason"  is  accepted  for  philosophy.1  To  Nietzsche 
that  which  exists  is  the  mere  incidental  product  of 
blind  forces.  Instead  of  working  for  a  development 
of  the  better  from  the  best  of  the  present,  which  is  the 
method  of  nature,  he  shows  his  contempt  for  the  hu- 
man and  all-too-human;  he  prophesies  a  deluge  and 
hopes  that  from  its  floods  the  overman  will  emerge 
whose  seal  of  superiority  will  be  the  strength  of  the 
conqueror  that  enables  him  to  survive  in  the  struggle 
for  existence. 

Nietzsche  has  looked  deeply  into  the  apparent  chaos 
of  life  that  according  to  Darwin  is  a  ruthless  struggle 

1  See  Nietzsche's  poems  in  the  appendix  to  A  Genealogy 
of  Morals,  Eng.  ed.,  Macmillan,  p.  248. 

32 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ORIGINALITY 

for  survival.  He  avoids  the  mistake  of  those  senti- 
mentalists who  believe  that  goody-goodyness  can  rule 
the  world,  who  underrate  the  worth  of  courage  and 
over-rate  humility,  and  who  would  venture  to  estab- 
lish peace  on  earth  by  grounding  arms.  He  sees  the 
differences  that  exist  between  all  things,  the  antagon- 
ism that  obtains  everywhere,  and  preferring  to  play 
the  part  of  the  hammer,  he  showers  expressions  of 
contempt  upon  the  anvil. 

And  Nietzsche's  self-assertion  is  immediate  and 
direct.  He  does  not  pause  to  consider  what  his  self  is, 
neither  how  it  originated  nor  what  will  become  of  it. 
He  takes  it  as  it  is  and  opposes  it  to  the  authority  of 
other  powers,  the  state,  the  church,  and  the  traditions 
of  the  past.  An  investigation  of  the  nature  of  the  self 
might  have  dispelled  the  illusion  of  his  self-glorifica- 
tion, but  he  never  thinks  of  analysing  its  constitution. 
Bluntly  and  without  any  reflection  or  deliberation  he 
claims  the  right  of  the  sovereignty  of  self.  He  seems 
to  forget  that  there  are  different  selves,  and  that  what 
we  need  most  is  a  standard  by  which  we  can  gauge 
their  respective  worth,  and  not  an  assertion  of  the 
rights  of  the  self  in  general. 

We  do  not  intend  to  quarrel  with  Nietzsche's  radi- 
calism. Nor  do  we  underrate  the  significance  of  the 
self.  We,  too,  believe  that  every  self  has  the  liberty 
to  choose  its  own  position  and  may  claim  as  many 
rights  as  it  pleases  provided  it  can  maintain  them.  If 
it  cannot  maintain  them  it  will  be  crushed;  otherwise 

33 


NIETZSCHE 

it  may  conquer  its  rivals  and  suppress  counter-claims ; 
but  therefore  the  wise  man  looks  before  he  leaps. 
Reckless  self-assertion  is  the  method  of  brute  creation. 
Neither  the  lion  nor  the  lamb  meditate  on  their  fate; 
they  simply  follow  their  instincts.  They  are  carniv- 
orous or  herbivorous  by  nature  through  the  actions  of 
their  ancestors.  This  is  what  Buddhists  call  the  law 
of  deeds  or  Karma.  Man's  karma  leads  higher.  Man 
can  meditate  on  his  own  fate,  and  he  can  discriminate. 
His  self  is  a  personality,  i.  e.,  a  self-controlled  common- 
wealth of  motor  ideas.  Man  does  not  blindly  follow 
his  impulses  but  establishes  rules  of  action.  He  can 
thus  abbreviate  the  struggle  and  avoid  unnecessary 
friction ;  he  can  rise  from  brute  violence  to  a  self-con- 
tained and  well-disciplined  strength.  Self-control  (i. 
e.,  ethical  guidance)  is  the  characteristic  feature  of  the 
true  "overman" ;  but  Nietzsche  knows  nothing  of  self- 
control  ;  he  would  allow  the  self  blindly  to  assert  itself 
after  the  fashion  of  animal  instincts. 

Nietzsche  is  the  philosopher  of  instinct.  He  spurns 
all  logical  order,  even  truth  itself.  He  has  a  contempt 
for  every  one  who  learns  from  others,  for  he  regards 
such  a  man  as  a  slave  to  other  people's  thought.  His 
ambition  for  originality  is  expressed  in  these  four  lines 
which  he  inserted  as  a  motto  to  the  second  edition  of 
La  Gay  a  Sciensa: 

"Ich  wohne  in  tneinem  eignen  Haus, 
Hab'  niemandtm  nie  nichts  nachgemacht 
Und — lachte  noch  jeden  Meister  aus, 
Der  nicht  sich  selber  ausgelacht." 
34 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ORIGINALITY 

We  translate  faithfully,  preserving  even  the  ungram- 
matical  use  of  the  double  negative,  as  follows: 

"In  my  own  house  do  I  reside, 
Did  never  no  one  imitate, 
And  every  master  I  deride, 
Save  if  himself  he'd  derogate." 

We  wonder  that  Nietzsche  did  not  think  of  Goethe's 
little  rhyme,  which  seems  to  suit  his  case  exactly : 

"A  fellow  says :  'I  own  no  school  or  college ; 

No  master  lives  whom  I  acknowledge; 

And  pray  don't  entertain  the  thought 
That  from  the  dead  I  e'er  learned  aught.' 

This,  if  I  rightly  understand, 

Means :    'I'm  a  fool  by  own  command.' " 

Nietzsche  observes  that  the  thoughts  of  most  philos- 
ophers are  secretly  guided  by  instincts.  He  feels  that 
all  thought  is  at  bottom  a  "will  for  power,"  and  the 
will  for  truth  has  no  right  to  exist  except  it  serve  the 
will  for  power.  He  reproaches  philosophers  for  glori- 
fying truth. 

Fichte  in  his  Duties  of  the  Scholar  says : 

"My  life  and  my  fate  are  nothing;  but  the  results  of  my 
life  are  of  great  importance.  I  am  a  priest  of  Truth;  I  am 
in  the  service  of  Truth;  I  feel  under  obligation  to  do,  to 
risk,  and  to  suffer  anything  for  truth." 

Nietzsche  declares  that  this  is  shallow.  Will  for 
truth,  he  says,  should  be  called  "will  to  make  being 
thinkable."  Here,  it  seems  to  us,  Nietzsche  simply 
replaces  the  word  "truth"  by  one  of  its  functions. 

35 


NIETZSCHE 

Truth  is  a  systematic  representation  of  reality,  a  com- 
prehensive description  of  facts;  the  result  being  that 
"existence  is  made  thinkable." 

Nietzsche  is  in  a  certain  sense  right  when  he  says 
that  truth  in  itself  is  nothing ;  for  every  representation 
of  reality  must  serve  a  purpose,  otherwise  it  is  super- 
fluous and  useless.  And  the  purpose  of  truth  is  the 
furtherance  of  life.  Nietzsche  instinctively  hits  the 
right  thing  in  saying  that  at  the  bottom  of  philosophy 
there  is  the  will  for  power.  In  spite  of  our  school- 
philosopher's  vain  declamations  of  "science  for  its  own 
sake,"  genuine  philosophy  will  never  be  anything  else 
than  a  method  for  the  acquisition  of  power.  But  this 
method  is  truth.  Nietzsche  errs  when  he  declares  that 
"the  head  is  merely  the  intestine  of  the  heart."  The 
head  endeavors  to  find  out  the  truth,  and  the  truth  is 
not  purely  subjective.  It  is  true  that  truth  is  of  no 
use  to  a  man  unless  he  makes  it  his  own;  he  must 
possess  it;  it  must  be  part  of  himself,  but  he  cannot 
create  it.  Truth  cannot  be  made ;  it  must  be  discovered. 
Since  the  scholar's  specialized  business  is  the  elucida- 
tion of  the  method  of  discovering  the  truth — not  its 
purpose,  not  its  application  in  practical  life — Fichte's 
ideal  of  the  aim  of  scholarship  remains  justified. 

Omit  the  ideal  of  truth  in  a  philosophy,  and  it  be- 
comes an  ignis  fatuus,  a  will-o'-the-wisp,  that  will  lead 
people  astray.  Truth  makes  existence  thinkable,  but 
thinkableness  alone  is  not  as  yet  a  test  of  truth.  The 
ultimate  test  of  truth  is  its  practical  application.  There 

36 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ORIGINALITY 

is  something  wrong  with  a  theory  that  does  not  work, 
and  thus  the  self  has  a  master,  which  is  reality,  the 
world  in  which  it  lives,  with  its  laws  and  actualities. 
The  subjective  self  must  measure  its  worth  by  the 
objective  standard  of  truth — to  be  obtained  through 
exact  inquiry  and  scientific  investigation. 

The  will  for  power,  in  order  to  succeed,  must  be 
clarified  by  a  methodical  comprehension  of  facts  and 
conditions.  The  contradictory  impulses  in  one's  own 
self  must  be  systematized  so  that  they  will  not  col- 
lide and  mutually  annihilate  themselves ;  and  the  com- 
prehension of  this  orderly  disposition  is  called  reason. 

Nietzsche  is  on  the  right  track  when  he  ridicules 
such  ideals  as  "virtue  for  virtue's  sake,"  and  even 
"truth  for  truth's  sake."  Virtue  and  truth  are  for  the 
sake  of  life.  They  have  not  their  purpose  in  them- 
selves, but  their  nature  consists  in  serving  the  expan- 
sion and  further  growth  of  the  human  soul.  This  is 
a  truth  which  we  have  always  insisted  upon  and  which 
becomes  apparent  when  those  people  who  speak  of  vir- 
tue for  its  own  sake  try  to  define  virtue,  or  determine 
the  ultimate  standard  of  right  and  wrong,  of  goodness 
and  badness.  We  say,  that  whatever  enhances  soul- 
growth,  thus  producing  higher  life  and  begetting  a 
superior  humanity,  is  good ;  while  whatever  cripples  or 
retards  those  aspirations  is  bad.  Further,  truth  is  not 
holy  in  itself.  It  becomes  holy  in  the  measure  that  it 
serves  man's  holiest  aspirations.  We  sometimes  meet 
among  scientists,  and  especially  among  philologists, 

37 


NIETZSCHE 

men  who  with  the  ideal  of  "truth  for  truth's  sake," 
pursue  some  very  trivial  investigations,  such,  for  ex- 
ample, as  the  use  of  the  accusative  after  certain  pre- 
positions in  Greek,  or  how  often  Homer  is  guilty  of  a 
hiatus.  They  resemble  Faust's  famulus  Wagner, 
whom  Faust  characterizes  as  a  fool 

".  .  .  whose  choice  is 
To  stick  in  shallow  trash  for  ever  more, 
Who  digs  with  eager  hand  for  buried  ore, 
And  when  he  finds  an  angle-worm  rejoices." 

Thus  there  are  many  trivial  truths  of  no  importance, 
the  investigation  of  which  serves  no  useful  purpose. 
For  instance,  whether  the  correct  pronunciation  of  the 
Greek  letter  -q  was  ee  or  ay  need  not  concern  us  much, 
and  the  philologist  who  devotes  all  his  life  and  his  best 
strength  to  its  settlement  is  rather  to  be  pitied  than  ad- 
mired. Various  truths  are  very  different  in  value,  for 
life  and  truth  become  holy  according  to  their  import- 
ance. All  this  granted,  we  need  not,  with  Nietzsche, 
discard  truth,  reason,  virtue,  and  all  moral  aspirations. 

Nietzsche  apparently  is  under  the  illusion  that  rea- 
son, systematic  thought,  moral  discipline  and  self-con- 
trol, are  external  powers,  and  in  his  love  of  liberty  he 
objects  to  their  authority.  Did  he  ever  consider  that 
thought  is  not  an  external  agent,  but  a  clarification  of 
man's  instincts,  and  that  discipline  is,  or  at  least  in  its 
purpose  and  final  aim  ought  to  be,  self -regulation,  so 
that  our  contradictory  thoughts  would  not  wage  an  in- 
ternecine war?  Thus,  Nietzsche,  the  instinct-philos- 


A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ORIGINALITY 

opher,  appears  as  an  ingenious  boy  whose  very  imma- 
turity is  regarded  by  himself  as  the  highest  blossom  of 
his  existence.  Like  an  intoxicated  youth,  he  revels  in 
his  irresponsibility  and  laughs  at  the  man  who  has 
learned  to  take  life  seriously.  Because  the  love  of 
truth  originates  from  instincts,  Nietzsche  treats  it  as 
a  mere  instinct,  and  nothing  else.  He  forgets  that  in 
the  evolution  of  man's  soul  all  instincts  develop  into 
something  higher  than  instinct,  and  the  love  of  truth 
develops  into  systematic  science. 

Nietzsche  never  investigated  what  his  own  self  con- 
sisted of.  He  never  analyzed  his  individuality.  Other- 
wise he  would  have  learned  that  he  received  the  most 
valuable  part  of  his  being  from  others,  and  that  the 
bundle  of  instincts  which  he  called  his  sovereign  self 
was  nothing  but  the  heirloom  of  the  ages  that  preceded 
him.  In  spite  of  his  repudiation  of  any  debt  to  others,  he 
was  but  the  continuation  of  others.  But  he  boldly  car- 
ried his  individualism,  if  not  to  its  logical  conclusions, 
yet  to  its  moral  applications.  When  speaking  of  the  Or- 
der of  Assassins  of  the  times  of  the  Crusades,  he  said 
with  enthusiasm :  "The  highest  secret  of  their  leaders 
was,  'Nothing  is  true,  everything  is  allowed !' "  And 
Nietzsche  adds:  "That  indeed,  was  liberty  of  spirit; 
that  dismissed  even  the  belief  in  truth."  The  philoso- 
pher of  instinct  even  regards  the  adherence  to  truth 
as  slavery  and  the  proclamation  of  truth  as  dogmatism. 


THE  OVERMAN 

THE  quintessence  of  Nietzsche's  philosophy  is  the 
"overman."  What  is  the  overman? 
The  word  (Uebermensch)  comes  from  a  good  mint ; 
it  is  of  Goethe's  coinage,  and  he  used  it  in  the  sense 
of  an  awe-inspiring  being,  almost  in  the  sense  of 
Unmensch,  to  characterize  Faust,  the  titanic  man  of 
high  aims  and  undaunted  courage, — the  man  who 
would  not  be  moved  in  the  presence  of  hell  and  pur- 
sued his  aspirations  in  spite  of  the  forbidding  counte- 
nance of  God  and  the  ugly  grin  of  Satan.  But  the  same 
expression  was  used  in  its  proper  sense  about  two  and 
a  half  millenniums  ago  in  ancient  China,  where  at  the 
time  of  Lao-tze  the  term  chiiin  jen  (  .fj  A )  >  "superior 
man,"  or  chiiin  tze,  "superior  sage,"  was  in  common 
usage.  But  the  overman  or  chiiin  jen  of  Lao-tze,  of 
Confucius  and  other  Chinese  sages  is  not  a  man  of 
power,  not  a  Napoleon,  not  an  unprincipled  tyrant,  not 
a  self-seeker  of  domineering  will,  not  a  man  whose  ego 
and  its  welfare  is  his  sole  and  exclusive  aim,  but  a 
Christlike  figure,  who  puts  his  self  behind  and  thus 
makes  his  self — a  nobler  and  better  self — come  to  the 

40 


THE  OVERMAN 

front,  who  does  not  retaliate,  but  returns  good  for  evil,1 
a  man  (as  the  Greek  sage  describes  him)  who  would 
rather  suffer  wrong  than  commit  wrong.2 

This  kind  of  higher  man  is  the  very  opposite  of 
Nietzsche's  overman,  and  it  is  the  spirit  of  this  nobler 
conception  of  a  higher  humanity  which  furnishes  the 
best  ideas  of  all  the  religions  of  the  world,  of  Lao-tze's 
Taoism,  of  Buddhism  and  of  Christianity. 

Alexander  Tille,  the  English  translator  of  Nietz- 
sche's Thus  Spake  Zarathustra,  translates  the  word 
Uebermensch  by  "beyond-man."  But  "beyond"  means 
jenseits;  and  Nietzsche  wrote  uber,  i.  e.,  superior  to, 
over,  or  higher  than,  and  the  literal  translation  "over- 
man" appears  to  be  the  best.  It  is  certainly  better  than 
the  barbaric  combination  of  "superman"  in  which 
Latin  and  Saxon  are  mixed  against  one  of  the  main 
rules  for  the  construction  of  words.  Say  "superhu- 
man" and  "overman,"  but  not  "overhuman"  or  "super- 
man." Emerson  in  a  similar  vein,  when  attempting 
to  characterize  that  which  is  higher  than  the  soul,  in- 
vented the  term  "oversoul,"  and  I  can  see  no  objection 
to  the  word  "overman." 

The  overman  is  the  higher  man,  the  superhuman 
man  of  the  future,  a  higher,  nobler,  more  powerful,  a 
better  being  than  the  present  man !  What  a  splendid 

1  Lao-tze's  Too  Teh  King,  Chaps.  49  and  63. 

a  For  a  collection  of  Greek  quotations  on  the  ethics  of  re- 
turning good  for  evil,  see  The  Open  Court,  Vol.  XV,  1901, 
pp.  9-12. 

41 


NIETZSCHE 

idea!  Since  evolution  has  been  accepted  as  a  truth, 
we  may  fairly  trust  that  we  all  believe  in  the  overman. 
All  our  reformers  believe  in  the  possibility  of  realizing 
a  higher  mankind.  We  Americans  especially  have 
faith  in  the  coming  of  the  kingdom  of  the  overman, 
and  our  endeavor  is  concentrated  in  hastening  his 
arrival.  The  question  is  only,  What  is  the  overman 
and  how  can  we  make  this  ideal  of  a  higher  develop- 
ment actual  ? 

Happy  Nietzsche!  You  need  not  trouble  yourself 
about  consistency;  you  reject  all  ideals  as  superstitions, 
and  then  introduce  an  ideal  of  your  own.  "There  you 
see,"  says  an  admirer  of  Nietzsche,  "what  a  splendid 
principle  it  is  not  to  own  any  allegiance  to  logic,  or  rule, 
or  consistency.  The  best  thought  of  Nietzsche's  would 
never  have  been  uttered  if  he  had  remained  faithful 
to  his  own  principles." 

However  ingenious  the  idea  of  an  overman  may  be, 
Nietzsche  carries  his  propositions  to  such  extremes 
that  in  spite  of  many  flashes  of  truth  they  become  in 
the  end  ridiculous  and  even  absurd.  His  ideal  is  good, 
but  he  utterly  fails  to  comprehend  its  nature  and  also 
the  mode  in  which  alone  the  overman  can  be  realized. 

Nietzsche  proclaims  the  coming  of  the  "overman," 
but  his  overman  is  not  superior  by  intellect,  wisdom, 
or  nobility  of  character,  but  by  vigor,  by  strength,  by 
an  unbending  desire  for  power  and  an  unscrupulous 
determination.  The  blond  barbarian  of  the  north  who 
tramples  under  foot  the  citizens  of  Greece  and  Rome, 

42 


THE  OVERMAN 

Napoleon  I,  and  the  Assyrian  conqueror, — such  are  his 
heroes  in  whom  this  higher  manhood  formerly  mani- 
fested itself. 

He  saw  in  the  history  of  human  thought,  the  de- 
velopment of  the  notion  of  the  "true  world,"  which  to 
him  was  a  mere  subjective  phantom,  a  superstition; 
but  a  reaction  must  set  in,  and  he  prophesied  that  the 
doom  of  nihilism  would  sweep  over  the  civilized  world 
applying  the  torch  to  its  temples,  churches  and  institu- 
tions. Upon  the  ruins  of  the  old  world  the  real  man, 
the  overman,  would  rise  and  establish  his  own  empire, 
an  empire  of  unlimited  power  in  which  the  herds,  i.  e., 
the  common  people,  would  become  subservient.  The 
"herd  animal"  (so  Nietzsche  called  any  one  foolish 
enough  to  recognize  morality  and  truth)  is  born  to 
obey.  He  is  destined  to  be  trodden  under  foot  by  the 
overman  who  is  strong  and  also  unscrupulous  enough 
to  use  the  herds  and  govern  them. 

Nietzsche  was  by  no  means  under  the  illusion  that 
the  rule  of  the  overman  would  be  lasting,  but  he  took 
comfort  in  the  thought  that  though  there  would  be 
periods  in  which  the  slaves  would  assert  themselves 
and  establish  an  era  of  the  herd  animals,  the  overman 
would  nevertheless  assert  himself  from  time  to  time, 
and  this  was  what  he  called  his  "doctrine  of  the  eternal 
return" — the  gospel  of  his  philosophy.  The  highest 
summit  of  existence  is  reached  in  those  phases  of  the 
denouement  of  human  life  when  the  overman  has  full 
control  over  the  herds  which  are  driven  into  the  field, 

43 


NIETZSCHE 

^ 

sheared  and  butchered  for  the  sole  benefit  of  him  who 
knows  the  secret  that  this  world  has  no  moral  signifi- 
cance beyond  being  a  prey  to  his  good  pleasure.  Nietz- 
sche's hope  is  certainly  not  desirable  for  the  mass  of 
mankind,  but  even  the  fate  of  the  overman  himself 
would  appear  as  little  enviable  a  condition  as  that  of 
the  tyrant  Dionysius  under  the  sword  of  Damocles,  or 
the  Czar  of  Russia  living  in  constant  fear  of  the  an- 
archistic bomb. 

Nietzsche,  feeling  that  his  thoughts  were  untimely, 
lived  in  the  hope  of  "the  coming  of  the  great  day"  on 
which  his  views  would  find  recognition.  He  looked 
upon  the  present  as  a  rebellion  against  the  spirit  of 
strength  and  vigor ;  Christianity  especially,  and  its  doc- 
trine of  humility  and  love  for  the  down-trodden  was 
hateful  to  him.  He  speaks  of  it  as  a  rebellion  of  slaves 
and  places  in  the  same  category  the  democraticism  that 
now  characterizes  the  tendency  of  human  development 
which  he  denounces  as  a  pseudo-civilization. 

He  insists  that  the  overman  is  beyond  good  and  evil ; 
and  yet  it  is  obvious  that  though  he  claims  to  be  the 
first  philosopher  who  maintained  the  principle  of  un- 
morality,  he  was  only  the  first  philosopher  boldly  to 
proclaim  it.  His  maxim  (or  lack  of  maxims)  has  been 
stealthily  and  secretly  in  use  among  all  those  classes 
whom  he  calls  "overmen,"  great  and  small.  The  great 
overmen  are  conquerors  and  tyrants,  who  meteorlike 
appear  and  disappear,  the  small  ones  are  commonly 
characterized  as  the  criminal  classes;  but  there  is  this 

44 


THE  OVERMAN 

difference  between  the  two,  that  the  former,  at  least 
so  far  as  they  have  succeeded,  recognize  the  absolute 
necessity  of  establishing  law  and  order,  and  though 
they  may  temporarily  have  infringed  upon  the  rules  of 
morality  themselves,  they  have  finally  come  always  to 
the  conclusion  that  in  order  to  maintain  their  position 
they  must  enforce  upon  others  the  usual  rules  of 
morality. 

Both  Alexander  and  Caesar  were  magnanimous  at 
the  right  moment.  They  showed  mercy  to  the  van- 
quished, they  exercised  justice  frequently  against  their 
own  personal  likes  or  dislikes,  and  were  by  no  means 
men  of  impulse  as  Nietzsche  would  have  his  overman 
be.  The  same  is  true  of  Napoleon  whose  success  is 
mainly  due  to  making  himself  subservient  to  the  needs 
of  his  age.  As  soon  as  he  assumed  the  highest  power 
in  France,  Napoleon  replaced  the  frivolous  tone  at  his 
court,  to  which  his  first  wife  Josephine  had  been  ac- 
customed, by  an  observance  of  so-called  bourgeois 
decency,  and  he  enforced  it  against  her  inclinations  and 
his  own. 

Further,  Napoleon  served  the  interests  of  Germany 
more  than  is  commonly  acknowledged  by  sweeping  out 
of  existence  the  mediaeval  system  of  innumerable  sov- 
ereigns, ecclesiastical  as  well  as  secular,  who  in  con- 
formity with  the  conservative  tenor  of  the  German 
people  had  irremediably  ensconced  themselves  in  their 
hereditary  rights  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  people. 
Moreover,  the  Code  Napoleon,  the  new  law  book,  per- 

45 


NIETZSCHE 

haps  the  most  enduring  work  of  Napoleon,  was  com- 
piled by  the  jurists  of  the  time,  not  because  Napoleon 
cared  for  justice,  but  because  he  saw  that  the  only  way 
of  establishing  a  stable  government  was  by  acknowl- 
edging rules  of  equity  and  by  enforcing  their  recogni- 
tion. It  is  true  that  Napoleon  made  his  service  in  the 
cause  of  right  and  justice  a  pedestal  for  himself,  but 
in  contrast  to  Nietzsche's  ideas  we  must  notice  that  this 
recognition  of  principle  was  the  only  way  of  success 
to  a  man  whose  natural  tendency  was  an  unbounded 
egotism,  an  unlimited  desire  for  power. 

In  spite  of  his  enthusiasm  in  announcing  the  advent 
of  an  overman,  Nietzsche  would  be  a  poor  adviser  for 
a  rising  usurper.  He  would  be  able  to  cause  a  great 
upheaval,  to  bring  about  a  Volcanic  eruption,  or  to 
raise  a  thunderstorm  wherever  restlessness  prevails, 
but  his  philosophy  lacks  the  principle  of  using  dis- 
cretion, or  advising  self-discipline,  of  applying  scien- 
tific methods — all  of  which  is  indispensable  for  success. 
He  preaches  boldness,  not  wisdom;  and  a  hero  after 
Nietzsche's  heart  would  be  like  a  navigator  who 
courageously  ventures  into  the  storm  but  scorns  a  chart 
and  leaves  the  mariners'  compass  behind;  he  would 
steer  not  as  circumstances  demand  but  according  to  his 
own  sweet  will,  and  would  be  wrecked  before  ever 
reaching  the  harbor  of  overmanhood. 

How  much  greater  is  the  ideal  of  the  overman  as 
taught  by  the  ancient  philosopher  of  China!  He,  the 
c hiiin  jen,  the  superior  man,  does  not  need  power  either 

46 


THE  OVERMAN 

political  or  financial  to  be  great;  he  does  not  need  a 
pedestal  of  oppressed  slaves  to  stand  on;  he  is  great 
in  himself,  because  he  has  a  great  compassionate  heart 
and  a  broad  comprehensive  mind.  He  is  simple,  and, 
as  we  read  in  the  Tao  Teh  King,  "He  wears  wool  [is 
not  dressed  in  silk  and  purple]  and  wears  his  jewel 
concealed  in  his  bosom." 


ZARATHUSTRA 

TO  those  who  have  not  the  time  to  wade  through 
the  twelve  volumes  of  Nietzsche's  works  and 
yet  wish  to  become  acquainted  with  him  at  his  best, 
we  recommend  a  perusal  of  his  book  Thus  Spake  Zara- 
thustra.  It  is  original  and  interesting,  full  of  striking 
passages,  sometimes  flashes  with  deep  truths,  then 
again  is  sterile  and  unprofitable,  or  even  tedious,  and 
sometimes  absurd ;  but  at  any  rate  it  presents  the  em- 
bodiment of  Nietzsche's  grandest  thoughts  in  their 
most  attractive  and  characteristic  form.  We  need 
scarcely  warn  the  reader  that  Zarathustra  is  only  an- 
other name  for  Friedrich  Nietzsche  and  has  nothing 
to  do  with  the  historical  person  of  that  name,  the  great 
Iranian  prophet,  the  founder  of  Mazdaism. 

Nietzche's  Zarathustra  is  a  hermit  philosopher  who, 
weary  of  his  wisdom,  leaves  his  cave  and  comes  to 
mingle  with  men,  to  teach  them  the  overman.  He 
meets  a  saint  who  loves  God,  and  Zarathustra  leaving 
him  says:  "Is  it  possible?  This  old  saint  in  his  forest 
has  not  yet  heard  that  God  is  dead!" 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE 

IN  THE  PRIME  OF  LIFE 


ZARATHUSTRA 

Zarathustra  preaches  to  a  crowd  in  the  market: 

"I  teach  you  the  overman.  Man  is  a  something  that  shall 
be  surpassed.  What  have  ye  done  to  surpass  him? 

"All  beings  hitherto  have  created  something  beyond  them- 
selves :  and  are  ye  going  to  be  the  ebb  of  this  great  tide  and 
rather  revert  to  the  animal  than  surpass  man? 

"What  with  man  is  the  ape?  A  joke  or  a  sore  shame. 
Man  shall  be  the  same  for  the  overman,  a  joke  or  a  sore 
shame. 

"Behold,  I  teach  you  the  overman ! 

"The  overman  is  the  significance  of  the  earth.  Your  will 
shall  say;  the  overman  shall  be  the  significance  of  the  earth. 

"I  conjure  you,  my  brethren,  remain  faithful  to  the  earth 
and  do  not  believe  those  who  speak  unto  you  of  superterres- 
trial  hopes !  Poisoners  they  are  whether  they  know  it  or  not. 

"Verily,  a  muddy  stream  is  man.  One  must  be  the  ocean 
to  be  able  to  receive  a  muddy  stream  without  becoming  un- 
clean. 

"Behold,  I  teach  you  the  overman :  he  is  that  ocean,  in  him 
your  great  contempt  can  sink. 

"What  is  the  greatest  thing  ye  can  experience?  That  is  the 
hour  of  great  contempt.  The  hour  in  which  not  only  your 
happiness,  but  your  reason  and  virtue  as  well,  turn  loathsome. 

"I  love  him  who  is  of  a  free  spirit  and  of  a  free  heart : 
thus  his  head  is  merely  the  intestine  of  his  heart,  but  his 
heart  driveth  him  to  destruction. 

"I  love  all  those  who  are  like  heavy  drops  falling  one  by 
one  from  the  dark  cloud  lowering  over  men :  they  announce 
the  coming  of  the  lightning  and  perish  in  the  announcing. 

"Behold,  I  am  an  announcer  of  the  lightning  and  a  heavy 
drop  from  the  clouds ;  that  lightning's  name  is  the  over- 
man." 

Zarathustra  comes  as  an  enemy  of  the  good  and  the 
just.  He  says: 

49 


NIETZSCHE 

"Lo,  the  good  and  just!  Whom  do  they  hate  most?  Him 
who  breaketh  to  pieces  their  tables  of  values, — the  law-breaker, 
the  criminal : — but  he  is  the  creator. 

"The  destroyer  of  morality  I  am  called  by  the  good  and 
just :  my  tale  is  immoral." 


COINS  OF  ANCIENT  ELIS. 

Each  is  worth  two  drachmae.    One  shows  on  the 

obverse  a  Zeus  head  with  a  laurel  wreath, 

the  other  a  winged  Victory. 

Nietzsche's  favorite  animals  are  the  proud  eagle  and 
the  cunning  serpent,  the  former  because  it  typifies  aris- 
tocracy, the  latter  as  the  wisest  among  all  creatures  of 
the  earth.  It  is  a  strange  and  exceptional  combination, 
for  these  two  animals  are  commonly  represented  as 

sa 


ZARATHUSTRA 

enemies.  The  eagle  and  serpent  was  the  emblem  of 
ancient  Elis  and  is  at  present  the  coat-of-arms  of 
Mexico,  but  in  both  cases  the  eagle  is  interpreted  to 
be  the  conqueror  of  the  serpent,  not  its  friend,  carry- 
ing it  as  his  prey  in  his  claws. 

Zarathustra's  philosophy  is  a  combination  of  the 
eagle's  pride  and  the  serpent's  wisdom,  which  Nietz- 
sche describes  thus : 

"Lol  an  eagle  swept  through  the  air  in  wide  circles,  a 
serpent  hanging  from  it  not  like  a  prey,  but  like  a  friend: 
coiling  round  its  neck. 

"They  are  mine  animals,'  said  Zarathustra  and  rejoiced 
heartily. 

"The  proudest  animal  under  the  sun,  and  the  wisest  animal 
under  the  sun  have  set  out  to  reconnoitre. 

"They  wish  to  learn  whether  Zarathustra  still  liveth. 
Verily,  do  I  still  live. 

"More  dangerous  than  among  animals  I  found  it  among 
men.  Dangerous  ways  are  taken  by  Zarathustra.  Let  mine 
animals  lead  me!" 

Here  is  a  sentence  worth  quoting: 

"Of  all  that  is  written  I  love  only  that  which  the  writer 
wrote  with  his  blood.  Write  with  blood,  and  thou  wilt  learn 
that  blood  is  spirit." 

In  another  chapter  on  the  back-worlds-men  Nietz- 
sche writes: 

"Once  Zarathustra  threw  his  spell  beyond  man,  like  all 
back-worlds-men.  Then  the  world  seemed  to  me  the  work 
of  a  suffering  and  tortured  God. 

"Alas!  brethren,  that  God  whom  I  created  was  man's  work 
and  man's  madness,  like  all  Gods ! 

"Man  he  was,  and  but  a  poor  piece  of  man  and  the  I. 

51 


NIETZSCHE 

From  mine  own  ashes  and  flame  it  came  unto  me,  that  ghost, 
yea  verily !  It  did  not  come  unto  me  from  beyond ! 

"What  happened,  brethren?  I  overcame  myself,  the  suf- 
ferer, and  carrying  mine  own  ashes  unto  the  mountains  in- 
vented for  myself  a  brighter  flame.  And  lo!  the  ghost  de- 
parted from  me! 

"Now  to  me,  the  convalescent,  it  would  be  suffering  and 
pain  to  believe  in  such  ghosts :  suffering  it  would  be  for  me 
and  humiliation.  Thus  spake  I  unto  the  back-worlds^men." 

Nietzsche's  self  is  not  ideal  but  material;  it  is  not 
thought,  not  even  the  will,  but  the  body.  The  follow- 
ing passage  sounds  like  Vedantism  as  interpreted  by 
a  materialist : 

"He  who  is  awake  and  knoweth  saith :  Body  I  am 
throughout,  and  nothing  besides;  and  soul  is  merely  a  word 
for  a  something  in  body. 

"Body  is  one  great  reason,  a  plurality  with  one  sense,  a 
war  and  a  peace,  a  flock  and  a  herdsman. 

"Also  thy  little  reason,  my  brother,  which  thou  callest 
'spirit' — it  is  a  tool  of  thy  body,  a  little  tool  and  toy  of  thy 
great  reason. 

"T,  thou  sayest  and  art  proud  of  that  word.  But  the 
greater  thing  is — which  thou  wilt  not  believe — thy  body  and  its 
great  reason.  It  doth  not  say  T,  but  it  is  the  acting  'I.' 

"The  self  ever  listeneth  and  seeketh :  it  compareth,  sub- 
dueth,  conquereth,  destroyeth.  It  ruleth  and  is  the  ruler  of 
the  T  as  well. 

"Behind  thy  thoughts  and  feelings,  my  brother,  standeth 
a  mighty  lord,  an  unknown  wise  man — whose  name  is  self. 
In  thy  body  he  dwelleth,  thy  body  he  is. 

"There  is  more  reason  in  thy  body  than  in  thy  best  wisdom. 
And  who  can  know  why  thy  body  needeth  thy  best  wisdom? 

"Thy  self  laugheth  at  thine  T  and  its  prancings:  What 
are  these  boundings  and  flights  of  thought?  it  saith  unto 

52 


ZARATHUbTRA 

itself.    A  round-about  way  to  my  purpose.    I  am  the  leading- 
string  of  the  I  and  the  suggester  of  its  concepts. 

"The  creative  self  created  for  itself  valuing  and  despising, 
it  created  for  itself  lust  and  woe.  The  creative  body  created 
for  itself  the  spirit  to  be  the  hand  of  its  will." 

One  of  the  best  passages  in  Zarathustra's  sermons  is 
Nietzsche's  command  to  love  the  overman,  the  man  of 
the  distant  future: 

"I  tell  you,  your  love  of  your  neighbor  is  your  bad  love 
of  yourselves. 

"Ye  flee  from  yourselves  unto  your  neighbor  and  would 
fain  make  a  virtue  thereof;  but  I  see  through  your  'unself- 
ishness.' 

"The  thou  is  older  than  the  I ;  the  thou  hath  been  pro- 
claimed holy,  but  the  I  not  yet;  man  thus  thrusteth  himself 
upon  his  neighbor. 

"Do  I  counsel  you  to  love  your  neighbor?  I  rather  coun- 
sel you  to  flee  from  your  neighbor  and  to  love  the  most 
remote. 

"Love  unto  the  most  remote  future  man  is  higher  than 
love  unto  your  neighbor.  And  I  consider  love  unto  things 
and  ghosts  to  be  higher  than  love  unto  men. 

"This  ghost  which  marcheth  before  thee,  my  brother,  is 
more  beautiful  than  thou  art.  Why  dost  thou  not  give  him 
thy  flesh  and  thy  bones?  Thou  art  afraid  and  fleest  unto 
thy  neighbor. 

"Unable  to  endure  yourselves  and  not  loving  yourselves 
enough,  you  seek  to  wheedle  your  neighbor  into  loving  you 
and  thus  to  gild  you  with  his  error. 

"My  brethren,  I  counsel  you  not  to  love  your  neighbor; 
I  counsel  you  to  love  those  who  are  the  most  remote." 

In  perfect  agreement  with  the  ideal  of  the  overman 
is  Nietzsche's  view  of  marriage,  and  verily  it  contains  a 
very  true  and  noble  thought : 

53 


NIETZSCHE 

"Thou  shalt  build  beyond  thyself.  But  first  thou  must 
be  built  thyself  square  in  body  and  soul. 

"Thou  shalt  not  only  propagate  thyself  but  propagate 
thyself  upwards !  Therefore  the  garden  of  marriage  may 
help  thee! 

"Thou  shalt  create  a  higher  body,  a  prime  motor,  a  wheel 
of  self-rolling, — thou  shalt  create  a  creator. 

"Marriage :  thus  I  call  the  will  of  two  to  create  that  one 
which  is  more  than  they  who  created  it  I  call  marriage 
reverence  unto  each  other  as  unto  those  who  will  such  a  will. 

"Let  this  be  the  significance  and  the  truth  of  thy  marriage. 
But  that  which  the  much-too-many  call  marriage,  those 
superfluous — alas,  what  call  I  that? 

"Alai>!  that  soul's  poverty  of  two!  Alas!  that  soul's  dirt 
of  two !  Alas !  that  miserable  ease  of  two ! 

"Marriage  they  call  that;  and  they  say  marriage  is  made 
in  heaven. 

"Well,  I  like  it  not,  that  heaven  of  the  superfluous!" 
Nietzsche  takes  a  Schopenhauerian  view  of  woman- 
kind, excepting  from  the  common  condemnation  his 
sister  alone,  to  whom  he  once  said,  "You  are  not  a 
woman,  you  are  a  friend."    He  says  of  woman : 

"Too  long  a  slave  and  a  tyrant  have  been  hidden  in  woman. 
Therefore  woman  is  not  yet  capable  of  friendship;  she 
knoweth  love  only." 

Nietzsche  is  not  aware  that  the  self  changes  and 
that  it  grows  by  the  acquisition  of  truth.  He  treats  the 
self  as  remaining  the  same,  and  truth  as  that  which 
our  will  has  made  conceivable.  Truth  to  him  is  a  mere 
creature  of  the  self.  Here  is  Zarathustra's  condem- 
nation of  man's  search  for  truth : 

54 


ZARATHUSTRA 

"  'Will  unto  truth'  ye  call,  ye  wisest  men,  what  inspireth 
you  and  maketh  you  ardent? 

"  'Will  unto  the  conceivableness  of  all  that  is,' — thus  I 
call  your  will ! 

"All  that  is  ye  are  going  to  make  conceivable.  For  with 
good  mistrust  ye  doubt  whether  it  is  conceivable. 

"But  it  hath  to  submit  itself  and  bend  before  yourselves ! 
Thus  your  will  willeth.  Smooth  it  shall  become  and  subject 
unto  spirit  as  its  mirror  and  reflected  image. 

"That  is  your  entire  will,  ye  wisest  men,  as  a  will  unto 
power;  even  when  ye  speak  of  good  and  evil  and  of  valuations. 

"Ye  will  create  the  world  before  which  to  kneel  down. 
Thus  it  is  your  last  hope  and  drunkenness." 

Recognition  of  truth  is  regarded  as  submission : 

"To  be  true, — few  are  able  to  be  so !  And  he  who  is  able 
doth  not  want  to  be  so.  But  least  of  all  the  good  are  able. 

"Oh,  these  good  people !  Good  men  never  speak  the 
truth.  To  be  good  in  that  way  is  a  sickness  for  the  mind. 

"They  yield,  these  good  men,  they  submit  themselves ;  their 
heart  saith  what  is  said  unto  it,  their  foundation  obeyeth. 
But  whoever  obeyeth  doth  not  hear  himself!" 

Nietzsche  despises  science.  He  must  have  had  sorry 
experiences  with  scientists  who  offered  him  the  dry 
bones  of  scholarship  as  scientific  truth. 

"When  I  lay  sleeping,  a  sheep  ate  at  the  ivy-wreath  of  my 
head, — ate  and  said  eating:  'Zarathustra  is  no  longer  a 
scholar.' 

"Said  it  and  went  off  clumsily  and  proudly.  So  a  child 
told  me. 

"This  is  the  truth :  I  have  departed  from  the  house  of 
scholars,  and  the  door  I  have  shut  violently  behind  me. 

"Too  long  sat  my  soul  hungry  at  their  table.  Not,  as 
they,  am  I  trained  for  perceiving  as  for  cracking  nuts. 

"Freedom  I  love,  and  a  breeze  over  a  fresh  soil.     And 

55 


NIETZSCHE 

I  would  rather  sleep  on  ox-skins  than  on  their  honors  and 
respectabilities. 

"I  am  too  hot  and  am  burnt  with  mine  own  thoughts, 
so  as  often  to  take  my  breath  away.  Then  I  must  go  into 
the  open  air  and  away  from  all  dusty  rooms. 

"Like  millworks  they  work,  and  like  corn-crushers.  Let 
folk  only  throw  their  grain  into  them !  They  know  only  too 
well  how  to  grind  corn  and  make  white  dust  out  of  it. 

"They  look  well  at  each  other's  fingers  and  trust  each 
other  not  over-much.  Ingenious  in  little  stratagems,  they 
wait  for  those  whose  knowledge  walketh  on  lame  feet;  like 
spiders  they  wait. 

"They  also  know  how  to  play  with  false  dice;  and  I 
found  them  playing  so  eagerly  that  they  perspired  from  it. 

"We  are  strangers  unto  each  other,  and  their  virtues  are 
still  more  contrary  unto  my  taste  than  their  falsehoods  and 
false  dice." 

Even  if  all  scientists  were  puny  sciolists,  the  ideal 
of  science  would  remain,  and  if  all  the  professed  seek- 
ers for  truth  were  faithless  to  and  unworthy  of  their 
high  calling,  truth  itself  would  not  be  abolished. 

So  far  as  we  can  see,  Nietzsche  never  became  ac- 
quainted with  any  one  of  the  exact  sciences.  He  was 
a  philologist  who  felt  greatly  dissatisfied  with  the  loose 
methods  of  his  colleagues,  but  he  has  not  done  much 
in  his  own  specialty  to  attain  to  a  greater  exactness  of 
results.  His  essays  on  Homer,  on  the  Greek  tragedy, 
and  similar  subjects,  have  apparently  not  received 
much  recognition  among  philologists  and  historians. 

Having  gathered  a  number  of  followers  in  his  cave, 
one  of  them,  called  the  conscientious  man,  said  to  the 
others : 

56 


2ARATHUSTRA 

"We  seek  different  things,  even  up  here,  ye  and  I.  For 
I  seek  more  security.  Therefore  have  I  come  unto  Zara- 
thustra.  For  he  is  the  firmest  tower  and  will — 

"Fear — that  is  man's  hereditary  and  fundamental  feeling. 
By  fear  everything  is  explained,  original  sin  and  original 
virtue.  Out  of  fear  also  hath  grown  my  virtue,  which  is 
called  Science. 

"Such  long,  old  fears,  at  last  become  refined,  spiritual, 
intellectual,  to-day,  methinketh,  it  is  called  Science" 

This  conception  of  science  is  refuted  by  Nietzsche 
in  this  fashion: 

"Thus  spake  the  conscientious  one.  But  Zarathustra,  who 
had  just  returned  into  his  cave  and  had  heard  the  last  speech 
and  guessed  its  sense,  threw  a  handful  of  roses  at  the  con- 
scientious one,  laughing  at  his  'truths.'  'What?'  he  called. 
'What  did  I  hear  just  now?  Verily,  methinketh,  thou  art  a 
fool,  or  I  am  one  myself.  And  thy  "truth"  I  turn  upside  down 
with  one  blow,  and  that  quickly.' 

"  'For  fear  is  our  exception.  But  courage  and  adventure, 
and  the  joy  of  what  is  uncertain,  what  hath  never  been  dared 
— courage,  methinketh,  is  the  whole  prehistoric  development 
of  man. 

"  'From  the  wildest,  most  courageous  beasts  he  hath,  by 
his  envy  and  his  preying,  won  all  their  virtues.  Only  thus 
hath  he  become  a  man. 

"'This  courage,  at  last  become  refined,  spiritual,  intel- 
lectual, this  human  courage  with  an  eagle's  wings  and  a  ser- 
pent's wisdom — it,  methinketh,  is  called  to-day — ' 

'"Zarathustra!'  cried  all  who  sat  together  there,  as  from 
one  mouth  making  a  great  laughter  withal." 

In  spite  of  identifying  the  self  with  the  body,  which 
is  mortal,  Nietzsche  longs  for  the  immortal.  He  says : 

"Oh!  how  could  I  fail  to  be  eager  for  eternity,  and  for 
the  marriage-ring  of  rings,  the  ring  of  recurrence? 

57 


NIETZSCHE 

"Never  yet  have  I  found  the  woman  by  whom  I  should 
like  to  have  had  children,  unless  it  be  this  woman  I  love  — 
for  I  love  thee,  O  Eternity  1" 

The  best  known  of  Nietzsche's  poems  forms  the  con- 
clusion of  Thus  Spake  Zarathustra,  the  most  impress- 


*^i  /**•*««  A**  ***•«.      v  u,     \*l  • 

^;*^/  ^/   1^.^ 

'1«*f..  *^    ^*«    4*     <>- 

(  41   .>  T 


,Y 


NIETZSCHE'S  HANDWRITING. 


ive  work  of  Nietzsche,  and  is  called  by  him  "The 
Drunken  Song."  The  thoughts  are  almost  incoherent 
and  it  is  difficult  to  say  what  is  really  meant  by  it. 
Nothing  is  more  characteristic  of  Nietzsche's  attitude 
and  the  vagueness  of  his  fitful  mode  of  thought.  It 

58 


H  AEWS6H  61 EB  A6HT! 
Vft*  SPfflCT  DIETICFE  /"UTTEKWAeHTT 
..J6H  SCHUEF.  JCH  SCHUEF-, 
^AVS  TIEfEA  TRAVn  ilfl  JCH  ERWACHT:- 
•Jttt.  WELT  JST  TJEF, 
..VWSTJEFCR  AL30ER  JM  CEB«CMT. 
.TIEF  JST  JMR  VEM-, 
JLV«T  TIEFCff  NOCK  *L3  HgRZELEIOl 
nWEH  SPRICHT:  VER&EH ! 
JlOCn  «LLE  LVST  W8U,  EWI&KEIT-, 
.-WILLTIEfE.TJEFE  EWI&KEIT!' 
•ALSO 


NIETZSCHE'S  DRUNKEN  SONG 

ILLUSTRATION  BY  LINDLOF 


ZARATHUSTRA 

has  been  illustrated  by  Hans  Lindlof ,  in  the  same  spirit 
in  which  Richard  Strauss  has  written  a  musical  com- 
position on  the  theme  of  Nietzsche's  Thus  Spake 
Zarathustra. 

"The  Drunken  Song"  reads  in  our  translation  as 
follows : 

"Man,  listen,  pray! 
What  the  deep  midnight  has  to  say: 
'I  lay  asleep, 

'But  woke  from  dreams  deep  and  distraught 
'The  world  is  deep, 

'E'en  deeper  than  the  day  e'er  thought. 
'Deep's  the  world's  pain, — 
'Joy  deeper  still  than  heartache's  burning. 
'Pain  says,  Life's  vain ! 
'But  for  eternity  Joy's  yearning, 
'For  deep  eternity  Joy's  yearning !' " 

Prof.  William  Benjamin  Smith  has  translated  this 
same  song,  and  we  think  it  will  be  interesting  to  our 
readers  to  compare  his  translation  with  our  rendering. 
It  reads  as  follows : 

"Oh  Man !  Give  ear ! 

What  saith  the  midnight  deep  and  drear? 
'From  sleep,  from  sleep 
'I  woke  as  from  a  dream  profound. 
'The  world  is  deep 
'And  deeper  than  the  day  can  sound. 
'Deep  is  its  woe, — 

'Joy,  deeper  still  than  heart's  distress. 
'Woe  saith,  Forego! 
'But  Joy  wills  everlastingness, — 
'Wills  deep,  deep  everlastingness.' " 

59 


A  PROTEST  AGAINST  HIMSELF 

"XT  IETZSCHE  is  far  from  regarding  his  philosophy 
•V^  as  timely.  He  was  a  proud  and  aristocratic 
character,  spoiled  from  childhood  by  an  unfaltering 
admiration  on  the  part  of  both  his  mother  and  sister. 
It  was  unfortunate  for  him  that  his  father  had  died 
before  he  could  influence  the  early  years  of  his  son 
through  wholesome  discipline.  Not  enjoying  a  vigor- 
ous constitution  Nietzsche  was  greatly  impressed  with 
the  thought  that  a  general  decadence  was  overshadow- 
ing mankind.  The  truth  was  that  his  own  bodily  sys- 
tem was  subject  to  many  ailments  which  hampered  his 
mental  improvement.  He  was  hungering  for  health, 
he  envied  the  man  of  energy,  he  longed  for  strength 
and  vigor,  but  all  this  was  denied  him,  and  so  these 
very  shortcomings  of  his  own  bodily  strength — his 
own  decadence — prompted  in  him  a  yearning  for  bodily 
health,  for  an  unbounded  exercise  of  energy,  and  for 
success.  These  were  his  dearest  ideals,  and  his  desire 
for  power  was  his  highest  ambition.  He  saw  in  the 
history  of  human  thought,  the  development  of  the 

60 


A  PROTEST  AGAINST  HIMSELF 

notion  of  the  "true  world,"  which  to  him  was  a  mere 
subjective  phantom,  a  superstition;  but  a  reaction 
would  set  in,  and  he  prophesied  that  the  doom  of 
nihilism  would  sweep  over  the  civilized  world  apply- 
ing the  torch  to  its  temples,  churches  and  institutions. 
Upon  the  ruins  of  the  old  world  the  real  man,  the  over- 
man, would  rise  and  establish  his  own  empire,  an  em- 
pire of  unlimited  power  in  which  the  herds,  i.  e.,  the 
common  people  would  become  subservient. 

Nietzsche's  philosophy  forms  a  strange  contrast  to 
his  own  habits  of  life.  A  model  of  virtue,  he  made 
himself  the  advocate  of  vice,  and  gloried  in  it.  He 
encouraged  the  robber1  to  rob,  but  he  himself  was 
honesty  incarnate;  he  incited  the  people  to  rebel 
against  authority  of  all  kinds,  but  he  himself  was  a 
"model  child"  in  the  nursery,  a  "model  scholar"  in 
school,  and  a  "model  soldier"  while  serving  in  the  Ger- 
man army.  His  teachers  as  well  as  the  officers  of  his 
regiment  fail  to  find  words  enough  to  praise  Nietz- 
sche's obedience.2 

Nietzsche's  professors  declare  that  he  distinguished 
himself  "durch  punktlichen  Gehorsam"  (p.  3)  ;  his 
sister  tells  us  that  she  and  her  brother  were  "ungeheuer 
artig,  wahre  Musterkinder"  (p.  36).  He  makes  a  good 
soldier,  and,  in  spite  of  his  denunciations  of  posing, 

*E.g.:  "Bitte  nie!    Lass  dies  Gewimmer! 

Nimm,  ich  bitte  dich,  nimm  immer !" 

2  Compare  Das  Leben  Friedrich  Nietzsche's  by  his  sister, 
Elisabeth  Forster-Nietzsche. 

61 


METZSCHE 

displays  theatrical  vanity  in  having  himself  photo- 
graphed with  drawn  sword  (the  scabbard  is  missing). 
His  martial  mustache  almost  anticipates  the  tonsorial 
art  of  the  imperial  barber  of  the  present  Kaiser ;  and 
yet  his  spectacled  eyes  and  good-natured  features  be- 
tray the  peacefulness  of  his  intentions.  He  plays  the 
soldier  only,  and  would  have  found  difficulty  in  killing 
even  a  fly. 

Nietzsche  disclaims  ever  having  learned  anything  in 
any  school,  but  there  never  was  a  more  grateful  Ger- 
man pupil  in  Germany.  He  composed  fervid  poems  on 
his  school — the  well  known  institution  Schulpforta, 
which  on  account  of  its  severe  discipline  he  praises, 
not  in  irony  but  seriously,  as  the  "narrow  gate."  8 

Nietzsche  denounces  the  German  character,  German 
institutions,  and  the  German  language,  his  mother- 
tongue,  and  is  extremely  unfair  in  his  denunciations. 
He  takes  pleasure  in  the  fact  that  Deutsch  ( see  Ulfila's 
Bible  translation)  originally  means  "pagans  or 
heathen,"  and  hopes  that  the  dear  German  people  will 
earn  the  honor  of  being  called  pagans.  (La  Gaya 
Sciensa,  p.  176.)  A  reaction  against  his  patriotism 
set  in  immediately  after  the  war,  when  he  became 
acquainted  with  the  brutality  of  some  vulgar  speci- 
mens of  the  victorious  nation, — most  of  them  non- 
combatants.4 

*  Leben,  pp.  90-97. 

4  (See,  e.  g.,  Leben,  II.,  1,  pp.  108-111.)  "Nach  dem  Kriege 
missfiel  mir  der  Luxus,  die  Franzosenverachtung,"  etc.,  p.  108. 

62 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE 

AS  A  VOLUNTEER  IN  THE  GERMAN 
ARTILLERY,  1868 


A  PROTEST  AGAINST  HIMSELF 

Nietzsche  not  only  wrote  in  German  and  made  the 
most  involved  constructions,  but  when  the  war  broke 
out  he  asked  his  adopted  country  Switzerland,  in  which 
he  had  acquired  citizenship  after  accepting  a  position 
as  professor  of  classical  languages  at  the  University 
of  Basel,  for  leave  of  absence  to  join  the  German 
army.  In  the  Franco-Prussian  war  he  might  have  had 
a  chance  to  live  up  to  his  theories  of  struggle,  but  un- 
fortunately the  Swiss  authorities  did  not  allow  him  to 
join  the  army,  and  granted  leave  of  absence  only  on 
condition  that  he  would  serve  as  a  nurse.  Such  is  the 
irony  of  fate.  While  Nietzsche  stood  up  for  a  ruth- 
less assertion  of  strength  and  for  a  suppression  of 
sympathy  which  he  denounced  as  a  relic  of  the  ethics 

"Ich  halte  das  jetzige  Preussen  fur  eine  der  Cultur  hochst 
gefahrliche  Macht."  Nietzsche  ridicules  the  German  lan- 
guage as  barbarous  in  sound  (La  Gaya  Scienza,  pp.  138-140), 
"walderhaft,  heiser,  wie  aus  raucherigen  Stuben  und  un- 
hoflichen  Gegenden."  Unique  is  the  origin  of  the  standard 
style  of  modern  high  German  from  the  bureaucratic  slang, 
"kanzleimassig  schreiben,  das  war  etwas  Vornehmes"  (La 
Gaya  Scienza,  p.  138),  and  at  present  the  German  changes 
into  an  "Offizierdeutsch"  (ibid.,  p.  139).  Nietzsche  suspects 
"the  German  depth,"  "die  deutsche  Tiefe,"  to  be  a  mere  mental 
dyspepsia  (see  "Jenseits  von  Gut  und  Bose,"  p.  211),  saying, 
"Der  Deutsche  verdaut  seine  Ereignisse  schlecht,  or  wird  nie 
damit  fertig;  die  deutsche  Tiefe  ist  oft  nur  eine  schwere, 
zogernde  Verdauung."  Nevertheless,  he  holds  that  the  old- 
fashioned  German  depth  is  better  than  modern  Prussian 
"Schneidigkeit  und  Berliner  Witz  und  Sand."  He  prefers  the 
company  of  the  Swiss  to  that  of  his  countrymen.  (See  also 
"Was  den  Deutschen  abgeht,"  Vol.  8,  p.  108.) 

63 


NIETZSCHE 

of  a  negation  of  life,  his  own  tender  soul  was  so  over- 
sensitive that  his  sister  feels  justified  in  tracing  his 
disease  back  to  the  terrible  impressions  he  received 
during  the  war. 

Nietzsche  speaks  of  the  king  as  "the  dear  father  of 
the  country." 8  If  there  was  a  flaw  in  Nietzsche's 
moral  character,  it  was  goody-goodyness ;  and  his  phil- 
osophy is  a  protest  against  the  principles  of  his  own 
nature.  While  boldly  calling  himself  "the  first  un- 
moralist,"  justifying  even  license  itself  and  defending 
the  coarsest  lust,8  his  own  life  might  have  earned  him 
the  name  of  sissy,  and  he  shrank  in  disgust  from  moral 
filth  wherever  he  met  with  it  in  practical  life. 

Nietzsche  denounced  pessimism,  and  yet  his  phil- 
osophy was,  as  he  himself  confesses,  the  last  conse- 
quence of  pessimism.  Hegel  declared  (says  Nietzsche 
in  Morgenrothe,  p.  8),  "Contradiction  moves  the  world, 
all  things  are  sel f -contradictory ";  "we  (adds  Nietz- 
sche) carry  pessimism  even  into  logic."  He  proposes 
to  vivisect  morality;  "but  (adds  he)  you  cannot  vivi- 
sect a  thing  without  killing  it."  Thus  his  "unmoral- 
ism"  is  simply  an  expression  of  his  earnestness  to  in- 

*  "Unser  lieber  Konig,"  "der  Landesvater,"  etc.    See  Leben, 
I.,  p.  24,  and  II.,  1,  p.  248,  "Unser  lieber  alter  Kaiser  Wilhelm," 
and  "wir  Preussen  waren  wirklich  stolz."    These  expressions 
occur  in  Nietzsche's  description  of  the  Emperor's  appearance 
at  Bayreuth. 

*  E.  g.,  "Auch  der  schadlichste  Mensch  ist  vielleicht  immer 
noch  der  allerniitzlichste  in  Hinsicht  auf  Erhaltung  der  Art," 
etc.    La  Gaya  Scienza,  p.  3  ff. 

64 


A  PROTEST  AGAINST  HIMSELF 

vestigate  the  moral  problem,  and  he  expresses  the  re- 
sult in  the  terse  sentence ;  Moral  ist  Nothluge  (Mensch- 
liches,  p.  63.) 

He  preached  struggle  and  hatred,  and  yet  was  so 
tender-hearted  that  in  an  hour  of  dejection  he  con- 
fessed to  his  sister  with  a  sigh:  "I  was  not  at  all 
made  to  hate  or  be  an  enemy."7  The  decadence  which 
he  imputes  to  mankind  is  a  mere  reflection  of  his  own 
state  of  mind,  and  the  strength  which  he  praises  is  that 
quality  in  which  he  is  most  sorely  lacking.  Nietzsche 
himself  had  the  least  possible  connection  with  active 
life.  He  was  unmarried,  had  no  children,  nor  any  in- 
terests beyond  his  ambition,  and  having  served  as  pro- 
fessor of  the  classical  languages  for  some  time  at  the 
small  university  of  Basel,  he  was  for  the  greater  part  of 
his  life  without  a  calling,  without  duties,  without  aims. 
He  never  ventured  to  put  his  own  theories  into  practice. 
He  did  not  even  try  to  rise  as  a  prophet  of  his  own 
philosophy,  and  remained  in  isolation  to  the  very  end 
of  his  life. 

Nietzsche  must  have  felt  the  contradiction  between 
his  theories  and  his  habits  of  life,  and  it  appears  that 
he  suffered  under  it  more  than  can  be  estimated  by  an 
impartial  reader  of  his  books.  He  was  like  the  bird 
in  the  cage  who  sings  of  liberty,  or  an  apoplectic  pa- 
tient who  dreams  of  deeds  of  valor  as  a  knight  in 
tournament  or  as  a  wrestler  in  the  prize  ring.  Never 

7  "Ich  bin  so  gar  nicht  zum  Hassen  und  zum  Feind  sein 
gemacht!" 

65 


NIETZSCHE 

was  craving  for  power  more  closely  united  with  im- 
potence ! 

It  is  characteristic  of  him  that  he  said,  "If  there 
were  a  God,  how  should  I  endure  not  to  be  God?" 
and  so  his  ambition  impelled  him  at  least  to  prophesy 
the  coming  of  his  ideal,  i.  e.,  robust  health,  full  of 
bodily  vigor  and  animal  spirits,  unchecked  by  any  rule 
of  morality,  and  an  unstinted  use  of  power. 

Nietzsche  had  an  exaggerated  conception  of  his  voca- 
tion and  he  saw  in  himself  the  mouthpiece  of  that 
grandest  and  deepest  truth,  viz.,  that  man  should  dare 
to  be  himself  without  any  regard  of  morality  or  con- 
sideration for  his  fellow  beings.  And  here  we  have 
the  tragic  element  of  his  life.  Nietzsche,  the  atheist, 
deemed  himself  a  God  incarnate,  and  the  despiser  of 
the  Crucified,  suffered  a  martyr's  fate  in  offering  his 
own  life  to  the  cause  of  his  hope.  The  earnestness 
with  which  he  preached  his  wild  and  untenable  doc- 
trines appeals  to  us  and  renders  his  figure  sympathetic, 
which  otherwise  would  be  grotesque.  Think  of  a  man 
who  in  his  megalomania  preaches  a  doctrine  that  jus- 
tifies an  irresponsible  desire  for  power!  Would  he 
not  be  ridiculous  in  his  impotence  to  actualize  his 
dream?  and  on  the  other  hand,  if  he  were  strong 
enough  to  practice  what  he  preached,  if  like  another 
Napoleon,  he  would  make  true  his  dreams  of  enslaving 
the  world,  would  not  mankind  in  self-defense  soon 
rise  in  rebellion  and  treat  him  as  a  criminal,  rendering 
him  and  his  followers  incapable  of  doing  harm?  But 
Nietzsche's  personality,  weak  and  impotent  and  power- 

66 


A  PROTEST  AGAINST  HIMSELF 

less  to  appear  as  the  overman  and  to  subjugate  the 
world  to  his  will,  suffered  excruciating  pains  in  his 
soul  and  tormented  himself  to  death,  which  came  to 
him  in  the  form  of  decadence — a  softening  of  the 
brain. 

Poor  Nietzsche!  what  a  bundle  of  contradictions! 
None  of  these  contradictions  are  inexplicable.  All  of 
them  are  quite  natural.  They  are  the  inevitable  re- 
actions against  a  prior  enthusiasm,  and  he  swings, 
according  to  the  law  of  the  pendulum,  to  the  opposite 
extreme  of  his  former  position. 

How  did  Nietzsche  develop  into  an  unmoralist? 
Simply  by  way  of  reaction  against  the  influence  of 
Schopenhauer  in  combination  with  the  traditional 
Christianity. 

Nietzsche  passed  through  three  periods  in  his  de- 
velopment. He  was  first  a  follower  of  Schopen- 
hauer and  an  admirer  of  Wagner,  but  he  shattered  his 
idols  and  became  a  convert  to  Auguste  Comte's  positiv- 
ism. Schopenhauer  was  the  master  at  whose  feet 
Nietzsche  sat;  from  him  he  learned  boldness  of 
thought  and  atheism,  that  this  world  is  a  world  of 
misery  and  struggle.  He  accepted  for  a  time  Schop- 
enhauer's pessimism  but  rebelled  in  his  inmost  soul 
against  the  ethical  doctrine  of  the  negation  of  the 
will.  He  retained  Schopenhauer's  contempt  for  pre- 
vious philosophers  (presumably  he  never  tried  to 
understand  them)  yet  he  resented  the  thought  of  a 
negation  of  life  and  replaced  it  by  a  most  emphatic 
assertion.  He  thus  recognized  the  reactionary  spirit  of 

67 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE 

AS  PROFESSOR  AT  BASLE 


A  PROTEST  AGAINST  HIMSELF 

Schopenhauer,  whose  system  is  a  Christian  metaphys- 
ics. Nietzsche  denounces  the  ethics  of  a  negation  of 
the  will  as  a  disease,  and  since  nature  in  the  old  sys- 
tem is  regarded  as  the  source  of  moral  evil  the  idea 
dawns  on  him  that  he  himself,  trying  to  establish  a 
philosophy  of  nature,  is  an  immoralist.  He  now  ques- 
tions morality  itself  from  the  standpoint  of  an  affirm- 
ation of  the  will,  and  at  last  goes  so  far  as  to  speak  of 
ideals  as  a  symptom  of  shallowness.8 

Nietzsche  argued  that  our  conception  of  truth  and 
our  ideal  world  is  but  a  phantasmagoria,  and  the  pic- 
ture of  the  universe  in  our  consciousness  a  distorted 
image  of  real  life.  Our  pleasures  and  pains,  too,  are 
both  transient  and  subjective.  Accordingly  it  would 
be  a  gross  mistake  for  us  to  exaggerate  their  import- 
ance. What  does  it  matter  if  we  endure  a  little  more 
or  less  pain,  or  of  what  use  are  the  pleasures  in  which 
we  might  indulge?  The  realities  of  life  consist  in 
power,  and  in  our  dominion  over  the  forces  that  dom- 
inate life.  Knowledge  and  truth  are  of  no  use  unless 
they  become  subservient  to  this  realistic  desire  for 
power.  They  are  mere  means  to  an  end  which  is  the 
superiority  of  the  overman,  the  representative  of 
Nietzsche's  philosophy  by  whom  the  mass  of  mankind 
are  to  be  enslaved.  This  view  constitutes  his  third 

*  See,  e.  g.,  Leben,  I.,  p.  135,  where  he  speaks  of  a  new 
"Freigeisterei,"  denouncing  the  "libres  penseurs"  as  "unver- 
besserliche  Flachkopfe  und  Hanswiirste,"  adding,  "Sic  glauben 
allesammt  noch  an's  'Ideal.'" 


NIETZSCHE 

period,  in  which  he  wrote  those  works  that  are  pecul- 
iarly characteristic  of  his  own  philosophy. 

Nietzsche  must  not  be  taken  too  seriously.  He  was 
engaged  with  the  deepest  problems  of  life,  and  pub- 
lished his  opinions  as  to  their  solution  before  he  had 
actually  attempted  to  investigate  them.  He  criticised 
and  attacked  like  the  Irishman  who  hits  a  head 
wherever  he  sees  it.  Here  are  the  first  three  rules  of 
his  philosophical  warfare: 

"First:  I  attack  only  those  causes  which  are  vic- 
torious, sometimes  I  wait  till  they  are  victorious.  Sec- 
ondly :  I  attack  them  only  when  I  would  find  no  allies, 
when  I  stand  isolated,  when  I  compromise  myself 
alone.  Thirdly:  I  have  never  taken  a  step  in  public 
which  did  not  compromise  me.  That  is  my  criterion 
of  right  action." 

A  man  who  adopts  this  strange  criterion  of  right 
conduct  must  produce  a  strange  philosophy.  His  soul 
is  in  an  uproar  against  itself.  Says  Nietzsche  in  his 
Gotzendammerung,  Aphorism  45: 

"Almost  every  genius  knows  as  one  phase  of  his  devel- 
opment the  'Catilinary  existence,'  so-called,  which  is  a  feel- 
ing of  hatred,  of  vengeance,  of  revolution  against  everything 
that  is,  which  no  longer  needs  to  become  .  .  .  Catiline — the 
form  of  Caesar's  pre-existence." 

Nietzsche  changed  his  views  during  his  life-time, 
and  the  unmoralist  Nietzsche  originated  in  contradic- 
tion to  his  habitual  moralism.  He  was  a  man  of  ex- 
tremes. As  soon  as  a  new  thought  dawned  on  him,  it 
took  possession  of  his  soul  to  the  exclusion  of  his 

70 


A  PROTEST  AGAINST  HIMSELF 

prior  views,  and  his  later  self  contradicts  his  former 
self. 

Nietzsche  says: 

"The  serpent  that  cannot  slough  must  die.  In  the  same 
way,  the  spirits  which  are  prevented  from  changing  their 
opinions  cease  to  be  spirits." 

So  we  must  expect  that  if  Nietzsche  had  been  per- 
mitted to  continue  longer  in  health,  he  would  have 
cast  off  the  slough  of  his  immoralism  and  the  nega- 
tive conceptions  of  his  positivism.  His  Zarathustra 
was  the  last  work  of  his  pen,  but  it  is  only  the  most 
classical  expression  of  the  fermentation  of  his  soul, 
not  the  final  purified  result  of  his  philosophy ;  it  is  not 
the  solution  of  the  problem  that  stirred  his  heart. 

While  writing  his  Unseitgemasse  Betrachtungen., 
Nietzsche  characterizes  his  method  of  work  thus : 

"That  I  proceed  with  my  outpourings  considerably  like 
a  dilettante  and  in  an  immature  manner,  I  know  very  well, 
but  I  am  anxious  first  of  all  to  get  rid  of  the  whole  polemico- 
negative  material.  I  wish  undisturbedly  to  sing  off,  up  and 
down  and  truly  dastardly,  the  whole  gamut  of  my  hostile 
feelings,  'that  the  vaults  shall  echo  back.'*  Later  on,  i.  e., 
within  five  years,  I  shall  discard  all  polemics  and  bethink 
myself  of  a  really  'good  work.'  But  at  present  my  breast 
is  oppressed  with  disgust  and  tribulation.  I  must  expectorate, 
decorously  and  indecorously,  but  radically  and  for  good" 
[endgiiltig]. 

The  writings  of  Nietzsche  will  make  the  impression 
of  a  youthful  immaturity  upon  any  half-way  serious 

*  "Dass  das  Gewolbe  wiederhallt," — a  quotation  from 
Goethe's  "Faust." 

71 


NIETZSCHE 

reader.  There  is  a  hankering  after  originality  which 
of  necessity  leads  to  aberrations  and  a  sovereign  con- 
tempt for  the  merits  of  the  past.  The  world  seems  en- 
dangered, and  yet  any  one  who  would  seriously  try  to 
live  up  to  Nietzsche's  ideal  must  naturally  sober  down 
after  a  while,  and  we  may  apply  to  him  what  Mephis- 
topheles  says  of  the  baccalaureus : 

"Yet  even  from  him  we're  not  in  special  peril 
He  will,  ere  long,  to  other  thoughts  incline. 
The  must  may  foam  absurdly  in  the  barrel, 
Nathless,  it  turns  at  last  to  wine." 

Tr.  by  Bayard  Taylor. 

Nietzsche  did  not  live  long  enough  to  experience  a 
period  of  matured  thought.  He  died  before  the  fer- 
mentation of  his  mind  had  come  to  its  normal  close, 
and  so  his  life  will  remain  forever  a  great  torso,  with- 
out intrinsic  worth,  but  suggestive  and  appealing  only 
to  the  immature,  including  the  "herd  animal"  who 
would  like  to  be  an  overman. 

The  very  immaturity  of  Nietzsche's  view  becomes 
attractive  to  immature  minds.  He  wrote  while  his 
thoughts  were  still  in  a  state  of  fermentation,  and  he 
died  before  the  wine  of  his  soul  was  clarified. 

Nietzsche  is  an  almost  tragic  figure  that  will  live  in 
art  as  a  brooding  thinker,  a  representative  of  the  dis- 
satisfied, a  man  of  an  insatiable  love  of  life,  with  wild 
and  unsteady  looks,  proud  in  his  indomitable  self-as- 
sertion, but  broken  in  body  and  spirit.  Such  he  was 
in  his  last  disease  when  his  mind  was  wrapt  in  the 
eternal  night  of  dementia,  the  oppressive  conscious- 

72 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE 

THE  LATEST  PORTRAIT,  AFTER  AN  OIL  PAINTING 
BY  C.  STOEVING 


A  PROTEST  AGAINST  HIMSELF 

ness  of  which  made  him  exclaim  in  lucid  moments 
the  pitiable  complaint,  "Mutter,  ich  bin  dumm."  As 
such  he  is  represented  in  Klein's  statue,10  which  in  its 
pathetic  posture  is  a  psychological  masterpiece. 

Nietzsche's  works  are  poetic  effusions  more  than 
philosophical  expositions  and  yet  we  would  hesitate 
to  call  him  a  poet.  His  poems  are  not  poetical  in  the 
usual  sense.  They  lack  poetry  and  yet  they  appeal  not 
only  to  his  admirers,  but  also  to  his  critics  and  ene- 
mies. Most  of  them  are  artificial  yet  they  are  so  char- 
acteristic that  they  are  interesting  specimens  of  a  pe- 
culiar kind  of  taste.  They  strike  us  as  ingenious,  be- 
cause they  reflect  his  eccentricities. 

In  a  poem  entitled  "Ecce  Homo"11  he  characterizes 
himself : 

"Yea,  I  know  from  whence  I  came ! 
Never  satiate,  like  the  flame 
Glow  I  and  consume  me  too 
Into  light  turns  what  I  find, 
Cinders  do  I  leave  behind, 
Flame  am  I,  'tis  surely  true." 

""Ja,  ich  weiss  woher  ich  stamme ! 
Ungesattigt  gleich  der  Flamme, 
Gliihe  und  verzehr  ich  mich, 
Licht  wird  alles  was  ich  fasse, 
Kohle  alles  was  ich  lasse : 
Flamme  bin  ich  sicherlich !" 

10  Reproduced  as  the  frontispiece  of  this  book. 


73 


NIETZSCHE'S  PREDECESSOR 

T?  RIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE,  the  author  of  Thus 
-L  Spake  Zarathustra  and  the  inventor  of  the  new 
ideal  called  the  "overman,"  is  commonly  regarded  as 
the  most  extreme  egotist,  to  whom  morality  is  non-ex- 
istent and  who  glories  in  the  coming  of  the  day  in 
which  a  man  of  his  liking — the  overman — would  live 
au  grand  jour.  His  philosophy  is  an  individualism  car- 
ried to  its  utmost  extreme,  sanctioning  egotism,  de- 
nouncing altruism  and  establishing  the  right  of  the 
strong  to  trample  the  weak  under  foot.  It  is  little 
known,  however,  that  he  followed  another  thinker,  Jo- 
hann  Caspar  Schmidt,  whose  extreme  individualism  he 
adopted.  But  this  forerunner  who  preached  a  phi- 
losophy of  the  sovereignty  of  self  and  an  utter  dis- 
regard of  our  neighbors'  rights  remained  unheeded ;  he 
lived  in  obscurity,  he  died  in  poverty,  and  under  the 
pseudonym  "Max  Stirner"  he  left  behind  a  book  en- 
titled Der  Einzige  und  sein  Eigentunt. 

The  historian  Lange  briefly  mentioned  him  in  his 
History  of  Materialism,  and  the  novelist  John  Henry 

74 


NIETZSCHE'S    PREDECESSOR 

Mackay  followed  up  the  reference  which  led  to  the 
discovery  of  this  lonely  comet  on  the  philosophical 
sky.1 

The  strangest  thing  about  this  remarkable  book  con- 
sists in  the  many  coincidences  with  Friedrich  Nietz- 
sche's philosophy.  It  is  commonly  deemed  impossible 
that  the  famous  spokesman  of  the  overman  should  not 
have  been  thoroughly  familiar  with  this  failure  in  the 
philosophical  book  market ;  but  while  Stirner  was  for- 
gotten the  same  ideas  transplanted  into  the  volumes  of 
the  author  of  Thus  Spake  Zarathustra  found  an  echo 
first  in  Germany  and  soon  afterwards  all  over  the 
world. 

Stirner's  book  has  been  Englished  by  Stephen  T.  By- 
ington  with  an  introduction  by  J.  L.  Walker  at  the 
instigation  of  Benjamin  R.  Tucker,  the  representative 
of  American  peaceful  anarchism,  under  the  title  The 
Ego  and  His  Own.  They  have  been  helped  by  Mr. 
George  Schumm  and  his  wife,  Mrs.  Emma  Heller 
Schumm.  These  five  persons,  all  interested  in  this 
lonely  and  unique  thinker,  must  have  had  much 
trouble  in  translating  the  German  original  and  though 
the  final  rendering  of  the  title  is  not  inappropriate,  the 
translator  and  his  advisers  agree  that  it  falls  short  of 
the  mark.  For  the  accepted  form  Mr.  B.  R.  Tucker  is 
responsible,  and  he  admits  in  the  preface  that  it  is  not 

1  See  also  R.  Schellwien,  Max  Stirner  und  Friedrich  Nietz- 
sche; V.  Basch,  L'individualisme  anarchiste,  Max  Stirner, 
1904. 

75 


NIETZSCHE 

an  exact  equivalent  of  the  German.  Der  Einzige  means 
"the  unique  man,"  a  person  of  a  definite  individuality, 
but  in  the  book  itself  our  author  modifies  and  enriches 
the  meaning  of  the  term.  The  unique  man  becomes 
the  ego  and  an  owner  (ein  Eigener),  a  man  who  is  pos- 
sessed of  property,  especially  of  his  own  being.  He  is 
a  master  of  his  own  and  he  prides  himself  on  his  own- 
hood,  as  well  as  his  ownership.  As  such  he  is  unique, 
and  the  very  term  indicates  that  the  thinker  who  pro- 
poses this  view-point  is  an  extreme  individualist.  In 
Stirner's  opinion  Christianity  pursued  the  ideal  of  lib- 
erty from  the  world ;  and  in  this  sense  Christians  speak 
of  spiritual  liberty.  To  become  free  from  anything 
that  oppresses  us  we  must  get  rid  of  it,  and  so  the 
Christian  to  rid  himself  of  the  world  becomes  a  prey 
to  the  idea  of  a  contempt  of  the  world.  Stirner  de- 
clares that  the  future  has  a  better  lot  in  store  for  man. 
Man  shall  not  merely  be  free,  which  is  a  purely  nega- 
tive quality,  but  he  shall  be  his  own  master;  he  shall 
become  an  owner  of  his  own  personality  and  whatever 
else  he  may  have  to  control.  His  end  and  aim  is  he 
himself.  There  is  no  moral  duty  above  him.  Stirner 
explains  in  the  very  first  sentence  of  his  book: 

"What  is  not  supposed  to  be  my  concern !  First  and  fore- 
most, the  good  cause,  then  God's  cause,  the  cause  of  mankind, 
of  truth,  of  freedom,  of  humanity,  of  justice;  further,  the 
cause  of  my  people,  my  prince,  my  fatherland;  finally,  even 
the  cause  of  mind,  and  a  thousand  other  causes.  Only  my 
cause  is  never  to  be  my  concern.  'Shame  on  the  egoist  who 
thinks  only  of  himself.' " 

76 


NIETZSCHE'S    PREDECESSOR 

Stirner  undertakes  to  refute  this  satirical  explana- 
tion in  his  book  on  the  unique  man  and  his  own,  and  a 
French  critic  according  to  Paul  Lauterbach  (p.  5) 
speaks  of  his  book  as  un  Ivure  qu'on  quitte  monarque, 
"a  book  which  one  lays  aside  a  king." 

Stirner  is  opposed  to  all  traditional  views.  He  is 
against  church  and  state.  He  stands  for  the  self-de- 
velopment of  every  individual,  and  insists  that  the  high- 
est duty  of  every  one  is  to  stand  up  for  his  ownhood. 

J.  L.  Walker  in  his  Introduction  contrasts  Stirner 
with  Nietzsche  and  gives  the  prize  of  superiority  to  the 
former,  declaring  him  to  be  a  genuine  anarchist  not 
less  than  Josiah  Warren,  the  leader  of  the  small  band 
of  New  England  anarchists.  He  says: 

"In  Stirner  we  have  the  philosophical  foundation  for 
political  liberty.  His  interest  in  the  practical  development 
of  egoism  to  the  dissolution  of  the  state  and  the  union  of 
free  men  is  clear  and  pronounced,  and  harmonizes  perfectly 
with  the  economic  philosophy  of  Josiah  Warren.  Allowing 
for  difference  of  temperament  and  language,  there  is  a  sub- 
stantial agreement  between  Stirner  and  Proudhon.  Each 
would  be  free,  and  sees  in  every  increase  of  the  number  of 
free  people  and  their  intelligence  an  auxiliary  force  against 
the  oppressor.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  will  any  one  for  a 
moment  seriously  contend  that  Nietzsche  and  Proudhon 
march  together  in  general  aim  and  tendency — that  they  have 
anything  in  common  except  the  daring  to  profane  the  shrine 
and  sepulcher  of  superstition? 

"Nietzsche  has  been  much  spoken  of  as  a  disciple  of 
Stirner,  and,  owing  to  favorable  cullings  from  Nietzsche's 
writings,  it  has  occurred  that  one  of  his  books  has  been 

77 


NIETZSCHE 

supposed  to  contain  more  sense  than  it  really  does — so  long 
as  one  had  read  only  the  extracts. 

"Nietzsche  cites  scores  or  hundreds  of  authors.  Had  he 
read  everything,  and  not  read  Stirner? 

"But  Nietzsche  is  as  unlike  Stirner  as  a  tight-rope  per- 
formance is  unlike  an  algebraic  equation. 

"Stirner  loved  liberty  for  himself,  and  loved  to  see  any 
and  all  men  and  women  taking  liberty,  and  he  had  no  lust  of 
power.  Democracy  to  him  was  sham  liberty,  egoism  the 
genuine  liberty. 

"Nietzsche,  on  the  contrary,  pours  out  his  contempt  upon 
democracy  because  it  is  not  aristocratic.  He  is  predatory  to 
the  point  of  demanding  that  those  who  must  succumb  to 
feline  rapacity  shall  be  taught  to  submit  with  resignation. 
When  he  speaks  of  'anarchistic  dogs'  scouring  the  streets  of 
great  civilized  cities,  it  is  true,  the  context  shows  that  he 
means  the  communists;  but  his  worship  of  Napoleon,  his 
bathos  of  anxiety  for  the  rise  of  an  aristocracy  that  shall 
rule  Europe  for  thousands  of  years,  his  idea  of  treating 
women  in  the  Oriental  fashion,  show  that  Nietzsche  has 
struck  out  in  a  very  old  path — doing  the  apotheosis  of  tyr- 
anny. We  individual  egoistic  anarchists,  however,  may  say 
to  the  Nietzsche  school,  so  as  not  to  be  misunderstood :  We 
do  not  ask  of  the  Napoleons  to  have  pity,  nor  of  the  predatory 
barons  to  do  justice.  They  will  find  it  convenient  for  their 
own  welfare  to  make  terms  with  men  who  have  learned  of 
Stirner  what  a  man  can  be  who  worships  nothing,  bears 
allegiance  to  nothing.  To  Nietzsche's  rhodomontade  of  eagles 
in  baronial  form,  born  to  prey  on  industrial  lambs,  we  rather 
tauntingly  oppose  the  ironical  question :  Where  are  your 
claws?  What  if  the  'eagles'  are  found  to  be  plain  barnyard 
fowls  on  which  more  silly  fowls  have  fastened  steel  spurs  to 
hack  the  victims,  who,  however,  have  the  power  to  disarm 
the  sham  'eagles'  between  two  suns? 

"Stirner  shows  that  men  make  their  tyrants  as  they  make 
their  gods,  and  his  purpose  is  to  unmake  tyrants. 

78 


NIETZSCHE'S    PREDECESSOR 

"Nietzsche  dearly  loves  a  tyrant. 

"In  style  Stirner's  work  offers  the  greatest  possible  con- 
trast to  the  puerile,  padded  phraseology  of  Nietzsche's  Zara- 
thustra  and  its  false  imagery.  Who  ever  imagined  such  an 
unnatural  conjuncture  as  an  eagle  'toting*  a  serpent  in  friend- 
ship ?  which  performance  is  told  of  in  bare  words,  but  nothing 
comes  of  it.  In  Stirner  we  r.re  treated  to  an  enlivening  and 
earnest  discussion  addressed  to  serious  minds,  and  every 
reader  feels  that  the  word  is  to  him,  for  his  instruction  and 
benefit,  so  far  as  he  has  -mental  independence  and  courage 
to  take  it  and  use  it.  The  startling  intrepidity  of  this  book 
is  infused  with  a  whole-hearted  love  for  all  mankind,  as  evi- 
denced by  the  fact  that  the  author  shows  not  one  iota  of 
prejudice  or  any  idea  of  division  of  men  into  ranks.  He 
would  lay  aside  government,  but  would  establish  any  regu- 
lation deemed  convenient,  and  for  this  only  our  convenience 
is  consulted.  Thus  there  will  be  general  liberty  only  when  the 
disposition  toward  tyranny  is  met  by  intelligent  opposition 
that  will  no  longer  submit  to  such  a  rule.  Beyond  this  the 
manly  sympathy  and  philosophical  bent  of  Stirner  are  such 
that  rulership  appears  by  contrast  a  vanity,  an  infatuation 
of  perverted  pride.  We  know  not  whether  we  more  admire 
our  author  or  more  love  him. 

"Stirner's  attitude  toward  woman  is  not  special.  She  is 
an  individual  if  she  can  be,  not  handicapped  by  anything  he 
says,  feels,  thinks,  or  plans.  This  was  more  fully  exemplified 
in  his  life  than  even  in  this  book;  but  there  is  not  a  line  in 
the  book  to  put  or  keep  woman  in  an  inferior  position  to 
man,  neither  is  there  anything  of  caste  or  aristocracy  in 
the  book." 

It  is  not  our  intention  to  enter  here  into  a  detailed 
criticism  of  Stirner's  book.  We  will  only  point  out 
that  society  will  practically  remain  the  same  whether 
we  consider  social  arrangements  as  voluntary  contracts 

79 


NIETZSCHE 

or  as  organically  developed  social  institutions,  or  as 
imposed  upon  mankind  by  the  divine  world-order,  or 
even  if  czars  and  kings  claim  to  govern  "by  the  grace 
of  God."  Whatever  religious  or  natural  sanction  any 
government  may  claim  to  possess,  the  method  of  keep- 
ing order  will  be  the  same  everywhere.  Wrongs  have 
been  done  and  in  the  future  may  still  be  committed  in 
the  name  of  right,  and  injustice  may  again  and  again 
worst  justice  in  the  name  of  the  law.  On  the  other 
hand,  however,  we  can  notice  a  progress  throughout 
the  world  of  a  slow  but  steady  improvement  of  con- 
ditions. Any  globe-trotter  will  find  by  experience  that 
his  personal  safety,  his  rights  and  privileges  are  prac- 
tically the  same  in  all  civilized  countries,  whether 
they  are  republics  like  Switzerland,  France  and  the 
United  States,  or  monarchies  like  Sweden,  Germany 
and  Italy.  At  the  same  time  murders,  robberies,  thefts 
and  other  crimes  are  committed  all  over  the  world,  even 
in  the  homes  of  those  who  pride  themselves  on  being 
the  most  civilized  nations.  The  world-conception  lying 
behind  our  different  social  theories  is  the  same  wher- 
ever the  same  kind  of  civilization  prevails.  Where 
social  evils  prevail,  dissatisfaction  sets  in  which  pro- 
duces theories  and  reform  programs,  and  when  they 
remain  unheeded,  a  climax  is  reached  which  leads  to 
revolution. 

Stirner's  book  begins  with  a  short  exhortation  head- 
ed with  Goethe's  line, 

"My  trust  in  nothingness  is  placed." 

80 


NIETZSCHE'S    PREDECESSOR 

He  discusses  the  character  of  human  life  (Chap.  I) 
and  contrasts  men  of  the  old  and  the  new  eras  (Chap. 
II).  He  finds  that  the  ancients  idealized  bodily  exist- 
ence while  Christianity  incarnates  the  ideal.  Greek 
artists  transfigure  actual  life ;  in  Christianity  the  divine 
takes  abode  in  the  world  of  flesh,  God  becomes  in- 
carnate in  man.  The  Greeks  tried  to  go  beyond  the 
world  and  Christianity  came ;  Christian  thinkers  are 
pressed  to  go  beyond  God,  and  there  they  find  spirit. 
They  are  led  to  a  contempt  of  the  world  and  will  finally 
end  in  a  contempt  of  spirit.  But  Stirner  believes  that 
the  ideal  and  the  real  can  never  be  reconciled,  and  we 
must  free  ourselves  from  the  errors  of  the  past.  The 
truly  free  man  is  not  the  one  who  has  become  free, 
but  the  one  who  has  come  into  his  own,  and  this  is  the 
sovereign  ego. 

As  Achilles  had  his  Homer  so  Stirner  found  his 
prophet  in  a  German  socialist  of  Scotch  Highlander 
descent,  John  Henry  Mackay.  The  reading  public 
should  know  that  Mackay  belongs  to  the  same  type  of 
restless  reformers,  and  he  soon  became  an  egoistic  an- 
archist, a  disciple  of  Stirner.  His  admiration  is  but  a 
natural  consequence  of  conditions.  Nevertheless  Mac- 
kay's  glorification  of  Stirner  proves  that  in  Stirner 
this  onesided  world-conception  has  found  its  classical, 
its  most  consistent  and  its  philosophically  most  syste- 
matic presentation.  Whatever  we  may  have  to  criticize 
in  anarchism,  Stirner  is  a  man  of  uncommon  distinc- 
tion, the  leader  of  a  party,  and  the  standard-bearer  of  a 

81 


NIETZSCHE 

cause  distinguished  by  the  extremeness  of  its  proposi- 
tions which  from  the  principle  of  individualism  are 
carried  to  their  consistent  ends. 

Mackay  undertook  the  difficult  task  of  unearthing 
the  history  of  a  man  who,  naturally  modest  and  re- 
tired, had  nowhere  left  deep  impressions.  No  stone 
remained  unturned  and  every  clue  that  could  reveal 
anything  about  his  hero's  life  was  followed  up  with  un- 
precedented devotion.  He  published  the  results  of  his 
labors  in  a  book  entitled  "Max  Stirner,  His  Life  and 
His  Work."2  The  report  is  extremely  touching  not  so 
much  on  account  of  the  great  significance  of  Stirner's 
work  which  to  impartial  readers  appears  exaggerated, 
but  through  the  personal  tragedy  of  a  man  who  towers 
high  above  his  surroundings  and  suffers  the  misery  of 
poverty  and  failure. 

Mr.  Mackay  describes  Stirner  as  of  medium  height, 
rather  less  so  than  more,  well  proportioned,  slender, 
always  dressed  with  care  though  without  pretension, 
having  the  appearance  of  a  teacher,  and  wearing  silver- 
or  steel-rimmed  spectacles.  His  hair  and  beard  were 
blonde  with  a  tinge  of  red,  his  eyes  blue  and  clear, 
but  neither  dreamy  nor  penetrating.  His  thin  lips 
usually  wore  a  sarcastic  smile,  which,  however,  had 
nothing  of  bitterness ;  his  general  appearance  was  sym- 
pathetic. No  portrait  of  Stirner  is  in  existence  except 
one  pencil  sketch  which  was  made  from  memory  in 

Stirner,  sein  Leben  und  sein  Werk.    Berlin,  1898. 
82 


NIETZSCHE'S    PREDECESSOR 

1892  by  the  London  socialist,  Friedrich  Engels,  but  the 
criticism  is  made  by  those  who  knew  Stirner  that  his 
features,  especially  his  chin  and  the  top  of  his  head, 
were  not  so  angular  though  nose  and  mouth  are  said 


PENCIL  SKETCH  OF  MAX  STIRNER. 
The  only  portrait  in  existence. 

to  have  been  well  portrayed,  and  Mackay  claims  that 
Stirner  never  wore  a  coat  and  collar  of  that  type. 

Stirner  was  of  purely  Prankish  blood.  His  ancestors 
lived  for  centuries  in  or  near  Baireuth.  His  father, 
Albert  Christian  Heinrich  Schmidt  of  Anspach,  a 
maker  of  wind-instruments,  died  of  consumption  in 
1807  at  the  age  of  37,  half  a  year  after  the  birth  of 
his  son.  His  mother,  Sophie  Eleanora,  nee  Reinlein 
of  the  city  of  Erlangen,  six  months  later  married  H.  F. 

83 


NIETZSCHE 

L.  Ballerstedt,  the  assistant  in  an  apothecary  shop  in 
Helmstedt,  and  moved  with  him  to  Kulm  on  the  Vis- 
tula. In  1818  the  boy  was  sent  back  to  his  native  city 
where  his  childless  god-father  and  uncle,  Johann  Cas- 
par Martin  Sticht,  and  his  wife  took  care  of  him. 

Young  Johann  Caspar  passed  through  school  with 
credit,  and  his  schoolmates  used  to  call  him  "Stirner" 
on  account  of  his  high  forehead  (Stirn)  which  was  the 
most  conspicuous  feature  of  his  face.  This  name  clung 
to  him  throughout  life.  In  fact  his  most  intimate 
friends  never  called  him  by  any  other,  his  real  name 
being  almost  forgotten  through  disuse  and  figuring  only 
in  official  documents. 

Stirner  attended  the  universities  of  Erlangen,  Berlin 
and  Konigsberg,  and  finally  passed  his  examination  for 
admission  as  a  teacher  in  gymnasial  schools.  His  step- 
father died  in  the  summer  of  1837  in  Kulm  at  the  age 
of  76.  It  is  not  known  what  became  of  his  mother 
who  had  been  mentally  unsound  for  some  time. 

Neither  father  nor  stepfather  had  ever  been  success- 
ful, and  if  Stirner  ever  received  any  inheritance  it  must 
have  been  very  small.  On  December  12  of  1837  Stir- 
ner married  Agnes  Clara  Kunigunde  Burtz,  the  daugh- 
ter of  his  landlady. 

Their  married  life  was  brief,  the  young  wife  dying 
in  a  premature  child-birth  on  August  29th.  We  have 
no  indication  of  an  ardent  love  on  either  side.  He  who 
wrote  with  passionate  fire  and  with  so  much  insistence 

84 


NIETZSCHE'S    PREDECESSOR 

in  his  philosophy,  was  calm  and  peaceful,  subdued  and 
quiet  to  a  fault  in  real  life. 

Having  been  refused  appointment  in  one  of  the  pub- 
lic or  royal  schools  Stirner  accepted  a  position  in  a 
girls'  school  October  1,  1839.  During  the  political  fer- 
mentation which  preceded  the  revolutionary  year  of 
1848,  he  moved  in  the  circle  of  those  bold  spirits  who 
called  themselves  Die  Freien  and  met  at  Hippel's, 
among  whom  were  Ludwig  Buhl,  Meyen,  Friedrich 
Engels,  Mussak,  C.  F.  Koppen,  the  author  of  a  work 
on  Buddha,  Dr.  Arthur  Miiller  and  the  brothers  Bruno, 
Egbert  and  Edgar  Bauer.  It  was  probably  among  their 
associates  that  Stirner  met  Marie  Dahnhardt  of  Gade- 
busch  near  Schwerin,  Mecklenberg,  the  daughter  of  an 
apothecary,  Helmuth  Ludwig  Dahnhardt.  She  was  as 
different  from  Stirner  as  a  dashing  emancipated  woman 
can  be  from  a  gentle  meek  man,  but  these  contrasts 
were  joined  together  in  wedlock  on  October  21,  1843. 
Their  happiness  did  not  last  long,  for  Marie  Dahnhardt 
left  her  husband  at  the  end  of  three  years. 

The  marriage  ceremony  of  this  strange  couple  has 
been  described  in  the  newspapers  and  it  is  almost  the 
only  fact  of  Stirner's  life  that  stands  out  boldly  as  a 
well-known  incident.  That  these  descriptions  contain 
exaggerations  and  distortions  is  not  improbable,  but  it 
cannot  be  denied  that  much  contained  in  the  reports 
must  be  true. 

On  the  morning  of  October  21,  a  clergyman  of  ex- 
tremely liberal  views,  Rev.  Marot,  a  member  of  the 
Consistory,  was  called  to  meet  the  witnesses  of  the 

85 


NIETZSCHE 

ceremony  at  Stirner's  room.  Bruno  Bauer,  Buhl,  prob- 
ably also  Julius  Faucher,  Assessor  Kochius  and  a 
young  English  woman,  a  friend  of  the  bride,  were  pres- 
ent. The  bride  was  in  her  week-day  dress.  Mr.  Marot 
asked  for  a  Bible,  but  none  could  be  found.  Accord- 
ing to  one  version  the  clergyman  was  obliged  to  re- 
quest Herr  Buhl  to  put  on  his  coat  and  to  have  the 
cards  removed.  When  the  rings  were  to  be  exchanged 
the  groom  discovered  that  he  had  forgotten  to  procure 
them,  and  according  to  Wilhelm  Jordan's  recollection 
Bauer  pulled  out  his  knitted  purse  and  took  off  the 
brass  rings,  offering  them  as  a  substitute  during  the 
ceremony.  After  the  wedding  a  dinner  with  cold 
punch  was  served  to  which  Mr.  Marot  was  invited. 
But  he  refused,  while  the  guests  remained  and  the 
wedding  carousal  proceeded  in  its  jolly  course. 

In  order  to  understand  how  this  incident  was  pos- 
sible we  must  know  that  in  those  pre-revolutionary 
years  the  times  were  out  of  joint  and  these  heroes  of 
the  rebellion  wished  to  show  their  disrespect  and  abso- 
lute indifference  to  a  ceremony  that  to  them  had  lost 
all  its  sanctity. 

Stirner's  married  life  was  very  uneventful,  except 
that  he  wrote  the  main  book  of  his  life  and  dedicated 
it  to  his  wife  after  a  year's  marriage,  with  the  words, 

"Meinem  Liebchen 
Marie  Dahnhardt." 

Obviously  this  form  which  ignores  the  fact  that  they 
were  married,  and  uses  a  word  of  endearment  which  in 

86 


NIETZSCHE'S    PREDECESSOR 

this  connection  is  rather  trivial,  must  be  regarded  as 
characteristic  of  their  relation  and  their  life  princi- 
ples. Certain  it  is  that  she  understood  only  the  nega- 
tive features  of  her  husband's  ideals  and  had  no  ap- 
preciation of  the  genius  that  stirred  within  him. 
Lauterbach,  the  editor  of  the  Reclam  edition  of  Stir- 
ner's  book,  comments  ironically  on  this  dedication 
with  the  Spanish  motto  Da  Dios  almendras  al  que  no 
tiene  muelas,  "God  gives  almonds  to  those  who  have 
no  teeth." 

Marie  Dahnhardt  was  a  graceful  blonde  woman 
rather  under-sized,  with  heavy  hair  which  surrounded 
her  head  in  ringlets  according  to  the  fashion  of  the 
time.  She  was  very  striking  and  became  a  favorite 
of  the  round  table  of  the  Freien  who  met  at  Hippel's. 
She  smoked  cigars  freely  and  sometimes  donned  male 
attire,  in  order  to  accompany  her  husband  and  his 
friends  on  their  nightly  excursions.  It  appears  that 
Stirner  played  the  most  passive  part  in  these  adven- 
tures, but  true  to  his  principle  of  individuality  we  have 
no  knowledge  that  he  ever  criticized  his  wife. 

Marie  Dahnhardt  had  lost  her  father  early  and  was 
in  possession  of  a  small  fortune  of  10,000  thalers,  pos- 
sibly more.  At  any  rate  it  was  considered  quite  a  sum 
in  the  circle  of  Stirner's  friends,  but  it  did  not  last  long. 
Having  written  his  book,  Stirner  gave  up  his  position 
so  as  to  prevent  probable  discharge  and  now  they 
looked  around  for  new  resources.  Though  Stirner  had 
studied  political  economy  he  was  a  most  unpractical 

87 


NIETZSCHE 

man ;  but  seeing  there  was  a  dearth  of  milk-shops,  he 
and  his  wife  started  into  business.  They  made  con- 
tracts with  dairies  but  did  not  advertise  their  shop,  and 
when  the  milk  was  delivered  to  them  they  had  large 
quantities  of  milk  on  hand  but  no  patrons,  the  result 
being  a  lamentable  failure  with  debts. 

In  the  circle  of  his  friends  Stirner's  business  experi- 
ence offered  inexhaustible  material  for  jokes,  while  at 
home  it  led  rapidly  to  the  dissolution  of  his  marriage. 
Frau  Schmidt  complained  in  later  years  that  her  hus- 
band had  wasted  her  property,  while  no  complaints  are 
known  from  him.  One  thing  is  sure  that  they  sep- 
arated. She  went  to  England  where  she  established 
herself  as  a  teacher  under  the  protection  of  Lady  Bun- 
sen,  the  wife  of  the  Prussian  ambassador. 

Frau  Schmidt's  later  career  is  quite  checkered.  She 
was  a  well-known  character  in  the  colony  of  German 
exiles  in  London.  One  of  her  friends  there  was  a  Lieu- 
tenant Techow.  When  she  was  again  in  great  distress 
she  emigrated  with  other  Germans,  probably  in  1852 
or  1853,  to  Melbourne,  Australia.  Here  she  tasted  the 
misery  of  life  to  the  dregs.  She  made  a  living  as  a 
washerwoman  and  is  reported  to  have  married  a  day 
laborer.  Their  bitter  experiences  made  her  resort  to 
religion  for  consolation,  and  in  1870  or  1871  she  be- 
came a  convert  to  the  Catholic  Church.  At  her  sister's 
death  she  became  her  heir  and  so  restored  her  good 
fortune  to  some  extent.  She  returned  to  London  where 
Mr.  Mackay  to  his  great  joy  discovered  that  she  was 


NIETZSCHE'S    PREDECESSOR 

still  alive  at  the  advanced  age  of  eighty.  What  a  valu- 
able resource  her  reminiscences  would  be  for  his  in- 
quiries !  But  she  refused  to  give  any  information  and 
finally  wrote  him  a  letter  which  literally  reads  as  fol- 
lows: "Mary  Smith  solemnly  avowes  that  she  will 
have  no  more  correspondence  on  the  subject,  and  au- 
thorizes Mr.  3  to  return  all  those  writings  to 

their  owners.    She  is  ill  and  prepares  for  death." 

The  last  period  of  Stirner's  life,  from  the  time  when 
his  wife  left  him  to  his  death,  is  as  obscure  as  his  child- 
hood days.  He  moved  from  place  to  place,  and  since 
his  income  was  very  irregular  creditors  pressed  him 
hard.  His  lot  was  tolerable  because  of  the  simple 
habits  of  his  life,  his  only  luxury  consisting  in  smoking 
a  good  cigar.  In  1853  we  find  him  at  least  twice  in 
debtor's  prison,  first  21  days,  from  March  5  to  26,  1853, 
and  then  36  days,  from  New  Year's  eve  until  February 
4  of  the  next  year.  In  the  meantime  (September  7) 
he  moved  to  Philippstrasse  19.  It  was  Stirner's  last 
home.  He  stayed  with  the  landlady  of  this  place,  a 
kind-hearted  woman  who  treated  all  her  boarders  like 
a  mother,  until  June  25,  1856,  when  he  died  rather 
suddenly  as  the  result  of  the  bite  of  a  poisonous  fly. 
A  few  of  his  friends,  among  them  Bruno  Bauer  and 
Ludwig  Buhl,  attended  his  funeral;  a  second-class 

"The  name  of  the  gentleman  she  mentions  is  replaced  by 
a  dash  at  his  express  wish  in  the  facsimile  of  her  letter  repro- 
duced in  Mr.  Mackay's  book  (p.  255). 


NIETZSCHE 

grave  was  procured  for  one  thaler  10  groats,  amounting 
approximately  to  one  American  dollar. 

During  this  period  Stirner  undertook  several  liter- 
ary labors  from  which  he  possibly  procured  some  re- 
muneration. He  translated  the  classical  authors  on 
political  economy  from  the  French  and  from  the  Eng- 
lish, which  appeared  under  the  title  Die  National- 
Oekonomen  der  Franzosen  und  Engldnder  (Leipsic, 
Otto  Wigand,  1845-1847). 

He  also  wrote  a  history  of  the  Reaction  which  he 
explained  to  be  a  mere  counter-revolution.  This 
Geschichte  der  Reaction  was  planned  as  a  much  more 
comprehensive  work,  but  the  two  volumes  which  ap- 
peared were  only  two  parts  of  the  second  volume  as 
originally  intended. 

The  work  is  full  of  quotations,  partly  from  Auguste 
Comte,  partly  from  Edmund  Burke.  None  of  these 
works  represent  anything  typically  original  or  of  real 
significance  in  the  history  of  human  thought. 

His  real  contribution  to  the  world's  literature  re- 
mains his  work  Der  Einzige  und  sein  Eigentum,  the 
title  of  which  is  rendered  in  English  The  Ego  and  His 
Own,  and  this,  strange  to  say,  enthrones  the  individual 
man,  the  ego,  every  personality,  as  a  sovereign  power 
that  should  not  be  subject  to  morality,  rules,  obliga- 
tions, or  duties  of  any  kind.  The  appeal  is  made  so  di- 
rectly that  it  will  convince  all  those  unscientific  and 
half-educated  minds  who  after  having  surrendered 
their  traditional  faith  find  themselves  without  any  au- 

90 


NIETZSCHE'S    PREDECESSOR 

thority  in  either  religion  or  politics.  God  is  to  them  a 
fable  and  the  state  an  abstraction.  Ideas  and  ideals, 
such  as  truth,  goodness,  beauty,  are  mere  phrases. 
What  then  remains  but  the  concrete  bodily  personality 
of  every  man  of  which  every  one  is  the  ultimate  stan- 
dard of  right  and  wrong? 


91 


EGO-SOVEREIGNTY 

STRANGE  that  neither  of  these  philosophers  of 
individuality,  Nietzsche  or  Stirner,  ever  took 
the  trouble  to  investigate  what  an  individual  is !  Stir- 
ner halts  before  this  most  momentous  question  of  his 
world-conception,  and  so  he  overlooks  that  his  ego,  his 
own  individuality,  this  supreme  sovereign  standing  be- 
yond right  and  wrong,  the  ultimate  authority  of  every- 
thing, is  a  hazy,  fluctuating,  uncertain  thing  which  dif- 
fers from  day  to  day  and  finally  disappears. 

The  individuality  of  any  man  is  the  product  of  com- 
munal life.  No  one  of  us  could  exist  as  a  rational  per- 
sonality were  he  not  a  member  of  a  social  group  from 
which  he  has  imbibed  his  ideas  as  well  as  his  language. 
Every  word  is  a  product  of  his  intercourse  with  his 
fellow-beings.  His  entire  existence  consists  in  his  re- 
lations toward  others  and  finds  expression  in  his  atti- 
tude toward  social  institutions.  We  may  criticize  ex- 
istent institutions  but  we  can  never  do  without  any. 
A  denial  of  either  their  existence  or  their  significance 
proves  an  utter  lack  of  insight  into  the  nature  of 
personality. 

92 


EGO-SOVEREIGNTY 

We  insert  here  a  few  characteristic  sentences  of 
Stirner's  views,  and  in  order  to  be  fair  we  follow  the 
condensation  of  John  Henry  Mackay  (pp.  135-192) 
than  whom  certainly  we  could  find  no  more  sympa- 
thetic or  intelligent  student  of  this  individualistic 
philosophy. 

Here  are  Stirner's  arguments : 

The  ancients  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  man 
was  spirit.  They  created  a  world  of  spirit,  and  in 
this  world  of  spirit  Christianity  begins.  But  what  is 
spirit?  Spirit  has  originated  from  nothing.  It  is  its 
own  creation  and  man  makes  it  the  center  of  the  world. 
The  injunction  was  given,  Thou  shalt  not  live  to  thy- 
self but  to  thy  spirit,  to  thy  ideas.  Spirit  is  the  God, 
the  ego  and  the  spirit  are  in  constant  conflict.  Spirit 
dwells  beyond  the  earth.  It  is  in  vain  to  force  the 
divine  into  service  here  for  I  am  neither  God  nor  man, 
neither  the  highest  being  nor  my  being.  The  spirit  is 
like  a  ghost  whom  no  one  has  seen,  but  of  whom  there 
are  innumerable  creditable  witnesses,  such  as  grand- 
mother can  give  account  of.  The  whole  world  that 
surrounds  thee  is  filled  with  spooks  of  thy  imagina- 
tion. The  holiness  of  truth  which  hallows  thee  is  a 
strange  element.  It  is  not  thine  own  and  strangeness 
is  a  characteristic  of  holiness.  The  specter  is  truly 
only  in  thine  ownhood Right  is  a  spleen  con- 
ferred by  a  spook;  might,  that  is  myself.  I  am  the 

mighty  one  and  the  owner  of  might Right  is 

the  royal  will  of  society.  Every  right  which  exists  is 

93 


NIETZSCHE 

created  right.  I  am  expected  to  honor  it  where  I  find 
it  and  subject  myself  to  it.  But  what  to  me  is  the  right 
of  society,  the  right  of  all  ?  What  do  I  care  for  equal- 
ity of  right,  for  the  struggle  for  right,  for  inalienable 
rights?  Right  becomes  word  in  law.  The  dominant 
will  is  the  preserver  of  the  states.  My  own  will  shall 
upset  them.  Every  state  is  a  despotism.  All  right  and 
all  power  is  claimed  to  belong  to  the  community  of  the 
people.  I,  however,  shall  not  allow  myself  to  be  bound 
by  it,  for  I  recognize  no  duty  even  though  the  state 
may  call  crime  in  me  what  it  considers  right  for  itself. 
My  relation  to  the  state  is  not  the  relation  of  one  ego 
to  another  ego.  It  is  the  relation  of  the  sinner  to  the 
saint,  but  the  saint  is  a  mere  fixed  idea  from  which 
crimes  originate  (Mackay,  pages  154-5). 

It  will  sometimes  be  difficult  to  translate  Stirner's 
declarations  in  their  true  meaning;  for  instance:  "I 
am  the  owner  of  mankind,  I  am  mankind  and  shall  do 
nothing  for  the  benefit  of  another  mankind.  The 
property  of  mankind  is  mine.  I  do  not  respect  the 
property  of  mankind.  Poverty  originates  when  I  can 
not  utilize  my  own  self  as  -I  want  to.  It  is  the  state 
which  hinders  men  from  entering  into  a  direct  relation 
with  others.  On  the  mercy  of  right  my  private  prop- 
erty depends.  Only  within  prescribed  limits  am  I  al- 
lowed to  compete.  Only  the  medium  of  exchange,  the 
money  which  the  state  makes,  am  I  allowed  to  use. 
The  forms  of  the  state  may  change,  the  purpose  of 
the  state  always  remains  the  same.  My  property,  how- 

94 


EGO-SOVEREIGNTY 

ever,  is  what  I  empower  myself  to.  Let  violence  de- 
cide, I  expect  all  from  my  own. 

"You  shall  not  lure  me  with  love,  nor  catch  me  with 
the  promise  of  communion  of  possessions,  but  the  ques- 
tion of  property  will  be  solved  only  through  a  war  of 
all  against  all,  and  what  a  slave  will  do  as  soon  as  he 
has  broken  his  fetters  we  shall  have  to  see.  I  know 
no  law  of  love.  As  every  one  of  my  sentiments  is  my 
property,  so  also  is  love.  I  give  it,  I  donate  it,  I  squan- 
der it  merely  because  it  makes  me  happy.  Earn  it 
if  you  believe  you  have  a  right  to  it.  The  measure  of 
my  sentiments  can  not  be  prescribed  to  me,  nor  the 
aim  of  my  feelings  determined.  We  and  the  world 
have  only  one  relation  toward  each  other,  that  of  use- 
fulness. Yea,  I  use  the  world  and  men."  (Pp.  156- 
157.) 

As  to  promises  made  and  confidence  solicited  Stir- 
ner  would  not  allow  a  limitation  of  freedom.  He  says : 
"In  itself  an  oath  is  no  more  sacred  than  a  lie  is  con- 
temptible." Stirner  opposes  the  idea  of  communism. 
"The  community  of  man  creates  laws  for  society. 
Communism  is  a  communion  in  equality."  Says  Stir- 
ner, "I  prefer  to  depend  on  the  egotism  of  men  rather 
than  on  their  compassion."  He  feels  himself  swelled 
into  a  temporary,  transient,  puny  deity.  No  man  ex- 
presses him  rightly,  no  concept  defines  him;  he,  the 
ego,  is  perfect.  Stirner  concludes  his  book :  "Owner 
I  am  of  my  own  power  and  I  am  such  only  when  I 
know  myself  as  the  only  one.  In  the  only  one  even  the 

95 


NIETZSCHE 

owner  returns  into  his  creative  nothingness  from  which 
he  was  born.  Any  higher  being  above,  be  it  God  or 
man,  detracts  from  the  feeling  of  my  uniqueness  and 
it  pales  before  the  sun  of  this  consciousness.  If  I 
place  my  trust  in  myself,  the  only  one,  it  will  stand 
upon  a  transient  mortal  creator  of  himself,  who  feeds 
upon  himself,  and  I  can  say, 

"Ich  hab  mein  Sach'  auf  nichts  gestellt." 
"My  trust  in  nothingness  is  placed." 

We  call  attention  to  Stirner's  book,  "The  Only  One 
and  His  Ownhood,"  not  because  we  are  strongly  im- 
pressed by  the  profundity  of  his  thought  but  because 
we  believe  that  here  is  a  man  who  ought  to  be  an- 
swered, whose  world-conception  deserves  a  careful 
analysis  which  finally  would  lead  to  a  justification  of 
society,  the  state  and  the  ideals  of  right  and  truth. 

Society  is  not,  as  Stirner  imagines,  an  artificial  prod- 
uct of  men  who  band  themselves  together  in  order  to 
produce  a  state  for  the  benefit  of  a  clique.  Society  and 
state,  as  well  as  their  foundation  the  family,  are  of  a 
natural  growth.  All  the  several  social  institutions 
(kind  of  spiritual  organisms)  are  as  much  organisms 
as  are  plants  and  animals.  The  co-operation  of  the 
state  with  religious,  legal,  civic  and  other  institutions, 
are  as  much  realities  as  are  individuals,  and  any  one 
who  would  undertake  to  struggle  against  them  or  treat 
them  as  nonentities  will  be  implicated  in  innumerable 
struggles. 

Stirner  is  the  philosopher  of  individualism.    To  him 

96 


EGO-SOVEREIGNTY 

the  individual,  this  complicated  and  fluctuant  being,  is 
a  reality,  indeed  the  only  true  reality,  while  other  com- 
binations, institutions  and  social  units  are  deemed  to 
be  mere  nonentities.  If  from  this  standpoint  the  in- 
dividualism of  Stirner  were  revised,  the  student  would 
come  to  radically  different  conclusions,  and  these  con- 
clusions would  show  that  not  without  good  reasons  has 
the  individual  developed  as  a  by-product  of  society,  and 
all  the  possessions,  intellectual  as  well  as  material, 
which  exist  are  held  by  individuals  only  through  the 
assistance  and  with  the  permission  of  the  whole  so- 
ciety or  its  dominant  factors. 

Both  socialism  and  its  opposite,  individualism,  which 
is  ultimately  the  same  as  anarchism,  are  extremes  that 
are  based  upon  an  erroneous  interpretation  of  com- 
munal life.  Socialists  make  society,  and  anarchists  the 
individual  their  ultimate  principle  of  human  existence. 
Neither  socialism  nor  anarchism  are  principles;  both 
are  factors,  and  both  factors  are  needed  for  preserv- 
ing the  health  of  society  as  well  as  comprehending 
the  nature  of  mankind.  By  neglecting  either  of  these 
factors,  we  can  only  be  led  astray  and  arrive  at  wrong 
conclusions. 

Poor  Stirner  wanted  to  exalt  the  ego,  the  sovereign 
individual,  not  only  to  the  exclusion  of  a  transcendent 
God  and  of  the  state  or  any  other  power,  divine  or 
social,  but  even  to  the  exclusion  of  his  own  ideals,  be 
it  truth  or  anything  spiritual ;  and  yet  he  himself  sac- 
rificed his  life  for  a  propaganda  of  the  ego  as  a  unique 

97 


NIETZSCHE 

and  sovereign  being.  He  died  in  misery  and  the  rec- 
ognition of  his  labors  has  slowly,  very  slowly,  followed 
after  his  death.  Yea,  even  after  his  death  a  rival  in- 
dividualist, Friedrich  Nietzsche,  stole  his  thunder  and 
reaped  the  fame  which  Stirner  had  earned.  Certainly 
this  noble-minded,  modest,  altruistic  egotist  was  paid 
in  his  own  coin. 

Did  Stirner  live  up  to  his  principle  of  ego  sov- 
ereignty ?  In  one  sense  he  did ;  he  recognized  the  right 
of  every  one  to  be  himself,  even  when  others  infringed 
upon  his  own  well-being.  His  wife  fell  out  with  him 
but  he  respected  her  sovereignty  and  justified  her  ir- 
regularities. Apparently  he  said  to  himself,  "She  has  as 
much  right  to  her  own  personality  as  I  have  to  mine." 
But  in  another  sense,  so  far  as  he  himself  was  con- 
cerned, he  did  not.  What  became  of  his  own  rights, 
his  ownhood,  and  the  sweeping  claim  that  the  world 
was  his  property,  that  he  was  entitled  to  use  or  misuse 
the  world  and  all  mankind  as  he  saw  fit ;  that  no  other 
human  being  could  expect  recognition,  nay  not  even 
on  the  basis  of  contracts,  or  promises,  or  for  the  sake 
of  love,  or  humaneness  and  compassion?  Did  Stirner 
in  his  poverty  ever  act  on  the  principle  that  he  was 
the  owner  of  the  world,  that  there  was  no  tie  of  moral- 
ity binding  on  him,  no  principle  which  he  had  to  re- 
spect? Nothing  of  the  kind.  He  lived  and  died  in 
peace  with  all  the  world,  and  the  belief  in  the  great 
ego  sovereignty  with  its  bold  renunciation  of  all  moral- 
ity was  a  mere  Platonic  idea,  a  tame  theory  which  had 

98 


EGO-SOVEREIGNTY 

not  the  slightest  influence  upon  his  practical  life. 

Men  of  Stirner's  type  do  not  fare  well  in  a  world 
where  the  ego  has  come  into  its  own.  They  will  be 
trampled  under  foot,  they  will  be  bruised  and  starved, 
and  they  will  die  by  the  wayside.  No,  men  of  Stirner's 
type  had  better  live  in  the  protective  shadow  of  a  state ; 
the  worst  and  most  despotic  state  will  be  better  than 
none,  for  no  state  means  mob  rule  or  the  tyranny  of 
the  bulldozer,  the  ruffian,  the  brutal  and  unprincipled 
self-seeker. 

Here  Friedrich  Nietzsche  comes  in.  Like  Stirner, 
Nietzsche  was  a  peaceful  man;  but  unlike  Stirner, 
Nietzsche  had  a  hankering  for  power.  Being  patho- 
logical himself,  without  energy,  without  strength  and 
without  a  healthy  appetite  and  a  good  stomach,  Nietz- 
sche longed  to  play  the  part  of  a  bulldozer  among  a 
herd  of  submissive  human  creatures  whom  he  would 
control  and  command.  This  is  Nietzsche's  ideal,  and 
he  calls  it  the  "overman."  Here  Nietzsche  modified 
and  added  his  own  notion  to  Stirner's  philosophy. 

Individualistic  philosophies  are  therefore  based  on 
an  obvious  error  by  misunderstanding  the  nature  of 
the  individual  man,  by  forgetting  the  reality  of  so- 
ciety and  its  continued  significance  for  the  individual 
life.  A  careful  investigation  of  the  nature  of  the  state 
as  well  as  of  our  personality  would  have  taught  Stir- 
ner that  both  the  state  and  the  individual  are  realities. 
The  state  and  society  exist  as  much  as  the  individuals 


99 


NIETZSCHE 

of  which  they  are  composed,1  and  no  individual  can 
ignore  in  his  maxims  of  life  the  rules  of  conduct,  the 
moral  principles,  or  whatever  you  may  call  that  some- 
thing which  constitutes  the  conditions  of  his  existence, 
of  his  physical  and  social  surroundings.  The  dignity 
and  divinity  of  personality  does  not  exclude  the  sig- 
nificance of  super-personalities ;  indeed,  the  two,  super- 
personal  presences  with  their  moral  obligations  and 
concrete  human  persons  with  their  rights  and  duties, 
co-operate  with  each  other  and  produce  thereby  all  the 
higher  values  of  life. 

Stirner  is  onesided  but,  within  the  field  of  his  one- 
sided view,  consistent.  Nietzsche  spurns  consistency 
but  accepts  the  field  of  notions  created  by  Stirner,  and, 
glorying  in  the  same  extreme  individualism,  proclaims 
the  gospel  of  that  individual  who  on  the  basis  of  Stir- 
ner's  philosophy  would  make  the  best  of  a  disorganized 
state  of  society,  who  by  taking  upon  himself  the  func- 
tions of  the  state  would  utilize  the  advantages  thus 
gained  for  the  suppression  of  his  fellow  beings;  and 
this  kind  of  individual  is  dignified  with  the  title  "over- 
man." 

Nietzsche  has  been  blamed  for  appropriating  Stir- 
ner's  thoughts  and  twisting  them  out  of  shape  from  the 
self-assertion  of  every  ego  consciousness  into  the  au- 
tocracy of  the  unprincipled  man  of  power ;  but  we  must 
concede  that  the  common  rules  of  literary  ethics  can 
not  apply  to  individualists  who  deny  all  and  any  moral 

'See  the  author's  The  Nature  of  the  State,  1894,  and 
Personality,  1911. 

100 


EGO-SOVEREIGNTY 

authority.  Why  should  Nietzsche  give  credit  to  the 
author  from  whom  he  drew  his  inspiration  if  neither 
acknowledges  any  rule  which  he  feels  obliged  to  ob- 
serve ?  Nietzsche  uses  Stirner  as  Stirner  declares  that 
it  is  the  good  right  of  every  ego  to  use  his  fellows,  and 
Nietzsche  shows  us  what  the  result  would  be — the  rise 
of  a  political  boss,  a  brute  in  human  shape,  the  over- 
man. 

Nietzsche  is  a  poet,  not  a  philosopher,  not  even  a 
thinker,  but  as  a  poet  he  exercises  a  peculiar  fascina- 
tion upon  many  people  who  would  never  think  of  agree- 
ing with  him.  Most  admirers  of  Nietzsche  belong  to 
the  class  which  Nietzsche  calls  the  "herd  animals," 
people  who  have  no  chance  of  ever  asserting  them- 
selves, and  become  hungry  for  power  as  a  sick  man 
longs  for  health. 

Individualism  and  anarchism  continue  to  denounce 
the  state,  when  they  ought  to  reform  it  and  improve 
its  institutions.  In  the  meantime  the  world  wags  on. 
The  state  exists,  society  exists,  and  innumerable  social 
institutions  exist.  The  individual  grows  under  the  in- 
fluence of  other  individuals,  his  ideas — mere  spooks  of 
his  brain — yet  the  factors  of  his  life,  right  or  wrong, 
guide  him  and  determine  his  fate.  There  are  as  rare 
exceptions  a  few  lawless  societies  in  the  wild  West 
where  a  few  outlaws  meet  by  chance,  revolver  in  hand, 
but  even  among  them  the  state  of  anarchy  does  not 
last  long,  for  by  habit  and  precedent  certain  rules  are 
established,  and  wherever  man  meets  man,  wherever 

101 


NIETZSCHE 

they  offer  and  accept  one  another's  help,  they  co-oper- 
ate or  compete,  they  join  hands  or  fight,  they  make 
contracts,  form  alliances,  and  establish  rules,  the  re- 
sult of  which  is  society,  the  state,  with  all  the  institu- 
tions of  the  state,  the  administration,  the  legislature, 
the  judiciary,  with  all  the  intricate  machinery  that  reg- 
ulates the  interrelations  of  man  to  man. 

The  truth  is  that  man  develops  into  a  rational,  hu- 
man and  humane  being  through  society  by  his  inter- 
course with  other  men.  Man  is  not  really  an  individual 
in  the  sense  of  Stirner  and  Nietzsche,  a  being  by  him- 
self and  for  himself,  having  no  obligations  to  his  fel- 
lows. Man  is  a  part  of  the  society  through  which  he 
originated  and  to  which  he  belongs  and  to  overlook,  to 
neglect  and  to  ignore  his  relations  to  society,  not  to 
recognize  definite  obligations  or  rules  of  conduct  which 
we  formulate  as  duties  is  the  grossest  mistake  philoso- 
phers can  make,  and  this  becomes  obvious  if  we  con- 
sider the  nature  of  man  as  a  social  being  as  Aristotle 
has  defined  it. 


102 


ANOTHER  NIETZSCHE 

THE  assertion  of  selfhood  and  the  hankering  after 
originality  make  Nietzsche  the  exponent  of  the 
absolute  uniqueness  of  everything  particular,  and  he 
goes  to  the  extreme  of  denying  all  kinds  of  universal- 
ity— even  that  of  formal  laws  (the  so-called  uniformi- 
ties of  nature),  reason,  and  especially  its  application 
in  the  field  of  practical  life,  morality.  His  ideal  is  "Be 
thyself!  Be  unique!  Be  original!"  Properly  speak- 
ing, we  should  not  use  the  term  ideal  when  speaking 
of  Nietzsche's  maxims  of  life,  for  the  conception  of  an 
ideal  is  based  upon  a  recognition  of  some  kind  of 
universality,  and  Nietzsche  actually  sneers  at  any  one 
having  ideals.  The  adherents  of  Nietzsche  speak  of 
their  master  as  "der  Einzige,"  i.  e.,  "the  unique  one," 
and  yet  (in  spite  of  the  truth  that  every  thing  partic- 
ular is  in  its  way  unique)  the  uniformities  of  nature 
are  so  real  and  unfailing  that  Nietzsche  is  simply  the 
representative  of  a  type  which  according  to  the  laws 
of  history  and  mental  evolution  naturally  and  inevit- 
ably appears  whenever  the  philosophy  of  nominalism 

103 


NIETZSCHE 

reaches  its  climax.  He  would  therefore  not  be  unique 
even  if  he  were  the  only  one  that  aspires  after  a  unique 
selfhood;  but  the  fact  is  that  there  are  a  number  of 
Nietzsches,  he  happening  to  be  the  best  known  of  his 
type.  Other  advocates  of  selfhood,  of  course,  will  be 
different  from  Nietzsche  in  many  unimportant  details, 
but  they  will  be  alike  in  all  points  that  are  essential 
and  characteristic.  One  of  these  Nietzsches  is  George 
Moore,  a  Britain  who  is  scarcely  familiar  with  the 
writings  of  his  German  double,  but  a  few  quotations 
from  his  book,  Confessions  of  a  Young  Man,  will  show 
that  he  can  utter  thoughts  which  might  have  been  writ- 
ten by  Friedrich  Nietzsche  himself.  George  Moore 
says: 

"I  was  not  dissipated,  but  I  loved  the  abnormal"  (p.  18). 

"I  was  a  model  young  man  indeed"  (p.  20). 

"I  boasted  of  dissipations"  (p.  19). 

"I  say  again,  let  general  principles  be  waived;  it  will  suf- 
fice for  the  interest  of  these  pages  if  it  be  understood  that 
brain-instincts  have  always  been,  and  still  are,  the  initial  and 
the  determining  powers  of  my  being"  (p.  47). 

George  Moore,  like  Nietzsche,  is  one  of  Schopen- 
hauer's disciples  who  has  become  sick  of  pessimism. 
He  says: 

"That  odious  pessimism!    How  sick  I  am  of  it"  (p.  310). 

When  George  Moore  speaks  of  God  he  thinks  of 
him  in  the  old-fashioned  way  as  a  big  self,  an  individ- 
ual and  particular  being.  Hence  he  denies  him.  God 
is  as  dead  as  any  pagan  deity.  George  Moore  says: 

"To  talk  to  us,  the  legitimate  children  of  the  nineteenth 

104 


ANOTHER    NIETZSCHE 

century,  of  logical  proofs  of  the  existence  of  God,  strikes  us 
in  just  the  same  light  as  the  logical  proof  of  the  existence 
of  Jupiter  Atnmon"  (p.  137). 

George  Moore  is  coarse  in  comparison  with  Nietz- 
sche. Nietzsche  is  no  cynic;  he  is  pure-hearted  and 
noble  by  nature.  Moore  is  voluptuous  and  vulgar. 
Both  are  avowed  immoralists,  and  if  the  principle  of 
an  unrestrained  egotism  be  right,  George  Moore  is  as 
good  as  Nietzsche,  and  any  criminal  given  to  the 
most  abominable  vices  would  not  be  worse  than  either. 

Nietzsche  feels  the  decadence  of  the  age  and  longs 
for  health;  but  he  attributes  the  cause  of  his  own 
decadence  to  the  Christian  ideals  of  virtue,  love,  and 
sympathy  with  others.  George  Moore  cherishes  the 
same  views;  he  says: 

"We  are  now  in  a  period  of  decadence,  growing  steadily 
more  and  more  acute"  (p.  239). 

"Respectability  .  .  .  continues  to  exercise  a  meretricious 
and  enervating  influence  on  literature"  (p.  240). 

"Pity,  that  most  vile  of  all  vile  virtues,  has  never  been 
known  to  me.  The  great  pagan  world  I  love  knew  it  not" 
(p.  200). 

"The  philanthropist  is  the  Nero  of  modern  times"  (p.  185). 

Both  Nietzsche  and  Moore  long  for  limitless  free- 
dom; but  Moore  seems  more  consistent,  for  he  lacks 
the  ideal  of  the  overman  and  extends  freedom  to  the 
sex  relation,  saying: 

"Marriage — what  an  abomination !  Love — yes,  but  not 
marriage  .  .  .  freedom  limitless"  (p.  168-169). 

Moore  loves  art,  but  his  view  of  art  is  cynical,  and 
here  too  he  is  unlike  Nietzsche;  he  says: 

105 


NIETZSCHE 

"Art  is  not  nature.  Art  is  nature  digested.  Art  is  a  sub- 
lime excrement"  (p.  178). 

Both  believe  in  the  coming  of  a  great  social  deluge. 
George  Moore  says : 

"The  French  revolution  will  compare  with  the  revolution 
that  is  to  come,  that  must  come,  that  is  inevitable,  as  a  puddle 
on  the  road-side  compares  with  the  sea.  Men  will  hang 
like  pears  on  every  lamp-post,  in  every  great  quarter  of 
London,  there  will  be  an  electric  guillotine  that  will  decapi- 
tate the  rich  like  hogs  in  Chicago"  (p.  343). 

Ideals  are  regarded  as  superstitions,  and  belief  in 
ideas  is  deemed  hypocritical.  George  Moore  says: 

"In  my  heart  of  hearts  I  think  myself  a  cut  above  you, 
because  I  do  not  believe  in  leaving  the  world  better  than  I 
found  it;  and  you,  exquisitely  hypocritical  reader,  think  that 
you  are  a  cut  above  me  because  you  say  you  would  leave 
the  world  better  than  you  found  it"  (p.  354). 

The  deeds  of  a  man,  his  thoughts  and  aspirations, 
which  constitute  his  spiritual  self,  count  for  nothing; 
the  body  alone  is  supposed  to  be  real,  and  thus  after 
death  a  pig  is  deemed  more  useful  than  a  Socrates. 
Continues  Moore: 

"The  pig  that  is  being  slaughtered  as  I  write  this  line 
will  leave  the  world  better  than  it  found  it,  but  you  will  leave 
only  a  putrid  carcass  fit  for  nothing  but  the  grave"  (p.  353). 

Wrong  is  idealized: 

"Injustice  we  worship;  all  that  lifts  us  out  of  the  miseries 
of  life  is  the  sublime  fruit  of  injustice. 

"Man  would  not  be  man  but  for  injustice"  (p.  203). 

"Again  I  say  that  all  we  deem  sublime  in  the  world's  his- 
tory are  acts  of  injustice;  and  it  is  certain  that  if  mankind 
does  not  relinquish  at  once  and  for  ever,  its  vain,  mad,  and 

106 


ANOTHER    NIETZSCHE 

frantic  dream  of  justice,  the  world  will  lapse  into  barbarism" 
(p.  205). 

George  Moore  gives  a  moment's  thought  to  the 
ideal  of  "a  new  art,  based  upon  science,  in  opposition 
to  the  art  of  the  old  world  that  was  based  on  imagina- 
tion, an  art  that  should  explain  all  things  and  embrace 
modern  life  in  its  entirety,  in  its  endless  ramifications, 
be  it,  as  it  were,  a  new  creed  in  a  new  civilization  . 
.  .  that  would  continue  to  a  more  glorious  and  legiti- 
mate conclusion  the  work  that  the  prophets  have  be- 
gun"; but  he  turns  his  back  upon  it.  It  would  be 
after  all  a  product  of  development;  it  would  be  the 
tyranny  of  a  past  age,  and  he  says,  "as  well  drink  the 
dregs  of  yesterday's  champagne"  (p.  128). 


107 


NIETZSCHE'S  DISCIPLES 

IT  is  said  that  barking  dogs  do  not  bite,  and  this 
being  true,  we  must  look  upon  Nietzsche's  phil- 
osophy as  a  harmless  display  of  words  and  a  burning 
desire  for  power  without  making  any  attempt  to  prac- 
tice what  he  preached.  His  philosophy,  so  far  as  he 
is  concerned,  is  a  purely  Platonic  love  of  an  unattain- 
able star  whose  brilliance  dazzled  the  imagination  of 
a  childlike  peaceful  weakling.  Suppose,  however,  for 
argument's  sake,  that  Nietzsche  had  been  a  man  of 
robust  health,  and  that  he  had  been  born  at  the  time  of 
great  disturbances,  offering  unlimited  chances  to  an 
unscrupulous  ambition,  would  he  under  these  circum- 
stances have  led  the  life  he  preached,  and  in  case  he 
had  done  so,  would  he  have  boldly  and  unreservedly 
admitted  his  principles  while  carrying  out  his  plans? 
Did  ever  Caesar  or  Napoleon  or  any  usurper,  such  as 
Richard  III,  who  unscrupulously  aspired  for  power, 
own  that  he  would  shrink  from  nothing  to  attain  his 
aim?  Such  a  straightforward  policy  for  any  schemer 
would  be  the  surest  way  of  missing  his  aim.  Such 

106 


NIETZSCHE'S  DISCIPLES 

men,  on  the  contrary,  have  played  hypocrites,  and  have 
pretended  to  cherish  ideals  generally  approved  by  the 
large  masses  of  the  people  whom  Nietzsche  calls  the 
herd.  So  it  is  obvious  that  the  philosophy  of  Nietz- 
sche if  it  were  ever  practically  applied,  would  have 
become  a  secret  doctrine  known  only  to  the  initiated 
few,  while  the  broad  masses  would  be  misguided  by 
some  demonstrative  show  of  moral  principles  that 
might  be  pleasing  to  the  multitudes  and  yet  at  the 
same  time  conceal  the  real  tendency  of  the  overman 
to  gain  possession  of  his  superior  position. 

Nietzsche's  influence  upon  professional  philosophers 
is  comparatively  weak.  Whenever  mentioned  by  them, 
it  is  in  criticism,  and  he  is  generally  set  aside  as  one- 
sided, and  perhaps  justly,  because  he  was  truly  no 
philosopher  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word.  He  was 
no  reasoner,  no  logician,  and  we  can  not,  properly 
speaking,  look  upon  his  philosophy  as  a  system  or  even 
a  systematized  view  of  the  world.  Nietzsche  made 
himself  the  exponent  of  a  tendency,  and  as  such  he 
has  his  followers  among  large  masses  of  those  very 
people  whom  he  despised  as  belonging  to  the  herds. 
As  Nietzsche  idealized  this  very  quality  in  which  he 
was  lacking,  so  his  followers  recruit  themselves  from 
the  ranks  of  those  people  who  more  than  all  others 
would  be  opposed  to  the  rule  of  the  overman.  His 
most  ardent  followers  are  among  the  nihilists  of  Rus- 
sia, the  socialists  and  anarchists  of  all  civilized  coun- 
tries. The  secret  reason  of  attraction,  perhaps  un- 

109 


NIETZSCHE 

known  to  themselves,  seems  to  be  Nietzsche's  defense 
of  the  blind  impulse  and  the  privilege  which  he  claims 
for  the  overman  to  be  himself  in  spite  of  law  and 
order  and  morality,  and  also  his  contempt  for  rules, 
religious,  philosophical,  ethical  or  even  logical,  that 
would  restrict  the  great  sovereign  passion  for  power. 

Nietzsche's  philosophy  has  taken  a  firm  hold  of  a 
number  of  souls  who  rebel  against  the  social,  the  polit- 
ical, the  religious,  and  even  the  scientific,  conditions  of 
our  civilization.  Nietzsche  is  the  philosopher  of  pro- 
test, and,  strange  to  say,  while  he  himself  is  aristo- 
cratic in  his  instincts,  he  appeals  most  powerfully  to 
the  masses  of  the  people. 

Nietzsche's  disciples  are  not  among  the  aristocrats, 
not  among  the  scholars,  not  among  the  men  of  genius. 
His  followers  are  among  the  people  who  believe  in 
hatred  and  hail  him  as  a  prophet  of  the  great  deluge. 
His  greatest  admirers  are  anarchists,  sometimes  also 
socialists,  and  above  all  those  geniuses  who  have  failed 
to  find  recognition.  Nietzsche's  thought  will  prove 
veritable  dynamite  if  it  should  happen  to  reach  the 
masses  of  mankind,  the  disinherited,  the  uneducated, 
the  proletariat,  the  Catilinary  existences.  Nietzsche's 
philosophy  is  an  intoxicant  to  those  whom  he  despised 
most;  they  see  in  him  their  liberator,  and  rejoice  in 
his  invectives. 

Invectives  naturally  appeal  to  those  who  are  as  un- 
thinking as  the  brutes  of  the  field,  but  feel  the  suffer- 
ings of  existence  as  much  as  do  the  beasts  of  burden. 


NIETZSCHE'S   DISCIPLES 

They  are  impervious  to  argument,  but  being  full  of 
bitterness  and  envy  they  can  be  led  most  easily  by 
any  kind  of  denunciations  of  their  betters.  Nietzsche 
hated  the  masses,  the  crowd  of  the  common  people, 
the  herd.  He  despised  the  lowly  and  had  a  contempt 
for  the  ideals  of  democracy.  Nevertheless,  his  style  of 
thought  is  such  as  to  resemble  the  rant  of  the  leaders 
of  mobs,  and  it  is  quite  probable  that  in  the  course  of 
time  he  will  become  the  philosopher  of  demagogues. 

A  great  number  of  Nietzsche's  disciples  share  their 
master's  eccentricities  and  especially  his  impetuosity. 
Having  a  contempt  for  philosophy  as  the  work  of  the 
intellect,  they  move  mainly  in  the  field  of  political  and 
social  self-assertion;  they  are  anarchists  who  believe 
that  the  overman  is  coming  in  labor  troubles,  strikes, 
and  through  a  subversion  of  the  authority  of  govern- 
ment in  any  form. 

The  best  known  German  expounders  of  Nietzsche's 
philosophy  have  been  Rudolph  Steiner  and  Alexander 
Tille.1  Professor  Henri  Lichtenberger  of  the  Univer- 

*A.  Tille,  Von  Darwin  bis  Nietzsche.  R.  Steiner,  Wahr- 
heit  und  Wissenschaft;  Die  Philosophic  der  Freiheit;  and 
F.  Nietzsche,  ein  K'dmpfer  gegen  seine  Zeit. 

We  have  already  mentioned  the  biography  of  Nietzsche  pub- 
lished by  the  philosopher's  sister,  Frau  E.  Forster-Nietzsche. 
A  characterization,  disavowed  by  Nietzsche's  admirers,  was 
written  by  Frau  Lou  Andreas  Salome,  under  the  title  F.  Nietz- 
sche in  seinen  Werken.  Other  works  kindred  in  spirit  are 
Schellwien's  Der  Geist  der  neueren  Philosophic,  1895,  and 
Der  Darwinismus,  1896;  also  Adolf  Gerecke,  Die  Aussichts- 
losigkeit  des  Moralismus;  Schmitt,  An  der  Grenzscheide 

111 


NIETZSCHE 

sity  of  Nancy  was  his  interpreter  in  France,2  and 
the  former  editor  of  The  Eagle  and  the  Serpent,  known 
under  the  pseudonym  of  Erwin  McCall,  in  England. 
This  periodical,  which  flourished  for  a  short  time  only, 
characterized  its  own  tendency  as  follows: 

"The  Eagle  and  the  Serpent  is  a  bi-monthly  journal  of 
egoistic  philosophy  and  sociology  which  teaches  that  in  social 
science  altruism  spells  damnation  and  egoism  spells  salvation. 
In  the  war  against  their  exploiters  the  exploited  cannot  hope 
to  succeed  till  they  act  as  a  unit,  an  'ego.' " 

A  reader  of  The  Eagle  and  the  Serpent  humorously 
criticised  the  egoistic  philosophy  as  follows : 

"DEAR  EAGLE  AND  SERPENT, — I  am  one  of  those  unreason- 
able persons  who  see  no  irreconcilable  conflict  between  egoism 
and  altruism.  The  altruism  of  Tolstoy  is  the  shortest  road  to 
the  egoism  of  Whitman.  The  unbounded  love  and  compas- 
sion of  Jesus  made  him  conscious  of  being  the  son  of  God, 
and  that  he  and  the  Father  were  one.  Could  egoism  go 
further  than  this?  I  believe  that  true  egoism  and  true 
altruism  grow  in  precisely  equal  degree  in  the  soul,  and  that 
the  alleged  qualities  which  bear  either  name  and  attempt  to 
masquerade  alone  without  their  respective  make-weights  are 
shams  and  counterfeits.  The  real  desideratum  is  balance, 
and  that  cannot  be  permanently  preserved  on  one  leg.  How- 
ever, you  skate  surprisingly  well  for  the  time  being  on  one 
foot,  and  I  have  enjoyed  the  first  performance  so  well  that 
I  enclose  60  cents  for  a  season-ticket. — ERNEST  H.  CROSBY, 
Rhinebeck,  N.  Y.f  U.  S.  A. 

A  German  periodical  Der  Eigene,  i.  e.,  "he  who  is 

zweier  Weltalter;  Karoly  Krausz,  Nietzsche  und  seine  Weltan- 
schauung. 

*  Henri  Lichtenberger,  La  philosophie  de  Nietzsche.  Paris, 
Alcan,  1898. 

112 


NIETZSCHE'S  DISCIPLES 

his  own,"  announced  itself  as  "a  journal  for  all  and 
nobody,"  and  sounded  "the  slogan  of  the  egoists,"  by 
calling  on  them  to  "preserve  their  ownhood." 

Another  anarchistic  periodical  that  stood  under  the 
influence  of  Nietzsche  appeared  in  Budapest,3  Hun- 
gary, in  German  and  Hungarian  under  the  name  Ohne 
Stoat,  ("Without  Government")  as  "the  organ  of 
ideal  anarchists,"  under  the  editorship  of  Karl  Krausz. 

Perhaps  the  most  worthy  exponent  of  Nietzsche  in 
England  today  is  his  translator  Thomas  Common.  He 
does  not  consider  himself  an  orthodox  Nietzsche  apos- 
tle but  thinks  that  Nietzsche  has  given  the  world  a 
very  important  revelation  and  that  his  new  philosophy 
of  history  and  his  explanation  of  the  role  of  Christian- 
ity are  among  the  most  wonderful  discoveries  since 

'We  may  mention  incidentally  that  a  contributor  to  Ohne 
Staat  reproduced  one  of  the  Homilies  of  St.  Chrysostom,  in 
which  he  harangues  after  the  fashion  of  the  early  Christian 
preachers  against  wealth  and  power.  The  state's  attorney, 
not  versed  in  Christian  patristic  literature,  seized  the  issue 
and  placed  the  man  who  quoted  the  old  Byzantine  saint 
behind  the  prison  bars.  In  the  issue  of  Nov.,  1898,  Dr.  Eugen 
Heinrich  Schmitt  mentions  the  case  and  says:  "Thus  we 
have  an  exact  and  historical  proof  that  the  liberty  of  speech 
and  thought  was  incomparably  greater  in  miserable,  servile 
Byzantium  than  it  is  now  in  the  much  more  miserable  and 
more  servile  despotism  of  modern  Europe."  Does  not  Dr. 
Schmitt  overlook  the  fact  that  in  the  days  of  Byzantine  Chris- 
tianity the  saints  were  protected  by  the  mob,  which  was  much 
feared  by  the  imperial  government  and  was  kept  at  bay  only 
by  a  nominal  recognition  of  its  claims  and  beliefs? 

113 


NIETZSCHE 

Darwin.  At  the  same  time  Mr.  Common  pronounces 
Nietzsche's  doctrine  of  eternal  recurrence  "very  fool- 
ish" and  believes  his  use  of  the  terms  "good"  and 
"evil"  so  perverted  that  he  was  frequently  confused 
about  them  and  so  misled  superficial  readers.  Mr. 
Common  published  at  regular  intervals  during  the 
years  1903  to  1909  ten  numbers  of  a  small  periodical 
entitled  variously  Notes  for  Good  Europeans  and  The 
Good  European  Point  of  View,  and  expects  to  resume 
its  publication  soon.  Its  motto  is  from  Nietzsche,  "In 
a  word — and  it  shall  be  an  honorable  word — we  are 
Good  Europeans  ....  the  heirs  of  thousands 
of  years  of  the  European  spirit."  Its  purpose  is  ex- 
pressed in  its  first  number  as  follows:  "Our  general 
purpose  is  to  spread  the  best  and  most  important 
knowledge  relating  to  human  well-being  among  those 
who  are  worthy  to  receive  it,  with  a  view  to  reducing 
the  knowledge  to  practice,  after  some  degree  of  unan- 
imity has  been  attained.  .  .  As  Nietzsche's  works, 
notwithstanding  some  limitations,  exaggerations  and 
minor  errors,  embody  the  foremost  philosophical 
thought  of  the  age,  it  will  be  one  of  our  special  objects 
to  introduce  these  works  to  English  readers." 

These  numbers  contain  many  bibliographical  and 
other  notes  of  interest  to  friends  or  critics  of  the 
Nietzsche  propaganda.  Mr.  Common  has  published 
selections  from  Nietzsche's  works  under  the  title, 
Nietzsche  as  Critic,  Philosopher,  Poet  and  Prophet.* 

4  Other  recent  English  Nietzschean  literature  is  as  follows : 
114 


BUST  OF  NIETZSCHE,  BY  KLINGER 


NIETZSCHE'S   DISCIPLES 

In  America  Nietzsche's  philosophy  is  represented 
by  a  book  of  Ragnar  Redbeard,  entitled  Might  is 
Right,  the  Survival  of  the  Fittest.5  The  author  char- 
acterizes his  work  as  follows: 

"This  book  is  a  reasoned  negation  of  the  Ten  Command- 
ments— the  Golden  Rule — the  Sermon  on  the  Mount — Repub- 
lican Principles — Christian  Principles — and  'Principles'  in 
general. 

"It  proclaims  upon  scientific  evolutionary  grounds,  the 
unlimited  absolutism  of  Might,  and  asserts  that  cut-and-dried 
moral  codes  are  crude  and  immoral  inventions,  promotive  of 
vice  and  vassalage." 

The  author  is  a  most  ardent  admirer  of  Nietzsche, 
as  may  be  learned  from  his  verses  made  after  the  pat- 
tern of  Nietzsche's  poetry.  He  sings: 

"There  is  no  'law'  in  heaven  or  earth  that  man  must  needs 
obey!  Take  what  you  can,  and  all  you  can;  and  take  it 
while  you — may. 

"Let  not  the  Jew-born  Christ  ideal  unnerve  you  in  the  fight. 
You  have  no  'rights,'  except  the  rights  you  win  by — might. 

"There  is  no  justice,  right,  nor  wrong;  no  truth,  no  good, 
no  evil.  There  is  no  'man's  immortal  soul,'  no  fiery,  fearsome 
Devil. 

"There  is  no  'heaven  of  glory :'  No ! — no  'hell  where  sin- 
Grace  Neal  Dolson,  The  Philosophy  of  Friedrich  Nietzsche, 
1901 ;  Oscar  Levy,  The  Revival  of  Aristocracy,  1906 ;  A.  R. 
Orage,  Fried.  Nietzsche,  the  Dionysion  Spirit  of  the  Age, 
1906;  A.  R.  Orage,  Nietzsche  in  Outline  and  Alphorism; 
Henry  L.  Mencken,  The  Philosophy  of  Friedrich  Nietzsche; 
M.  A.  Miigge,  Friedrich  Nietzsche:  His  Life  and  Work; 
Anthony  M.  Ludovici,  Who  Is  to  Be  Master  of  the  World? 

5  Published  by  Adolph  Mueller,  Chicago. 

115 


NIETZSCHE 

ners  roast.'  There  is  no  'God  the  Father/  No! — no  Son,  no 
'Holy  Ghost' 

"This  world  is  no  Nirvana  where  joy  forever  flows.  It  is 
a  grewsome  butcher  shop  where  dead  'lambs'  hang  in — rows. 

"Man  is  the  most  ferocious  of  all  the  beasts  of  prey.  He 
rangeth  round  the  mountains,  to  love,  and  feast,  and — slay. 

"He  sails  the  stormy  oceans,  he  gallops  o'er  the  plains,  and 
sucks  the  very  marrow-bones  of  captives  held  in — chains. 

"Death  endeth  all  for  every  man, — for  every  'son  of  thun- 
der'; then  be  a  lion  (not  a  'lamb')  and — don't  be  trampled 
under." 

A  valuable  recent  addition  to  the  discussion  of  ego- 
ism is  The  Philosophy  of  Egoism  by  James  L.  Walker, 
(Denver,  1905). 

We  know  of  no  American  periodical  which  stands 
for  Nietzsche's  views,  except,  perhaps,  The  Lion's 
Paw  (Chicago)  which  claims  to  follow  no  one.  In  the 
last  years  of  the  nineteenth  century  Clarence  L.  Swartz 
published  at  Wellesley,  Mass.,  an  egoistic  periodical 
called  the  7.  This  magazine  is  no  longer  in  existence, 
but  Mr.  Swartz  is  very  active  in  the  International  In- 
telligence Institute  whose  aims  are  universal  language, 
universal  nationality  and  universal  peace.  He  still 
maintains  the  same  philosophical  view  which  he  held 
as  editor  of  the  7,  but  his  philosophical  egoism  has  led 
him  in  far  different  paths  from  those  of  Nietzsche — 
into  the  paths  of  peace  and  not  of  struggle.  He  ex- 
presses his  present  conception  as  follows: 

"In  the  last  analysis  there  is  no  right  but  might. 
Such  is  the  common  ordinary  rule  of  every-day  life, 
from  which  there  is  no  escape,  even  were  escape  de- 

116 


NIETZSCHE'S   DISCIPLES 

sirable.  Any  attempt  to  overthrow  or  circumvent  or 
even  dispute  the  exercise  of  this  prerogative  of  the 
mighty  is  but  to  assert  or  oppose  a  greater  might. 
Expediency  always  dictates  how  might  should  be  ex- 
ercised. Politically,  I  hold  that  the  non-coercion  of 
the  non-invasive  individual  is  the  part  of  wisdom.  The 
individual  is  supreme,  and  should  be  preserved  as 
against  society,  for  in  no  other  way  can  evolution  per- 
form its  perfect  work." 

The  Free  Comrade  edited  by  J.  Wm.  Lloyd  and 
Leonard  Abbott,  an  avowedly  socialistic  and  individu- 
alistic paper,  originally  under  the  sole  editorship  of 
Lloyd,  stood  for  Nietzsche  and  his  egoism,  but  can  no 
longer  be  said  to  do  so. 


117 


THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  VALUATION 

IT  may  be  interesting  in  this  connection  to  men- 
tion the  case  of  an  American  equivalent  to  Nietz- 
sche's philosophy,  which  so  far  as  I  know  has  never 
yet  seen  publicity. 

Some  time  ago  the  writer  of  this  little  book  became 
acquainted  with  a  journalist  who  has  worked  out  for 
his  own  satisfaction  a  new  system  of  philosophy  which 
he  calls  "Christian  economics,"  the  tendency  of  which 
would  be  to  preach  a  kind  of  secret  doctrine  for  the 
initiated  few  who  would  be  clever  enough  to  avail 
themselves  of  the  good  opportunity.  He  claims  that 
the  only  thing  worth  while  in  life  is  the  acquisition  of 
power  through  the  instrumentality  of  money.  He  who 
acquires  millions  can  direct  the  destiny  of  mankind, 
and  this  tendency  was  first  realized  in  the  history  of 
mankind  in  this  Christian  nation  of  ours,  whose  osten- 
sible faith  is  Christianity.  Our  religion,  he  argues,  is 
especially  adapted  to  serve  as  a  foil  to  protect  and 
conceal  the  real  issue,  and  so  he  calls  his  world-con- 
ception, "Christian  economics."  Emperors  and  kings 

118 


THE    PRINCIPLE    OF    VALUATION 

are  mere  puppets  who  are  exhibited  to  general  inspec- 
tion, and  so  are  presidents  and  all  the  magistrates  in 
office.  Political  government  has  to  obey  the  behests 
of  the  financiers,  and  the  most  vital  life  of  mankind 
resides  in  its  economical  conditions. 

The  inventor  of  this  new  system  of  "Christian  eco- 
nomics" would  allow  no  other  valuation  except  that  of 
making  money,  on  the  sole  ground  that  science,  art  and 
che  pleasures  of  life  are  nothing  to  man  unless  he  is 
in  control  of  power  which  can  be  had  only  through 
the  magic  charm  of  the  almighty  dollar. 

I  shall  not  comment  upon  his  view,  but  shall  leave  it 
to  the  reader,  and  am  here  satisfied  to  point  out  its 
similarity  to-  Nietzsche's  philosophy.  There  is  one 
point  only  which  I  shall  submit  here  for  criticism  and 
that  is  the  principle  of  valuation  which  is  a  weak 
point  with  both  the  originator  of  "Christian  economics" 
and  with  Friedrich  Nietzsche. 

Nietzsche  proclaimed  with  great  blast  of  trumpets, 
if  we  may  so  call  his  rhetorical  display  of  phrases,  that 
we  need  a  revaluation  of  all  values;  but  the  best  he 
could  do  was  to  establish  a  standard  of  valuation  of  his 
own.  Every  man  in  this  world  attains  his  mode  of 
judging  values  according  to  his  character,  which  is 
formed  partly  by  inherited  tendencies,  partly  by  educa- 
tion and  is  modified  by  his  own  reflections  and  exper- 
iences. There  are  but  few  persons  in  this  world  who 
are  clearsighted  enough  to  formulate  the  ultimately 
guiding  motive  of  their  conduct.  Most  people  follow 

119 


NIETZSCHE 

their  impulses  blindly,  but  in  all  of  them  conduct  forms 
a  certain  consistent  system  corresponding  to  their  own 
idiosyncrasy.  These  impulses  may  sometimes  be  con- 
tradictory, yet  upon  the  whole  they  will  all  agree,  just 
as  leaves  and  blossoms,  roots  and  branches  of  the  same 
tree  will  naturally  be  formed  according  to  the  secret 
plan  that  determines  the  growth  of  the  whole  organ- 
ism. Those  who  work  out  a  specially  pronounced  sys- 
tem of  moral  conduct  do  not  always  agree  in  practical 
life  with  their  own  moral  principle,  sometimes  because 
they  wilfully  misrepresent  it  and  more  frequently  be- 
cause their  maxims  of  morality  are  such  as  they  them- 
selves would  like  to  be,  while  their  conduct  is  such  as 
they  actually  are.  Such  are  the  conditions  of  life  and 
we  will  call  that  principle  which  as  an  ultimate  raison 
d'etre  determines  the  conduct  of  man,  his  standard  of 
valuation.  We  will  see  at  once  that  there  is  a  different 
standard  for  each  particular  character. 

A  scientist  as  a  rule  looks  at  the  world  through  the 
spectacles  of  the  scientist.  His  estimation  of  other 
people  depends  entirely  on  their  accomplishments  in 
his  own  line  of  science.  Artist,  musician,  or  sculptor 
does  the  same.  To  a  professional  painter  scarcely  any 
other  people  exist  except  his  pupils,  his  master,  his 
rivals  and  especially  art  patrons.  The  rest  of  the  world 
is  as  indifferent  as  if  it  did  not  exist ;  it  forms  the  back- 
ground, an  indiscriminate  mass  upon  which  all  other 
values  find  their  setting.  All  the  professions  and  vo- 
cations, and  all  the  workers  along  the  various  lines  of 

120 


THE    PRINCIPLE    OF    VALUATION 

life  are  alike  in  that  every  man  has  his  own  standard 
of  valuation. 

A  Napoleon  or  a  Caesar  might  have  preached  the 
doctrine  that  the  sciences,  the  arts  and  other  accom- 
plishments are  of  no  value  if  compared  with  the  acqui- 
sition of  power,  but  I  feel  sure  that  it  would  not  have 
been  much  heeded  by  the  mass  of  mankind,  for  no 
one  would  change  his  standard  of  value.  A  financier 
might  publicly  declare  that  the  only  way  to  judge  peo- 
ple is  according  to  the  credit  they  have  in  banking, 
but  it  would  scarcely  change  the  standard  of  judgment 
in  society.  Beethoven  knew  as  well  as  any  other  of  his 
contemporaries  the  value  of  money  and  the  significance 
of  power,  and  yet  he  pursued  his  own  calling,  fasci- 
nated by  his  love  for  music.  The  same  is  true  not 
only  of  every  genius  in  all  the  different  lines  of  art 
and  science,  but  also  of  religious  reformers  and  in- 
ventors of  all  classes.  Tom,  Dick  and  Harry  in  their 
hankering  for  pleasure  and  frivolous  amusement  are 
not  less  under  the  influence  of  the  conditions  under 
which  they  have  been  born  than  the  great  men  whose 
names  are  written  in  the  book  of  fame.  It  is  difficult 
for  every  one  of  us  to  create  for  himself  a  new  stand- 
ard of  valuation,  for  what  Goethe  says  of  man's  destiny 
in  a  poem  entitled  Daimon,  is  true  :l 

"As  on  the  day  which  has  begotten  thee 
The  sun  and  planets  stood  in  constellation, 

1  So  far  as  I  know,  these  lines  have  never  been  tranilated 
before. 

121 


NIETZSCHE 

Thus  growest  and  remainest  thou  to  be, 
For  't  is  life's  start  lays  down  the  regulation 
How  thou  must  be.    Thyself  thou  canst  not  flee. 
Such  sibyl's  is  and  prophet's  proclamation. 
For  truly,  neither  force  nor  time  dissolveth, 
Organic  form  as,  living,  it  evolveth." 

The  original  reads  thus : 

"Wie  an  dem  Tag  der  dich  der  Welt  verliehen, 
Die  Sonne  stand  zum  Grusse  der  Planeten, 
Bist  alsobald  and  fort  und  fort  gediehen 
Nach  dem  Gesetz,  wonach  du  angetreten. 
So  musst  du  sein,  dir  kannst  du  nicht  entfliehen, 
So  sagten  schon  Sibyllen,  so  Propheten; 
Und  keine  Zeit  und  keine  Macht  zerstiickelt, 
Gepragte  Form,  die  lebend  sich  entwickelt." 

Our  attitude  in  life  depends  upon  our  character,  and 
the  basic  elements  of  character  are  the  product  of  the 
circumstances  that  gave  birth  to  our  being.  Our  char- 
acter enters  unconsciously  or  consciously  in  the  formu- 
lation of  our  standards  of  value  which  we  will  find  to 
be  the  most  significant  factors  of  our  destinies.  Now 
the  question  arises,  Is  the  standard  of  value  which  we 
set  up,  each  one  of  us  according  to  his  character,  pure- 
ly subjective  or  is  there  any  objective  criterion  of  its 
worth? 

We  must  understand  that  to  a  great  extent  our 
choice  of  a  profession  and  other  preferences  in  our 
occupations  or  valuations  are  naturally  different  ac- 
cording to  conditions ;  some  men  are  fit  to  be  musicians, 
or  scholars,  or  traders,  or  farmers,  or  manufacturers, 

122 


THE    PRINCIPLE    OF    VALUATION 

and  others  are  not.  The  same  profession  would  not 
be  appropriate  for  every  one.  But  there  is  a  field  com- 
mon to  all  occupations  which  deals  with  man's  attitude 
toward  his  fellow  beings  and,  in  fact,  toward  the  whole 
universe  in  general.  This  it  is  with  which  we  are 
mainly  concerned  in  our  discussion  of  a  criterion  of 
value  because  it  is  the  field  occupied  by  religion,  phi- 
losophy and  ethics.  Tradition  has  sanctioned  definite 
views  on  this  very  subject  which  have  been  codified 
in  certain  rules  of  conduct  different  in  many  details  in 
different  countries  according  to  religion,  national  and 
climatic  conditions,  and  the  type  of  civilization;  yet, 
after  all,  they  agree  in  most  remarkable  and  surprising 
coincidences  in  all  essential  points. 

Nietzsche,  the  most  radical  of  radicals,  sets  up  a 
standard  of  valuation  of  his  own,  placing  it  in  the 
acquisition  of  power,  and  he  claims  that  it  alone  is  en- 
titled to  serve  as  a  measure  for  judging  worth  because, 
says  he,  it  alone  deals  with  that  which  is  real  in  the 
world ;  yet  at  the  same  time  he  disdains  to  recognize  the 
existence  of  any  objective  criterion  of  the  several  stan- 
dards of  value.  If  he  were  consistent,  he  ought  to  give 
the  palm  of  highest  morality  to  the  man  who  succeeds 
best  in  trampling  under  foot  his  fellowmen,  and  he 
does  so  by  calling  him  the  overman,  but  he  does  not 
call  him  moral.  To  be  sure  this  would  be  a  novel  con- 
ception of  morality  and  would  sanction  what  is  com- 
monly execrated  as  one  of  the  most  devilish  forms  of 
immorality.  Nietzsche  takes  morality  in  its  accepted 

123 


NIETZSCHE 

meaning,  and  so  in  contradiction  to  himself  denies  its 
justification  in  general.  • 

Considering  that  every  one  carries  a  standard  of 
valuation  in  himself  we  propose  the  question,  "Is  there 
no  objective  criterion  of  valuation,  or  are  all  valua- 
tions purely  subjective?"  This  question  means 
whether  the  constitution  of  the  objective  world  in 
which  we  all  live,  is  such  as  to  favor  a  definite  mode 
of  action  determined  by  some  definite  criterion  of 
value. 

We  answer  that  subjective  standards  of  valuation 
may  be  regarded  as  endorsed  through  experience  by 
the  course  of  events  in  the  world  whenever  they  meet 
with  success,  and  thus  subjective  judgments  become  ob- 
jectively justified.  They  are  seen  to  be  in  agreement 
with  the  natural  course  of  the  world,  and  those  who 
adhere  to  them  will  in  the  long  run  be  rewarded  by 
survival.  Such  an  endorsement  of  standards  can  be 
determined  by  experience  and  has  resulted  in  what  is 
commonly  called  "morality."  We  may  here  take  for 
granted  that  the  moral  valuation  is  a  product  of  many 
millenniums  and  has  been  established,  not  only  in  one 
country  and  by  one  religion,  nor  in  one  kind  of  human 
society,  but  in  perfect  independence  in  many  different 
countries,  under  the  most  varied  conditions,  and  finds 
expression  in  the  symbolism  of  the  most  divergent 
creeds.  The  beliefs  of  a  Christian,  of  a  Buddhist,  of 
a  Mussulman  in  Turkey,  or  a  Taoist  in  the  Celestial 
Empire,  of  a  Parsee  in  Bombay,  or  a  Japanese  Shin- 

124 


THE    PRINCIPLE    OF    VALUATION 

toist,  are  all  as  unlike  as  they  can  be,  but  all  agree  as 
to  the  excellency  of  moral  behavior  which  has  been 
formulated  in  these  different  religions  in  sayings  incor- 
porated in  their  literature.  We  find  very  little  if  any- 
thing contradictory  in  their  standards  of  valuation,  and 
if  there  is  any  objective  norm  for  the  subjective  valua- 
tion of  man  it  is  this  moral  consensus  in  which  all  the 
great  religious  prophets  and  reformers  of  mankind 
agree. 

A  transvaluation  of  all  values  is  certainly  needed, 
and  it  is  taking  place  now.  In  fact  it  has  always  taken 
place  whenever  and  wherever  mankind  grows  or 
progresses  or  changes  the  current  world-conception. 

The  old  morality  has  been  negative  and  we  feel  the 
need  of  positive  ideals.  The  old  doctrines  are  formu- 
lated in  rules  which  forbid  certain  actions  and  our  com- 
mandments begin  with  the  words  "Thou  shalt  not 
.  .  ."  Those  folk  are  esteemed  moral  who  obey 
these  restrictions  or  at  least  do  not  ostensibly  infringe 
upon  them,  and  this  practically  limits  morality  to 
mediocrity.  How  often  have  great  and  noble  people 
been  condemned  as  immoral  because  some  irregularities 
would  not  fit  the  Procrustean  bed  of  customary  re- 
spectability!  Think  only  of  George  Eliot  who  had  to 
suffer  under  the  prejudices  of  Sunday-School  morality! 
We  need  a  higher  standard  in  which  we  may  set  aside 
the  paltry  views  of  the  old  morality  without  losing  our 
ideals.  We  need  a  positive  norm,  the  norm  which 
counts  in  the  actual  world  and  in  history,  where  man 

125 


NIETZSCHE 

is  measured  not  by  his  sins  of  omission  but  by  his  posi- 
tive accomplishments ;  not  by  the  errors  he  has  or  has 
not  committed,  but  by  his  deeds,  by  the  work  with 
which  he  has  benefited  mankind.  Therefore  the  new 
morality  does  not  waste  much  time  with  the  several  in- 
junctions, "Thou  shalt  not  .  .  ."  but  impresses  the 
growing  generation  with  the  demand :  "Do  something 
useful ;  show  thyself  efficient ;  be  superior  to  others  in 
nobility,  in  generosity,  in  energy;  excel  in  one  way  or 
another";  and  in  this  sense  a  transvaluation  of  the  old 
values  is  being  worked  out  at  present. 

We  will  grant  that  Nietzsche's  demand  of  a  trans- 
valuation  of  all  values  may  mean  to  criticize  the  nar- 
row doctrines  and  views  of  the  religion  of  his  sur- 
roundings. But  as  he  expresses  himself  and  according 
to  his  philosophical  principle  he  goes  so  far  as  to  con- 
demn not  only  the  husk  of  all  these  religious  move- 
ments, but  also  their  spirit.  In  spite  of  his  sub- 
jectivism which  denies  the  existence  of  anything  ideal, 
and  goes  so  far  as  to  deny  the  right  even  of  truth  to 
have  an  objective  value,  Nietzsche  establishes  a  new 
objectivism,  and  proposes  his  own,  and  indeed  very 
crude,  subjective  standard  of  valuation  as  the  only  ob- 
jective one  worthy  of  consideration  for  the  transvalua- 
tion of  all  values. 

Nietzsche's  real  world,  or  rather  what  he  deemed  to 
be  the  real  world,  is  a  dream,  the  dream  of  a  sick  man, 
to  whom  nothing  possesses  value  save  the  boons  denied 
him,  physical  health,  strength,  power  to  dare  and  to  do. 

126 


THE    PRINCIPLE    OF    VALUATION 

The  transvaluation  of  all  values  which  Nietzsche  so 
confidently  prophesied,  will  not  take  place,  at  least  not 
in  the  sense  that  Nietzsche  believed.  There  is  no  rea- 
son to  doubt  that  in  the  future  as  in  the  past  history 
will  follow  the  old  conservative  line  of  development  in 
which  different  people  according  to  their  different  char- 
acters will  adopt  their  own  subjective  standards,  and 
nature,  by  a  survival  of  the  fittest  will  select  those  for 
preservation  who  are  most  in  agreement  with  this  real 
world  in  which  we  live,  a  world  from  which  Nietzsche, 
according  to  the  sickly  condition  of  his  constitution, 
was  separated  by  a  wide  gulf.  He  thirsted  for  it  in 
vain,  and  we  believe  that  he  had  a  wrong  conception 
of  the  wealth  of  its  possibilities  and  viewpoints. 


127 


INDIVIDUALISM 


"V  TIETZSCHE  is  unquestionably  a  bold  thinker,  a 
-i-^l  Faust-like  questioner,  and  a  Titan  among  phi- 
losophers. He  is  a  man  who  understands  that  the  prob- 
lem of  all  problems  is  the  question,  Is  there  an  author- 
ity higher  than  myself?  And  having  discarded  belief 
in  God,  he  finds  no  authority  except  pretensions. 

Nietzsche  apparently  is  only  familiar  with  the  sanc- 
tions of  morality  and  the  criterion  of  good  and  evil  as 
they  are  represented  in  the  institutions  and  thoughts 
established  by  history,  and  seeing  how  frequently  they 
serve  as  tools  in  the  hands  of  the  crafty  for  the  oppres- 
sion of  the  unsophisticated  masses  of  the  people,  he  dis- 
cards them  as  utterly  worthless.  Hence  his  truly  mag- 
nificent wrath,  his  disgust,  his  contempt  for  underling 
man,  for  the  masses,  this  muddy  stream  of  present 
mankind. 

If  Nietzsche  had  dug  deeper,  he  would  have  found 
that  there  is  after  all  a  deep  significance  in  moral 
ideals,  for  there  is  an  authority  above  the  self  by 
which  the  worth  of  the  self  must  be  measured.  Truth 

128 


INDIVIDUALISM 

is  not  a  mere  creature  of  the  self,  but  is  the  comprehen- 
sion of  the  immutable  eternal  laws  of  being  which  con- 
stitute the  norm  of  existence.  Our  self,  "that  creating, 
willing,  valuing  'I,'  which  (according  to  Nietzsche)  is 
the  measure  and  value  of  all  things,"  is  itself  measured 
by  that  eternal  norm  of  being,  the  existence  of  which 
Nietzsche  does  not  recognize. 

What  is  true  of  Nietzsche  applies  in  all  fundamental 
questions  also  to  his  predecessor,  Max  Stirner.  It  ap- 
plies to  individualism  in  any  form  if  carried  to  its  con- 
sistent and  most  extreme  consequences. 

Nietzsche  is  blind  to  the  truth  that  there  is  a  norm 
above  the  self,  and  that  this  norm  is  the  source  of  duty 
and  the  object  of  religion ;  he  therefore  denies  the  very 
existence  of  duty,  of  conviction,  of  moral  principles, 
of  sympathy  with  the  suffering,  of  authority  in  any 
shape,  and  yet  he  dares  to  condemn  man  in  the  shape  of 
the  present  generation  of  mankind.  What  right  has 
he,  then,  to  judge  the  sovereign  self  of  to-day  and  to 
announce  the  coming  of  another  self  in  the  overman? 
From  the  principles  of  his  philosophical  anarchism  he 
has  no  right  to  denounce  mankind  of  to-day,  as  an 
underling;  for  if  there  is  no  objective  standard  of 
worth,  there  is  no  sense  in  distinguishing  between  the 
underman  of  today  and  the  overman  of  a  nobler  future. 

On  this  point,  however,  Nietzsche  deviates  from  his 
predecessor  Stirner.  The  latter  is  more  consistent  as 
an  individualist,  but  the  former  appeals  strongly  to  the 
egoism  of  the  individual. 

129 


NIETZSCHE 

Nietzsche  is  a  Titan  and  he  is  truly  Titanic  in  his 
rebellion  against  the  smallness  of  everything  that  means 
to  be  an  incarnation  of  what  is  great  and  noble  and 
holy.  But  he  does  not  protest  against  the  smallness 
of  the  representatives  of  truth  and  right,  he  protests 
against  truth  and  right  themselves,  and  thus  he  is  not 
merely  Titanic,  but  a  genuine  Titan, — attempting  to 
take  the  heavens  by  storm,  a  monster,  not  superhuman 
but  inhuman  in  proportions,  in  sentiment  and  in  spirit. 
Being  ingenious,  he  is,  in  his  way,  a  genius,  but  he  is 
not  evenly  balanced;  he  is  eccentric  and,  not  recog- 
nizing the  authority  of  reason  and  science,  makes  ec- 
centricity his  maxim.  Thus  his  grandeur  becomes 
grotesque. 

The  spirit  of  negation,  the  mischief-monger  Mephis- 
topheles,  says  of  Faust  with  reference  to  his  despair 
of  reason  and  science: 

"Reason  and  Knowledge  only  thou  despise, 
The  highest  strength  in  man  that  lies!  .  .  . 
And  I  shall  have  thee  fast  and  sure." 

— Tr.  by  Bayard  Taylor. 

Being  giant-like,  the  Titan  Nietzsche  has  a  sense  only 
for  things  of  large  dimensions.  He  fails  to  under- 
stand the  significance  of  the  subtler  relations  of  exist- 
ence. He  is  clumsy  like  Gargantua;  he  is  coarse  in 
his  reasoning ;  he  is  narrow  in  his  comprehension ;  his 
horizon  is  limited.  He  sees  only  the  massive  effects  of 
the  great  dynamical  changes  brought  about  by  brute 
force ;  he  is  blind  to  the  quiet  and  slow  but  more  pow- 

130 


INDIVIDUALISM 

erful  workings  of  spiritual  forces.  The  molecular 
forces  that  are  invisible  to  the  eye  transform  the  world 
more  thoroughly  than  hurricanes  and  thunderstorms; 
yet  the  strongest  powers  are  the  moral  laws,  the  curses 
of  wrong-doing  and  oppression,  and  the  blessings  of 
truthfulness,  of  justice,  of  good-will.  Nietzsche  sees 
them  not;  he  ignores  them.  He  measures  the  worth 
of  the  overman  solely  by  his  brute  force. 

If  Nietzsche  were  right,  the  overman  of  the  future 
who  is  going  to  take  possession  of  the  earth  will  not  be 
nobler  and  better,  wiser  and  juster  than  the  present 
man,  but  more  gory,  more  tiger-like,  more  relentless, 
more  brutal. 

Nietzsche  has  a  truly  noble  longing  for  the  advent 
of  the  overman,  but  he  throws  down  the  ladder  on 
which  man  has  been  climbing  up,  and  thus  losing  his 
foothold,  he  falls  down  to  the  place  whence  mankind 
started  several  millenniums  ago. 

We  enjoy  the  rockets  of  Nietzsche's  genius,  we  un- 
derstand his  Faust-like  disappointment  as  to  the  un- 
availableness  of  science  such  as  he  knew  it;  we  sym- 
pathize with  the  honesty  with  which  he  offered  his 
thoughts  to  the  world ;  we  recognize  the  flashes  of  truth 
which  occur  in  his  sentences,  uttered  in  the  tone  of  a 
prophet;  but  we  cannot  help  condemning  his  philos- 
ophy as  unsound  in  its  basis,  his  errors  being  the  re- 
sult of  an  immaturity  of  comprehension. 

Nietzsche  has  touched  upon  the  problem  of  prob- 
lems, but  he  has  not  solved  it.  He  weighs  the  souls  of 

131 


NIETZSCHE 

his  fellowmen  and  finds  them  wanting;  but  his  own 
soul  is  not  less  deficient.  His  philosophy  is  well  worth 
studying,  but  it  is  not  a  good  guide  through  life.  It  is 
great  only  as  being  the  gravest  error,  boldly,  conscien- 
tiously, and  seriously  carried  to  its  utmost  extremes 
and  preached  as  the  latest  word  of  wisdom. 

It  has  been  customary  that  man  should  justify  him- 
self before  the  tribunal  of  morality,  but  Nietzsche  sum- 
mons morality  itself  before  his  tribunal.  Morality 
justifies  herself  by  calling  on  truth,  but  the  testimony 
of  truth  is  ruled  out,  for  truth — objective  truth — is  de- 
nounced as  a  superstition  of  the  dark  ages.  Nietzsche 
knows  truth  only  as  a  contemptible  method  of  puny 
spirits  to  make  existence  conceivable — a  hopeless  task ! 
Nietzsche  therefore  finds  morality  guilty  as  a  usurper 
and  a  tyrant,  and  he  exhorts  all  esprits  forts  to  shake 
off  the  yoke. 

We  grant  that  the  self  should  not  be  the  slave  of 
morality ;  it  should  not  feel  the  "ought"  as  a  command ; 
it  should  identify  itself  with  it  and  make  its  require- 
ments the  object  of  its  own  free  will.  Good- will  on 
earth  will  render  the  law  redundant;  but  when  you 
wipe  out  the  ideal  of  good-will  itself  together  with  its 
foundation,  which  is  truth  and  the  recognition  of  truth, 
the  struggle  for  existence  will  reappear  in  its  primitive 
fierceness,  and  mankind  will  return  to  the  age  of  sav- 
agery. Let  the  esprits  forts  of  Nietzsche's  type  try  to 
realize  their  master's  ideal,  and  their  attempts  will  soon 
lead  to  their  own  perdition. 

132 


INDIVIDUALISM 

We  read  in  Der  arme  Teufel,1  a  weekly  whose  rad- 
ical editor  would  not  have  been  prevented  by  conven- 
tional reasons  from  joining  the  new  fad  of  Nietz- 
scheanism,  the  following  satirical  comment  on  some 
modern  poet  of  original  selfhood : 

"'I  am  against  matrimony  because  I  am  a  poet.  Wife, 
children,  family  life, — well,  well !  they  may  be  good  enough 
for  the  man  possessed  of  the  herding  instinct.  But  I  object 
to  trivialities  in  my  own  life.  I  want  something  stimulating, 
sensation,  poetry!  A  wife  would  be  prosaic  to  me,  simply 
on  account  of  being  my  wife;  and  children  who  would  call 
me  papa  would  be  disgusting.  Poetry  I  need !  Poetry !'  Thus 
he  spoke  to  a  friend,  and  when  the  latter  was  gone  con- 
tinued his  letter  reproaching  a  waitress  for  again  asking  for 
money  and  at  the  same  time  reflecting  upon  the  purity  of 
her  relations  to  the  bartender  who,  she  pretended,  was  her 
cousin  only.  ..." 

If  marriage  relations  were  abolished  to-day,  would 
not  in  the  course  of  time  some  new  form  of  marriage 
be  established  ?  Those  who  are  too  proud  to  utilize  the 
experiences  of  past  generations,  will  have  to  repeat 
them  for  themselves  and  must  wade  through  their  fol- 
lies, sins,  errors,  and  suffer  all  the  consequences  and 
undergo  their  penalties. 

Nietzsche  tries  to  produce  a  Caesar  by  teaching  his 
followers  to  imitate  the  vices  of  a  Catiline;  he  would 
raise  gods  by  begetting  Titans ;  he  endeavors  to  give  a 
nobler  and  better  standard  to  mankind,  not  by  lifting 

1  May  13,  1899.    Detroit,  949  Gratiot  Ave. 
133 


NIETZSCHE 

the  people  higher  and  rendering  them  more  efficient, 
but  by  depriving  them  of  all  wisdom  and  making  them 
more  pretentious. 

If  the  ethics  of  Nietzsche  were  accepted  to-day  as 
authoritative,  and  if  people  at  large  acted  accordingly, 
the  world  would  be  benefited  in  one  respect,  viz.,  hypoc- 
risy would  cease,  and  the  selfishness  of  mankind  would 
manifest  itself  in  all  its  nude  bestiality.  Passions 
would  have  full  sway;  lust,  robbery,  jealousy,  murder, 
and  revenge  would  increase,  and  Death  in  all  forms  of 
wild  outbursts  would  reap  a  richer  harvest  than  he  ever 
did  in  the  days  of  prehistoric  savage  life.  The  result 
would  be  a  pruning  on  a  grand  scale,  and  after  a  few 
bloody  decades  those  only  would  survive  who  either 
by  nature  or  by  hypocritical  self-control  deemed  it  best 
to  keep  the  lower  passions  and  the  too  prurient  in- 
stincts of  their  selfhood  in  proper  check,  and  then  the 
old-fashioned  rules  of  morality,  which  Nietzsche  de- 
clared antiquated,  would  be  given  a  new  trial  in  the 
new  order  of  things.  They  might  receive  a  different 
sanction,  but  they  would  find  recognition. 

Nietzsche  forgets  that  the  present  social  order  orig- 
inated from  that  general  free-for-all  fight  which  he 
commends,  and  that  if  we  begin  at  the  start  we  should 
naturally  run  through  the  same  or  a  similar  course  of 
development  to  the  same  or  very  similar  conditions. 
Will  it  not  be  better  to  go  on  improving  than  to  revert 
to  the  primitive  state  of  savagery? 

There  are  superstitious  notions  about  the  nature  of 

_  134 


INDIVIDUALISM 

the  sanction  of  ethics,  but  for  that  reason  the  moral 
ideals  of  mankind  remain  as  firmly  established  as  ever. 

The  self  is  not  the  standard  of  measurement  for  good 
and  evil,  right  and  wrong,  as  Nietzsche  claims  in  agree- 
ment with  the  sophists  of  old ;  the  self  is  only  the  con- 
dition to  which  and  under  which  it  applies.  There  is  no 
good  and  evil  in  the  purely  physical  world,  there  is  no 
suffering,  no  pain,  no  anguish — all  this  originates  with 
the  rise  of  organized  animal  life  which  is  endowed  with 
sentiency;  and  further  there  is  no  goodness  and  bad- 
ness, no  morality  until  the  animal  rises  to  the  height  of 
comprehending  the  nature  of  evil.  The  tiger  is  in  him- 
self neither  good  nor  bad,  but  he  makes  himself  a  cause 
of  suffering  to  others ;  and  thus  he  is  by  them  regarded 
as  bad.  Goodness  and  badness  are  relative,  but  they 
are  not  for  that  reason  unreal. 

It  is  true  that  there  is  no  "ought"  in  the  world  as  an 
"ought";  nor  are  there  metaphysical  ghosts  of  divine 
commandments  revealing  themselves.  But  man  learns 
the  lesson  how  to  avoid  evil  and  reducing  it  to  brief 
rules  which  are  easily  remembered,  he  calls  them  "com- 
mandments." 

Buddha  was  aware  that  there  is  no  metaphysical 
ghost  of  an  "ought,"  and  being  the  first  positivist  before 
positivism  was  ever  thought  of,  his  decalogue  is  offi- 
cially called  "avoiding  the  ten  evils,"  not  "the  ten  com- 
mandments," the  latter  being  a  popular  term  of  later 
origin. 

Granting  that  there  is  no  metaphysical  "ought"  in 

135 


NIETZSCHE 

the  world  and  that  it  finds  application  only  in  the 
domain  of  animate  life  through  the  presence  of  the 
self  or  rather  of  many  selves,  we  fail  to  see  that  the 
self  is  the  creator  of  the  norm  of  good  and  evil.  Grant- 
ing also  that  there  are  degrees  of  comprehending  the 
nature  of  evil  and  that  different  applications  naturally 
result  under  different  conditions,  we  cannot  for  that 
reason  argue  that  ethics  are  purely  subjective  and  that 
there  is  no  objective  norm  that  underlies  the  moral 
evolution  of  mankind  and  comes  out  in  the  progress  of 
civilization  more  and  more  in  its  purity. 

Nietzsche  is  like  a  schoolboy  whose  teacher  is  an 
inefficient  pedant.  He  rebels  against  his  authority  and 
having  had  but  poor  instruction  proclaims  that  the  mul- 
tiplication table  is  a  mere  superstition  with  which  the 
old  man  tries  to  enslave  the  free  minds  of  his  scholars. 
Are  there  not  different  solutions  possible  of  the  same 
example  and  has  not  every  one  to  regard  his  own  solu- 
tion as  the  right  solution?  How  can  the  teacher  claim 
that  he  is  the  standard  of  truth?  Why,  the  very  at- 
tempt at  setting  up  a  standard  of  any  kind  is  tyranny 
and  the  recognition  of  it  is  a  self-imposed  slavery. 
There  is  no  Tightness  save  the  Tightness  that  can  be 
maintained  in  a  general  hand-to-hand  contest,  for  it  is 
ultimately  the  fist  that  decides  all  controversies. 

Nietzsche  calls  himself  an  atheist ;  he  denies  the  ex- 
istence of  God  in  any  form,  and  thus  carries  atheism 
to  an  extreme  where  it  breaks  down  in  self-contradic- 
tion. We  understand  by  God  (whether  personal,  im- 

136 


INDIVIDUALISM 

personal,  or  superpersonal)  that  something  which  de- 
termines the  course  of  life;  the  factors  that  shape  the 
world,  including  ourselves ;  the  law  to  which  we  must 
adjust  our  conduct.  Nietzsche  enthrones  the  self  in 
the  place  of  God,  but  for  all  practical  purposes  his  God 
is  blunt  success  and  survival  of  the  fittest  in  the  crude 
sense  of  the  term ;  for  according  to  his  philosophy  the 
self  must  heed  survival  in  the  struggle  for  existence 
alone,  and  that,  therefore,  is  his  God. 

Nietzsche's  God  is  power,  i.  e.,  overwhelming  force, 
which  allows  the  wolf  to  eat  the  lamb.  He  ignores  the 
power  of  the  still  small  voice,  the  effectiveness  of  law 
in  the  world  which  makes  it  possible  that  man,  the 
over-brute,  is  not  the  most  ferocious,  the  most  mus- 
cular, or  the  strongest  animal.  Nietzsche  regards  the 
cosmic  order,  in  accommodation  to  which  ethical  codes 
have  been  invented,  as  a  mere  superstition.  Thus  it 
will  come  to  pass  that  Nietzsche's  type  of  the  over- 
man, should  it  really  make  its  appearance  on  earth, 
would  be  wiped  out  as  surely  as  the  lion,  the  king  of 
the  beasts,  the  proud  pseudo-overbrute  of  the  animals, 
will  be  exterminated  in  course  of  time.  The  lion  has  a 
chance  for  survival  only  behind  the  bars  of  the  zoolog- 
ical gardens  or  when  he  allows  himself  to  be  tamed  by 
man,  that  weakling  among  the  brutes  whose  power  has 
been  built  up  by  a  comprehension  of  the  sway  of  the 
invisible  laws  of  life,  physical,  mental  and  moral. 

What  is  the  secret  of  Nietzsche's  success?  While 
other  men  of  greater  consistency,  among  them  his  pred- 

137 


NIETZSCHE 

ecessor  Stirner,  failed,  he  attained  an  unparalleled 
fame,  and  his  philosophy  exercised  an  extraordinary 
influence  upon  large  classes  of  people  not  only  in  Ger- 
many but  also  abroad,  in  Russia,  in  France,  in  the 
United  States  and  even  in  conservative  England. 

We  must  concede  that  Nietzsche  possesses  a  poetic 
power  of  oratory;  he  appeals  to  sentiment;  he  is  not 
much  of  a  thinker,  not  a  philosopher,  but  a  leader  and 
a  prophet,  and  as  such  he  stands  for  the  most  extreme 
egoism.  Nietzsche  attempts  to  establish  the  absolute 
sovereignty  of  the  individual  and  grants  a  most  ir- 
responsible freedom  to  the  man  who  dares;  and  this 
principle  of  doing  away  with  moral  maxims  has  made 
him  popular. 

The  truth  is  that  our  moral  sanctions  are  no  longer 
accepted.  People  still  believe  in  God,  in  the  authority 
of  church  and  state,  but  their  belief  is  no  longer  a  living 
faith.  Whatever  they  may  think  of  God,  the  old  God, 
the  God  of  traditional  dogmatism,  is  gone.  He  is  no 
longer  a  living  power  in  the  hearts  of  the  people ;  and 
so,  large  masses  rejoice  to  have  the  proclamation 
frankly  stated  that  God  is  dead,  that  they  need  no 
longer  fear  hell,  and  that  the  chains  of  their  slavery  are 
broken. 

Nietzsche  is  consistent  in  his  denial  of  the  tradi- 
tional sanctions.  He  understands  not  only  that  there 
are  no  gods,  that  the  powers  of  nature  as  personifica- 
tions do  not  exist,  but  that  the  laws  of  nature  are  mere 
abstract  generalizations.  We  need  no  longer  believe 

138 


INDIVIDUALISM 

in  Hephaestos,  the  god  of  fire ;  there  is  no  use  to  bow 
the  knee  to  him  or  do  homage  to  his  divinity.  Nor  is 
there  any  truth  in  the  existence  of  a  phlogiston,  a 
metaphysical  fire-stuff,  or  any  fire  essence;  there  are 
only  scattered  facts  of  burning.  Everything  else  is 
mere  superstition.  Generalizations  exist  only  in  our 
imagination,  and  so  we  should  get  rid  of  the  idea  that 
there  is  any  truth  at  all.  Science  is  a  pretender  which 
is  apt  to  make  cowards  of  us.  That  man  is  wise  who 
is  not  hampered  by  scruple  or  doubt  of  any  kind  and 
simply  follows  the  bent  of  his  mind,  subjecting  to 
himself  every  thing  he  finds,  including  his  fellow 
human  beings. 

This  bold  and  reckless  proposition  appeals  to  egoism 
and  it  seems  so  true  that  abstract  formulas  and  gen- 
eralizations are  empty.  Weight  exists;  there  is  grav- 
ity; there  are  particular  phenomena  of  masses  in  mu- 
tual attraction,  but  gravitation,  the  law  of  these  actual 
happenings,  is  a  mere  formula,  an  imaginary  quantity, 
a  mere  thought  about  which  we  need  not  worry.  The 
law  of  gravitation  is  a  human  invention  and  has  no 
real  existence  in  the  realm  of  facts. 

And  the  same  would  of  course  be  true  about  the 
interrelations  among  human  beings  in  their  social  in- 
tercourse, too.  All  the  several  maxims  of  conduct, 
which  are  called  moral  and  constitute  our  code  of 
ethics,  are  built  upon  generalizations.  There  is  no 
sanction  for  them.  The  gods  who  were  formerly  sup- 
posed to  be  responsible  for  the  several  domains  of 

139 


NIETZSCHE 

facts  have  died  long  ago.  The  Jewish  deity  called 
Elohim,  the  Lord,  entered  upon  the  inheritance  of 
the  ancient  gods,  but  he  too  had  to  die.  Thereupon 
his  place  was  taken  by  metaphysical  essences,  pale 
ghosts  of  a  mysterious  nature,  but  they  too  died  and  so 
the  last  shadow  of  anything  authoritative  is  gone. 
We  are  en  face  du  rien;  therefore  let  us  boldly 
enjoy  our  freedom.  Let  us  be  ourselves;  let  our  pas- 
sions take  their  course ;  let  us  do  wrong  if  it  suits  us ; 
let  us  live  without  consideration  of  anything,  just  as 
we  please.  There  is  no  sanction  of  moral  maxims  to 
be  respected;  there  is  no  authority  of  conduct;  there 
is  no  judge ;  there  is  no  evil,  no  wrong. 

This  seems  pretty  plausible  to  our  modern  generation 
raised  in  the  traditions  of  nominalism,  but  would  we 
really  ignore  the  law  of  gravitation  because  the  New- 
tonian formula  is  a  man-made  abstraction  and  a  mere 
generalization?  Yet,  if  we  do  not  give  heed  to  it  we 
fall,  and  the  same  is  true  of  any  law  of  nature.  Our 
sciences  are  mental  constructions ;  they  are  mind-made, 
and  so  far  as  they  are  built  out  of  the  material  of  our 
experience  they  tally  with  facts  and  we  call  them  true. 
Our  social  interrelations,  too,  constitute  conditions  ob- 
servable in  experience ;  they  can  be  formulated  in  laws 
and  applied  to  practical  life;  they  can  be  expressed  in 
maxims  of  conduct  and  have  received  various  sanc- 
tions successively,  the  sanctions  of  religion,  the  sanc- 
tions of  metaphysics,  the  sanctions  of  science.  In  the 
age  of  savagery  the  sanction  of  moral  maxims  was 

140 


INDIVIDUALISM 

offered  us  in  a  mythological  dress.  With  the  rise  of 
monotheism  our  moral  sanction  came  to  us  as  the 
command  of  a  supreme  ruler  of  the  universe;  in  the 
age  of  abstract  philosophy  as  metaphysical  principles, 
and  in  the  age  of  science  these  should  be  recognized  as 
lessons  of  experience. 


141 


CONCLUSION. 

WE  will  gladly  grant  that  personifications  are 
mythological  fictions,  that  metaphysical  enti- 
ties are  products  of  a  philosophical  imagination  and 
that  the  scientific  formulas  are  abstract  generalizations, 
but  we  deny  that  generalizations  are  unmeaning;  they 
signify  some  actual  features  of  reality.  Abstract  ideas 
are  not  purely  fictitious;  they  denote  significant  quali- 
ties or  occurrences,  and  the  relations  in  life,  the  forms 
of  things,  combinations,  or  in  general  the  non-material 
configurations,  co-operations,  combinations  and  func- 
tions are  the  most  important  and  the  most  significant 
aspects  of  existence.  Indeed,  matter  and  energy  are 
only  the  clumsy  conditions  of  being ;  they  denote  actual- 
ity and  reality,  but  all  things,  all  events,  all  facts  are 
such  as  they  are  on  account  of  their  form — on  account 
of  that  feature  which  is  non-material  and  non- 
energetic. 

According  to  Nietzsche  the  whole  history  of  man- 
kind, especially  the  development  of  reason,  knowledge 

142 


CONCLUSION 

and  science,  is  a  great  blunder,  and  the  dawn  of  day 
begins  with  a  radical  break  with  the  past.  We  see  in 
the  evolution  of  life  a  gradual  ascent  with  a  slow  but 
constant  approximation  to  truth.  In  the  history  of 
religion  we  see  in  the  dawn  of  civilization  the  begin- 
ning of  a  comprehension  of  truth.  Mythology  is  not 
error  pure  and  simple,  not  a  conglomeration  of  super- 
stitions; it  is  plainly  characterized  by  a  groping  after 
great  truths,  and  myths  become  foolish  inventions  only 
when  the  poetic  character  of  the  tale  is  misunderstood. 
So  dogmas  become  dangerous  errors  when  the  symbol 
is  taken  literally,  when  the  letter  is  exalted  and  the 
spirit  forgotten.  It  is  true  that  science  has  taken  away 
the  charm  of  many  religious  beliefs,  but  the  great  les- 
son of  the  doctrine  of  evolution  is  to  show  us  that  our 
onward  march  in  the  humanization  of  man  does  not 
stop,  that  the  periods  of  mythology  and  dogma  are 
stages  in  the  progress  of  our  recognition  of  the  truth. 
There  is  no  need  to  fear  a  collapse  of  past  results  but 
we  may  boldly  build  higher.  We  must  search  for  truth 
and  we  shall  have  a  clearer  vision  of  it,  and  the  future 
will  bring  new  glories,  new  fulfilments  of  old  hopes 
and  grander  realization  of  our  fondest  dreams. 

Verily,  the  overman  will  come,  although  he  is  not 
quite  so  near  at  hand  as  one  might  wish.  He  is  at  hand 
though,  but  he  will  not  come,  as  Nietzsche  announces 
him,  in  the  storm  of  a  catastrophe.  The  fire  and  the 
storm  may  precede  the  realization  of  a  higher  human- 
ity; but  the  higher  humanity  will  be  found  neither  in 

143 


NIETZSCHE 

the  fire  nor  in  the  storm.  The  overman  will  be  born  of 
the  present  man,  not  by  a  contempt  for  the  shortcom- 
ings of  the  present  man,  but  by  a  recognition  of  the 
essential  features  of  man's  manhood,  by  developing 
and  purifying  the  truly  human  by  making  man  conform 
to  the  eternal  norm  of  rationality,  humaneness  and 
Tightness  of  conduct. 

What  we  need  first  is  the  standard  of  the  higher 
man ;  and  on  this  account  we  must  purify  our  notions 
of  the  norm  of  truth  and  righteousness, — of  God.  Let 
us  find  first  the  over-God,  and  the  overman  will  de- 
velop naturally.  The  belief  in  an  individual  God-being 
is  giving  way  to  the  recognition  of  a  superpersonal 
God,  the  norm  of  scientific  truth,  the  standard  of  right 
and  wrong,  the  standard  of  worth  by  which  we  meas- 
ure the  value  of  our  own  being;  and  the  kingdom  of 
the  genuine  overman  will  be  established  by  the  spread 
of  the  scientific  comprehension  of  the  world,  in  matters 
physical,  social,  intellectual,  moral,  and  religious. 


144 


INDEX 


Abbott,  Leonard,  116. 
Alexander,  45. 
All-too-human,  32. 
Ambition,    66,    107;    for    original- 
ity, 34;  for  power,  60. 
Anacreon,  11. 
Anarchism,  30,  44,  128. 
Anarchists,  110. 

Ancilla  Voluntatis,  intellect,  7,  30. 
Animals  superior  to  man,  21. 
Aphorisms,  no  preference  for,  24. 
Aristocracy,  50,  60. 
Aristocratic  tastes,  109. 
Aristotle,  101. 
Art,  3;  nature  of,  104. 
Assassins,    39. 
Atheism,  66,  135. 
Authority  of  conduct,  29. 
Average,  the,  6. 

Back-woiTds-men,  51. 

Ballerstedt,  H.  F.  L.,  82. 

Basch,  V.,  74. 

Bauer,  Bruno,  84,  85,  88. 

Beethoven,  2,  120. 

Bergson,  Henri,  3,  5. 

Blood  is  spirit,  51. 

Body,  self  is,  52. 

Bruno,  Edgar  and  Egbert,  84. 

Buddha's    Decalogue,    134;    gospel 

of  love,  28. 

Buhl,  Ludwig,  85,  86,  89. 
Burke,  Edmund,  89. 
Burtz,  Agnes  Clara  Kunigunde,  83. 
Byington,  Stephen  T.,  74. 

Caesar,  45,  69,  107,  120,  132. 


Carus,  Foundation  of  Mathematics, 
22;  Loo-Tge's  Tao  Teh  King, 
40,  47;  The  Nature  of  the  State, 
99;  Personality,  99. 

Catilinary  existences,  69,  109. 

Catilene,  69,  132. 

Chaos,  universe  a,  20. 

Change  of  views,  69. 

Chiiin  jen,  16,  40,  46. 

Christ,  overman  the,  16. 

Christ's  gospel  of  love,  28. 

Christian  economics,  117-118. 

Christianity  a  rebellion  of  slaves, 
44. 

Classical  taste,  2. 

Commandments,   negative,   124. 

Common,  Thomas,  112;  Niettsche 
as  Critic,  Philosopher,  Poet  and 
Prophet.  113. 

Comte,  Auguste,  67,  89. 

Confucius,  40. 

Consistency,  N.  scorns,  28,  42;  of 
N.,  30,  137;  of  Stirner,  99. 

Contempt  for,  democratic  ideals, 
110;  man,  127;  past,  71;  phi- 
losophy, 67;  the  all- too-human, 
32;  truth,  131;  world,  75. 

Contradictions  natural,  67. 

Contrast  between  life  and  theory, 
60,  64,  97,  108,  119. 

Cosmic  order,  22,  136. 

Cosmos,  universe  not  a,  20. 

Criterion  of  right  action,  69. 

Crosby,  Ernest  H.,  111. 

Cynic,  N.  not  a,  104. 

Dahnhardt,   Helmuth   Ludwig,  84. 


145 


INDEX 


Dahnhardt,  Marie,  84,  86-88. 

Damocles,  sword  of,  44. 

Darwin,  32,  113. 

Decadence,  60,  65. 

Democracy,  28. 

Der  arme  Teufel,  132. 

Der  Eigene,  111. 

Der  Wanderer  und  sein  Schatten, 

24. 
Deussen,  Paul,  10;  his  opinion  of 

N.,  IS. 

Die  Freien,  84,  86. 
Dionysiac  enthusiasm,  19. 
Doctrine  of  the  eternal  return,  43. 
Dolson,  Grace  Neal,  114. 
Dream,  N.'s  real  world  a,  125. 
Dreamers  catching  at  shadows,  20. 
Drunken  Song,  58-59. 
Duty  not  recognized,  9. 

Eagle  and  Serpent,  50-51,  78. 

Eagle  and  the  Serpent,  The,   111. 

Eliot,  George,  124. 

Elis,  Coins  of,  50. 

Emerson,  41. 

Emotional  attitude,  1. 

Engels,  Friedrich,  81,  84. 

Error,  a  liberator,  2;  mythology 
not,  142. 

Eternal  return,  43. 

Eternity,  love  for,  58. 

Ethics,  denial  of,  30;  denounced, 
31,  68;  identical,  124;  no  sanc- 
tion for,  138;  of  the  strong,  31; 
result  of  N.'s,  133;  test  of  phi- 
losophy, 1.  See  also  s.  v. 
"Morality." 

Evolution,  denned,  26;  lesson  of, 
142. 

Examination  at  school,   13-14. 

Expediency,  116. 

Faucher,  Julius,  85. 
Fault,  23,  38,  71,  129. 


Fichte,  Duties  of  the  scholar,  35. 
Financier,  standard  of,  120. 
Flatus  vocis,  26. 
Form,  importance  of,  25. 
Forms  in  themselves,  26. 
Forster-Nietzsche,    Elisabeth,    Dot 

Leben  Friedrich  Niettsche's,  61, 

110. 

Free  Comrade,  116. 
Freedom    fettered    by    convictions, 

31;   limitless,   94,    104;    love   of, 

55;  spiritual,  75. 

Garden  of  marriage,  54. 

Gargantua,  129. 

Genealogy  of  morals,  31,  32. 

Generalizations,  abstract,  137;  not 
unmeaning,  141. 

Genius  not  abnormal,  7. 

Geometry,  21,  22. 

Gerecke,  Adolph,  110. 

German  things,  dislike  of,  62. 

Germany  a  philosophical  storm 
center,  6. 

God,  a  poet's  lie,  23;  authority  of 
conduct,  29;  created  by  man,  51; 
denial  of,  103,  137;  idea  of,  28; 
is  dead,  48,  137;  norm  of  truth, 
143;  self  in  place  of,  136. 

Goethe,  2,  22,  40,  120,  129;  imita- 
tion of,  23;  quotations  from,  35, 
38,  71,  72,  80,  120-121;  129. 

Good,  and  evil,  30,  134;  and  evil, 
overman  beyond,  44;  men  never 
true,  55. 

Good  Europeans,  notes  for,  113. 

Good  will,  131. 

Goody-goodyness,  33,  64. 

Gotsendammcrung,   17,   69. 

Gravitation  a  human  invention, 
138,  139. 

Hammer  and  anvil,  33. 

Health,  N.'s  desire  for,   60,  66. 


146 


INDEX 


Hegel,  6,  64. 

Herd  animal  (Heerdentier),  8,  43, 

71,  110. 

Hero,  overman  the,  16. 
Hippel's,  86. 
Homer,  38,  56,  80. 
Hypocrisy,  Plato  accused  of,  19. 
Hypocrisy    to    obtain    power,    108. 
I,  115. 

Ideal,   Christianity   incarnates,   80. 

Ideals  are  superstitions,  105; 
needed,  positive,  124;  signifi- 
cance in,  127. 

Identical  ethics,  124;  world-con- 
ceptions, 80. 

Idols  of  the  past  shattered,   19. 

Imaginary,  scientist's  world,   19. 

Immature  minds,  influence  on,  20. 

Immaturity,  70,  130,  135;  appeal 
of,  71,  89;  of  N.,  39. 

Immortality,  desire  for,  57. 

Individual  defined,  91. 

Individualism,  95 ;  artistocratic, 
28,  30;  error  of,  98;  extreme, 
73,  75;  ineffective,  100. 

Influence  of  N.,  108. 

Insanity,  7,  64,  67,  71. 

Instinct  higher  than  reason,  3,  21; 
N.  the  philosopher  of,  34,  39; 
self  a  bundle  of,  39. 

Intellect  ancilla  voluntatis,   7,   30. 

International  Intelligence  Insti- 
tute, 115. 

Intoxicants,  19,  109. 

Ionian  physicist,  5. 

James,  William,  3,  5. 
"Joyful  science,"  30. 

Kant,  6,  26. 
Karma,  34. 

Key  to  the  universe,  reason  the, 
22. 


Kochius,  85. 
Koppen,  C.  F.,  84. 
Klein's  statue,  72. 
Krausz,  Karoly,  111,  112. 


La  Cay  a  Scienga,   20,   21,  22,  34, 

62,  63. 

Lange,  History  of  Materialism,  73. 
Lao-tze,  40,  47. 
Lauterbach,  76,  86. 
Lessing,  2. 
Levy,  Oscar,  114. 
Lichtenberger,  Henri,  110,  111. 
Life,  truth  for  the  sake  of,  37. 
Lightning,  overman  the,  49. 
Lion  and  lamb,  33,  136. 
Lion's  Paw,  115. 
Lindlof,  Hans,  59. 
Lloyd,  J.  Wm.,  116. 
Logic  untrue,  21. 
Lombroso,  6. 
Love,   freedom   of,    104;   not  your 

neighbor,  53;   Stirner's  view  of, 

94. 
Ludovici,  Anthony  M.,  114. 

McCall,  Erwin  (pseud.),  111. 

Mackay,  John  Henry,  74;  80ff,  87, 
92. 

Man,  beast  of  prey,  115;  a  muddy 
stream,  49;  a  part  of  society, 
101;  animals'  opinion  of,  21; 
contempt  for,  127;  his  own  mas- 
ter, 75;  humanization  of,  142; 
personality  of,  27. 

Marot,  84-85. 

Marriage,  a  poet's  objection  to, 
132;  an  abomination,  104;  N.'s 
view  of,  53-54. 

Masses,  are  pragmatists,  3;  dis- 
tinction for,  30;  enslaved  by 
overman,  68. 


147 


INDEX 


Mathematics,  21  f. 

Measure  of  truth,  24. 

Mencken,  Henry  L.,  114. 

Mephistopheles,  71,  129. 

Messiah,  overman  the,  16. 

Meyen,  84. 

Meyer,  a  fellow  student,    11-13. 

Mill,  John  Stuart,  21. 

Moore,  George,  and  N.  compared, 
103-104;  Confessions  of  a  Young 
Man,  103. 

"Moral  ist  Nothluge,"  65. 

Morality,  denial  of,  122-123;  im- 
moral, 31;  limited  to  medioc- 
rity, 124. 

See   also  s.   v.   "Ethics." 

Morgenrotht,  64. 

Mozart,  2. 

Mueller,  Adolph,   114. 

Mfiller,  Dr.  Arthur,  84. 

Miigge,  M.  A.,  114. 

Mussak,  84. 

Mythology  not  an  error,   142. 

Napoleon,  40,  43,  45f,  66,  77,  107, 
120. 

Nature,  uniformities  of,  22. 

Negation,  of  will,  67,  68;  spirit  of, 
129. 

Negative,  commandments,  124. 

Neighbor,  love  not,  S3. 

Nietzsche,  a  model  of  virtue,  61 ; 
a  modern,  6;  a  mystic,  19;  ab- 
normal, not  a  genius,  7;  ances- 
tors of,  29;  and  George  Moore 
compared,  101-104;  and  Stirner 
compared,  76-78,  98,  128;  con- 
firmation of,  11;  consistency  of, 
30;  contrast  between  life  and 
theory,  60,  64,  108;  destroyer 
of  morality,  SO;  his  doctrine  of 
self,  8;  immaturity  of,  39;  in- 
sanity of,  not  an  accident,  7; 


nominalistic  tendencies  of,  22; 
philosophy  of,  agreement  with, 
5;  philosophy  of,  result  of  nom- 
inalism, 25;  religious  character 
of,  19;  requiem  composed  by, 
14;  subjectivity  of,  23;  success 
of,  136-137;  tender-hearted,  64, 
65. 

Nihilism,  28,  43,  61. 

Nomina,  26. 

Nominalism,  and  realism,  25;  of 
J.ombroso,  6;  traditions  of,  139. 

Normal  man  the  exception,  7. 

Nothingness,  trust  in,  79,  95. 

Nurse,  N.  as  a,  63. 

Obedience,  61. 

Objectivism,  subjective,  125. 

Objectivity  of  truth,  2. 

Ocean,  overman  the,  49. 

Ohne  Stoat,  112. 

Open  Court,  The,  40. 

Orage,  A.  R.,  114. 

Order,  20,  21;   cosmic,  22,   136. 

Originality,  102;  ambition  for,  34; 

hankering  after,  71. 
Overman,  8,   16,   19,  32,  40ff,  49, 

68,   73,   98,    110,    122,    130,    136, 

142;   love  of,   53;   the  true,   27, 

34. 

Particularism,  28. 

Patriotism,  62. 

Personality  of  man,  27. 

Pessimism,  64,  67,   103. 

Philologist,  N.  a,  56,  65. 

Philosophy  as  a  science,  4;  con- 
tempt for,  67;  three  features 
of,  1. 

Pig,  usefulness  of,  105. 

Plato,  17;  accused  of  hypocrisy, 
19;  ideal  of,  97;  ideas  of,  25. 

Platonism,  16. 


148 


INDEX 


Pleasure  and  pain,  68. 

Poet,  God  the  lie  of,  123. 

Poet,  N.  a,  100,  137;  N.  not  really 
a,  72. 

Positive  ideals  needed,  124. 

Positivism,  18,  28. 

Power,  acquisition  of,  117,  122; 
desire  for,  42,  60,  66,  69,  99, 
107;  God  is,  136;  hypocrisy  to 
obtain,  108;  will  for,  35-37. 

Pragmatism,  4. 

Pragmatists,  masses  are,  3. 

Pride,  SI,  60,  71. 

Probability  but  no  truth,  23. 

Progress,  evolution  is,  26;  in  epi- 
cycles, 2;  in  the  world,  79. 

Protest,  against  himself,  60ff; 
against  truth,  129;  philosopher 
of,  109;  philosophy  of,  29. 

Proudhon,  76. 

Quarrels  at  school,  12. 

Real  world,  18-20,  23,  125. 

Realism  and  nominalism,  25. 

Reason,  a  blunder,  141;  key  to  the 
universe,  22  ;•  origin  of,  27;  sub- 
jective, 21;  tool  of  body,  52; 
universality  of,  25. 

Redbeard,  Ragnar,  Might  is  Right, 
114. 

Relativity,    24. 

Religion,  hatred  of,  19. 

Revaluation  of  values,   118. 

Richard  III,  107. 

Right  but  might,  no,  30,  93,  115. 

Rules  of  N.'s  philosophical  war- 
fare, 69. 

Salome,  Lou  Andreas,  110. 
Sandwich,  anecdote,  10. 
Schellwien,  R.r  74,  110. 
Schiller,  2. 
Schlegel,  2. 


Schmidt,    Albert    Christian    Hein- 

rich,  82. 
Schmidt,     Johann     Caspar.       See 

Stirner,  Max. 

Schmitt,  Eugen  Heinrich,  110,  112. 
Schopenhauer,  6,  7,  27,  30,  54,  67. 

103. 

Schiilpforta,  62;  a  pupil  at,   10. 
Schumm,  George  and  Mrs.  Emma 

H.,  74. 
Science,  a  blunder,  142;  a  means, 

5;    a   mental    construction,    139; 

a  pretender,   138;   despised,   55; 

for  its  own  sake,  36;  triumph  of, 

143;     unavailableness     of,     130; 

world  of,  18-20. 
Sciences  of  form,  the,  26. 
Scientist,  standard  of,  119. 
Sebastopol,  fall  of,  29. 
Self,   an   authority   above,   127;   is 

body,  52;  sovereignty  of,  8,  31, 

33,  91ff,  137;  truth  creature  of, 

54. 
Self-assertion,    right    of,    24;    the 

ethics  of  the  strong,  31. 
Serpent,  70;  eagle  and,  50-51,  78. 
Slavism,  29. 

Smith,  William  Benjamin,  59. 
Snuffing  brotherhood,  11. 
Socialism,  96. 

Society,  95;  man  a  part  of,  101. 
Socrates,  105. 
Soldier,  N.  as  a,  61. 
Sophists,  5. 

Spectacles  not  the  world,  5. 
Spirit,  blood  is,  51;  Stirner  on,  92. 
Spoiled  child,  60. 
Standard,   of  measurement,    7;   of 

valuation,    118,    124;    of    value* 

needed,   23. 
State,  a  despotism,  93;  growth  of, 

95. 

Steiner,   Rudolph,   110. 
Sticht,  Johann  Caspar,  83. 


149 


INDEX 


Stimmungsbild,  4. 

Stirner,  Max,  and  Nietzsche  com- 
pared, 76-78,  98,  128;  arguments 
of,  921  f;  consistent,  99;  con- 
trast between  life  and  theory, 
97;  death  of.  88,  97;  Der  Ein- 
Mige  ttnd  sein  Eigentum,  74,  80, 
89,  95;  description  of,  81;  life 
of,  82ff;  marriage  of,  84 f;  pen- 
cil sketch  of,  83;  the  name,  83; 
works  of,  89. 

Straus,  Richard,  59. 

Subjective  standard,  123. 

Subjectivism,  3. 

Subjectivity  of  N.,  23. 

Superman,  41. 

Superpersonal  God,   143. 

Superpersonalities,  99. 

Swartz,  Clarence  L.,  115. 

Switzerland,  a  citizen  of,  63. 

Things  in  themselves,  26. 

Three,   features  of  philosophy,   1; 

periods  in  N.'s  development,  67; 

rules    of    philosophical    warfare, 

69. 
Thus  Spake  Zarathustra,  41,  48ff, 

58,  70,  78. 
Tieck,  2. 

Tille,  Alexander,  41,  110. 
Tolstoy,  111. 
Tradition    defied,    5;    opposed    to, 

76;  sanction  of,  122;  sanction  of 

denied,  137. 

Tragic,  element,  66;  figure,  71. 
Transvaluation  of  values,  31,   124. 
True  world,  17-19,  43,  61. 
Truth,   as   authority,   29;   creature 

of  self,   54;   denned,   36;   exist- 


ence of,  29-30;  flashes  of,  130; 
for  the  sake  of  life,  37;  need 
of,  1;  non-existent,  17;  objectiv- 
ity of,  2;  probability  but  no,  23; 
protests  against,  129. 

Tucker,   Benjamin   R.,   74. 

Twilight  of  the  Idols,  17,  70. 

Tyrant,  morality  a,  131;  N.  loves 
a,  78;  overman  a,  16,  28,  44. 

Ulfila's  bible,  62. 

Uniformities    dominate    existence, 

22. 

Universality  of  reason,  25. 
Universe  a  chaos,  20. 
Unmoralist,  68;  development  into, 

67;  the  first,  9,  44,  64. 
Unmoralism,  30. 
Unmorality,  27. 
UnteitgemSsse  Betrachtungen,   70. 

Valuation,  principle  of,  117ff. 
Vedantism  interpreted  by  a  mate- 
rialist, 52. 
Virtue,  a  model  of,  61. 

Wagner.  2,  67. 

Walker,    James,    L.,    74,    76;    The 

Philosophy  of  Egoism,  115. 
Warren,  Josiah,  76. 
Wenley,  R.  M.,  6. 
Whitman,  111. 
Will,     ennoblement     of,     15;     for 

power,  35-37;  intellect  slave  of,, 

7,  30;  negation  of,  67,  68. 
Woman,     54;     Stirner's     attitude 

toward,  78. 
World-conceptions  identical,  79. 

Zarathustra,    41,   48ff,    58,    70,    78. 


150 


A     000709279     4 


